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ABSTRACT

Final Call: Rank-and-File Rebellion in New York City, 1965-1975
by

Glenn Dyer

Advisor: Robert Johnson
Between 1965 and 1975, New York City’s workers fomented a powerful yet inchoate movement
that challenged the entrenched power of employers, union officials, and politicians. In the words
of Central Labor Council head Harry Van Arsdale Jr., “strike fever” gripped the city; workers
refused to follow their leaders, rejecting contracts, wildcatting, and organizing insurgent electoral
campaigns. While historians have explored the rebellion as a national phenomenon, New York
City’s wave of upheaval was a locally bound movement with its own unique dynamics, culture,
and timeline, both powerfully shaping and shaped by the local political and social environment.
Significantly, workers’ rebellious activity circulated across the city, overcoming barriers of race,
occupation, skill, and political persuasion. New insurgent energies—black militancy and youth
revolt—fed the rebellion, as did growing political polarization under Mayor John Lindsay. New
York’s workers wanted more than better contracts; they contested control of the work process,
racism on the job, the workers’ place in America’s socioeconomic hierarchy, and implicitly and
explicitly demanded greater democratic control of their representative organization and lives.
Some initial challenges were effective, delivering better contracts and unseating undemocratic
leaders, but employer recalcitrance and union attacks on militant workers proved too powerful.
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In the face of this resistance, workers retreated into a survivalist attitude of accommodation and
resignation, contributing to the decline of social democratic New York and working-class power
in the city.
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Introduction

On January 15, 1969, Harry Van Arsdale Jr. and Joseph Trerotola, two of New York’s
most powerful union leaders, met to discuss the central problem facing organized labor in the
city. As, respectively, presidents of the AFL-CIO’s Central Labor Council and the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Joint Council 16, Van Arsdale and Trerotola represented more than
one million union members who were increasingly afflicted with “strike fever.”1 For the previous
three years, in industries as varied as municipal transportation, electrical generation, and
telephone service, militant union members had gone on strike against the wishes of employers,
government officials, and union representatives. Fuel oil drivers, elevator repairmen, and
plumbers rejected contracts put to them by their union hierarchy. Telephone workers, United
Parcel Service drivers, and railway workers took part in myriad wildcat strikes that challenged
bureaucratic grievance and negotiation procedures. Some of the city’s famed labor leaders,
including Mike Quill of the Transport Workers Union (TWU) and John DeLury of the sanitation
workers, led strikes in order to appease restive ranks. While contemporary commentators
accused union members of striking only to extract more money, labor upheaval in both the
private and public sectors transcended bread and butter demands: it articulated a rising workingclass anger in an increasingly polarizing city.
Between 1965 and 1975, New York City’s workers fomented a powerful yet inchoate
movement that challenged the entrenched power of employers, labor leaders, and politicians.
Recent scholarship on the labor upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s has termed this era the “rank-
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“January 9, 1969 Meeting Minutes, Special Executive Board Meeting,” New York Central
Labor Council Records, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, box 117,
NYC CLC Executive Board Meeting Minutes folder.
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and-file rebellion: rank and file because of its animators; and rebellion because it gave an outlet
for anger about inflation, work conditions, unresponsive union leadership, and political
disempowerment.2 As suggested by Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner, and Cal Winslow’s Rebel
Rank and File: Labor Militancy and Revolt From Below during the Long 1970s, the American
working class was “on the warpath,” targeting union leadership just as much as company
management.3 By the 1960s, many American unions had completed the transition to stable
bureaucracies that acted as “junior partner[s] in the American enterprise,” becoming professional
outfits increasingly insulated from their members. In spite of New York labor leaders’ greater
social commitments, their organizations were often equally bureaucratized and non-democratic.4
Though recent scholarly works has broken important ground, thus far, historians have
neither sufficiently studied the rebellion in New York City—America’s largest industrial
center—nor have they explored the rebellion as a phenomenon rooted in place. Rendering
rebellion within single industries and workplaces uncovers complicated internal union politics

2

The term rank-and-file rebellion was not in contemporary use to describe the wave of strikes
and workers’ challenges, but many commentators referred to upheaval in unions as rebellions or
restive rank and filers as rebels, see “Rebellion on Contracts: Rank-and-File Refusal to Take
Union Leaders’ Advice is Becoming Chronic,” New York Times, December 2, 1968; “Rank and
File Rebellion Stirs in Mine Union, Posing Threat to Lewis Legacy,” New York Times, June 13,
1969; “Teamster Rebellion on Pay Threatens to Tie Up Jersey,” New York Times, April 21, 1970;
the earliest scholarly work to use the term to address the whole of the period is Aaron Brenner,
“Rank-and-File Rebellion, 1966-1975,” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1996), but the two
most significant recent contributions are Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner, and Cal Winslow eds.,
Rebel Rank and File: Labor Militancy and Revolt from Below During the Long 1970s (New
York: Verso, 2010) and Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the
Working Class (New York: New Press, 2010); important earlier works on the subject include,
Samuel R. Friedman, Teamster Rank and File: Power, Bureaucracy, and Rebellion at Work and
in a Union (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) and Dan La Botz, Rank-and-File
Rebellion: Teamsters for a Democratic Union (New York: Verso, 1990).
3
Robert Brenner, “The Political Economy of the Rank-and-File Rebellion,” in Rebel Rank and
File: Labor Militancy and Revolt from Below During the Long 1970s, eds. Aaron Brenner,
Robert Brenner, and Cal Winslow (New York: Verso, 2010), 71.
4
Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 29.
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and grievances, but these analytical limitations can sometimes fail to see the interconnection and
circulation of working-class organizing efforts—the movement-ness of the rebellion. A national
picture, while important for establishing a metrics for rebellion, can also obscure important local
contours and histories.
First and foremost, New York’s “social democratic polity” laid the foundation for the
rebellion by building a powerful class-consciousness among the city’s workers and generating
labor leadership uniquely committed to New Deal liberalism but still entrenched and insulated
from their members.5 Second, though they worked for different employers and toiled in very
different conditions, workers in New York City radicalized and emboldened one another. Labor
leaders and politicians feared this influence, and in 1970, when the city’s postal workers led an
illegal strike that grew into a nationwide walkout, one of the strikers argued, “Everybody else
strikes and gets a big pay increase…The teachers, sanitationmen and transit workers all struck in
violation of the law and got big increases. Why shouldn’t we?”6 Though the upheaval took place
nationwide, New York’s workers looked primarily to each other for inspiration and motivation
throughout the rebellion. Recognizing the rebellion’s resonance within the city allows us to
better understand its interconnections and developments. Third, the city’s growing political
polarization under Mayor John Lindsay powerfully shaped the city’s strike wave, spurring deep
resentment among the city’s white workers. While many scholars have characterized white
workers in the 1960s as conservative or rightward bound, the story was more complicated. Many

5

Joshua Freeman calls postwar New York a social democratic polity because the joint struggle
of unions, political parties, and working class New Yorkers generated a municipality that was
uniquely committed to social democratic provisions such as public housing, healthcare,
education, as well as high rates of unionization, see Working-Class New York: Life and Labor
Since World War II (New York: The New Press, 2001), 55-71.
6
“Letter Carriers Defy Injunction Ordering Them Back to Work,” New York Times, March 19,
1970.
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found themselves facing off with Mayor Lindsay and a growing rights-based liberalism that
rejected their material interests, reissuing those claims as racist power brokering. For some union
members in the city, their strikes and mobilizations became a way to challenge the mayor and
express a broader anger. This polarization would eventually help undermine the movement,
undoing the social democratic polity and miring workers in harmful conflicts. Finally, strikes in
New York City followed a different timeline than in the rest of the country, growing significantly
in the middle of the 1960s but declining rapidly after 1971. While New York’s strike wave
mostly collapsed in the first years of the 1970s, minus a short-lived revival during the city’s 1975
fiscal crisis, rank-and-file rebellion nationally continued with several important wildcat and
reform movements taking hold. Rather than a tale of working class heroics and long-term
victories, New York’s rank-and-file rebellion is characterized heavily by defeat.7
My work contributes to the history of class in New York City, providing important new
insights into its contours and cleavages in the postwar era. New York has been the subject of
some of the most sustained and exciting studies of class, and the last 15 years has seen incredible
additions to the literature. Whether Sven Beckert’s Monied Metropolis: New York City and the

7

For the strike wave locally and nationally see, U.S. Department of Labor, Analysis of Work
Stoppages, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1972), 41; Analysis of Work
Stoppages, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1973), 51; Analysis of Work
Stoppages, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1974), 55; Analysis of Work
Stoppages, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1975), 46; for a look at some of
the continuing rank-and-file activity at the national level see, William Cleaver, “Wildcats in the
Appalachian Coal Fields,” in Midnight Oil: Work, Energy, War, 1973-1992 ed. Midnight Notes
Collective (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1992), 169-184; Dan La Botz, Rank-and-File Rebellion:
Teamsters for a Democratic Union (New York: Verso, 1991); Marjorie Murphy, “Militancy in
Many Forms: Teachers Strikes and Urban Insurrection,” in Rebel Rank and File: Labor
Militancy and Revolt From Below During the Long 1970s ed. Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner,
and Cal Winslow (New York: Verso, 2010), 229-248; the most relevant examinations of New
York’s rank-and-file rebellion include, Aaron Brenner, “Rank-and-File Struggles at the
Telephone Company,” in Rebel Rank and File: Labor Militancy and Revolt from Below During
the Long 1970, eds. Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner, and Cal Winslow (New York: Verso, 2010).
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Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896, which recounts the manner in which
New York’s elites composed themselves as a class through a growing political, social, and
cultural unity, or Joshua Freeman’s Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War
II, which demonstrates the fundamental role of working-class agency in shaping the city, our
understanding of class in New York has expanded immensely. Each of these works present class
not as a transcendent category but rather as a political formation that is articulated, deployed,
contested, and redefined within the ever-shifting field of forces in the city and the nation. My
research enriches this scholarship by uncovering unexamined, yet influential, opposition groups,
including the black-led Rank and File Committee for a Democratic Union in the TWU that
helped spark the 1966 transit strike. This work also explores struggles within unions that have
received relatively little scholarly attention, such as Teamsters Local 553 and Plumbers Local 2.
Additionally, I uncover the rank-and-file against union leaders and the business elite during the
city’s 1975 fiscal crisis. Significantly, my research suggests that rank-and-file struggles—not
simply labor writ large—played a key role in shaping New York City’s political transformation
and the decline of the city’s social democracy.8
In addition to literature on class, my work deepens our understanding of the political
shifts of the 1960s and 1970s. The myriad studies on the rise of conservatism, whether grassroots
8

For the best examinations of class in 19th century New York, see Sean Wilentz, Chants
Democratics: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1984) & Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City
and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); also see Richard B. Stott, Workers in the Metropolis: Class, Ethnicity,
and Youth in Antebellum New York City (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); for the
best examination of class in postwar New York, see Freeman, Working-Class New York; Kathy
Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is also an excellent look at class and gender in the
early part of the 20th century; on the rise of a managerial middle class professional culture, see
Keith D. Revell, Building Gotham: Civic Culture and Public Policy in New York City, 18981938 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
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histories such as Lisa McGirr’s Suburban Warriors: The Origin of the New American Right or
examinations of the shaping of political discourse such as Rick Perlstein’s Before the Storm:
Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus, have opened wide the general
narrative of the 1960s. Like many works before them, they operate within the period’s strongest
organizing rubric, the decline of New Deal liberalism. Matthew Lassiter’s work on the rise of
new political constituencies in the South as well as Michael Flamm’s study of law and order and
its role in undermining liberalism have extended this work significantly. Following this
expansion, several newer studies have outlined the continuation and transformation of social
movements that emerged in the 1960s into the 1970s, including conservatism, liberation
movements, and ecology. Through these scholarly works, the narrative of a radical 1960s and a
conservative 1970s has been cast aside for a much more nuanced tale, forging an open space in
which scholarly reevaluation of movements, events, and personalities can take place. 9

9

For exemplary literature on the Right and reaction, see Dan T. Carter, Politics of Rage: George
Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000); Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order:
Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: the Origins of the New American
Right (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm:
Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Nation
Books, 2001); Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar
Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); on periodization, see Bruce Schulman,
The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Free
Press, 2001) & Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, XXIII; finally, Lizabeth Cohen’s Consumer’s Republic: the
Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America stands out as one of the strongest attempts to
reorient the story of the 1960s by grounding the northern Civil Rights Movement’s language and
actions within the discursive field of the emerging consumption based national politics. For a
recent examinations of 1970s Left politics, see Dan Berger, The Hidden 1970s: Histories of
Radicalism (Rutgers, N.J.: Rutgers University, 2010), and for a slightly older study that does
well to include movements and grassroots politics of the Left and Right in the 1960s, see
Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999).

7
My research argues that workers in New York City during the 1960s and 1970s were not
reducible to a simple left-right polarity. Rather, they took part in diverse and sometimes
contradictory activities: seeing a fleeting hope or protest vote possibilities in George Wallace’s
racist populism, explicitly and implicitly demanding greater control of their working lives,
challenging their subordinate status within America’s socioeconomic hierarchy. While some
workers certainly turned rightward, it was not always the case that workers “vot[ed] against their
material interests;”10 Mayor Lindsay continually pitted workers’ interests against those of the
city’s growing black and Puerto Rican poor, causing damaging cleavages in the city’s social
democratic polity. Moreover, the turn away from expansive social concerns was not always a
result of turning rightward. I argue that the defeat of the city’s rank-and-file rebellion led to new
working-class norms in the 1970s, in which workers turned inwards and embraced survivalism in
the face of intractable elites and a worsening economy.
Sourcing the study of New York’s rank-and-file rebellion requires the use of a wide range
of primary materials. The records of New York City unions and labor organizations provided the

10

For local AFL-CIO discussion of the “Wallace Effect,” see “Special Meeting,” October 10,
1968, New York Central Labor Council Records, The Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner
Labor Archives, box 10, Exec Bd Meetings Minutes 1967-1969 folder; for Lindsay on rank-andfile led strikes’ negative effects on the city’s poor, “Confidential Memo from Harry W. Albright
Jr. to Nelson Rockefeller,” Undated, Nelson A. Rockefeller Gubernatorial Records, The
Rockefeller Archive Center, box 90, New York City Sanitation Strike, Key Events folder; for
Lindsay, race and labor, see Joshua Freeman, “Lindsay and Labor,” in America’s Mayor: John
V. Lindsay and the Reinvention of New York, ed. Sam Roberts (New York: Museum of the City
of New York & Columbia University Press, 2010); while recent studies have suggested
longstanding tendencies towards anticommunism as well as a long-term rise in conservatism,
New York City’s workers helped build a broad-based social democratic experiment in the two
decades prior to the rank-and-file rebellion, and Kenneth D. Durr describes a similar disjunction
between liberalism and working-class interest in Baltimore, in Behind the Backlash: White
Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2003); quote from Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2004), 4; see also Jefferson Cowie, “From Hard Hats to NASCAR
Dads,” New Labor Forum (Fall 2004): 9–17.
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richest documentation of the era’s struggles. Important collections include those of the Building
and Construction Trades Council, the AFL-CIO Central Labor Council, the Communications
Workers of America, District Council 37, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local
3, the New York Metro Area Postal Union, the Social Service Employees Union, TWU Local
100, and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). Each of these collections contain important
meeting minutes that discuss internal upheaval, correspondence from angry members, voting
records of insurgent campaigns, as well as flyers and leaflets from opposition groups. While the
bulk of the above union collections are held at the Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner
Labor Archives, the institution also has important serials and rank-and-file collections including
those of the Bell Workers Action Committee, Harlem Fight Back, United Action, Taxi Rank and
File Coalition, Transit Rank and File News, and the Anne Filardo Papers on Rank and File
Activism within the UFT. The James Haughton Papers at the New York Public Library’s
Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture give insight into the significant impact of the
Harlem Riots on black, labor militants and their attempts to build the activity of rank-and-file
organization within the TWU and in the country as a whole. The New York Municipal Archives
have myriad Lindsay and Beame-era holdings that document labor unrest during the 1960s and
1970s, whether in the form of notes on mediation proceedings, strike case files, or reports on
work stoppages in key economic sectors. Complementing municipal records are the John
Lindsay papers at Yale University Archives, which contain daily crisis calendars, negotiation
notes, internal communication, strike response plans, and copies of workers’ publications
produced by municipal employees. Finally, I consulted several other collections including the
Jack Bigel Collection at Barcuh College, which contain material relevant to the New York City
fiscal crisis; the archives of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Union, which contain not

9
only important documents from the electricians’ union but also the Taxi Drivers Union; the
Nelson A. Rockefeller gubernatorial papers at the Rockefeller Archive Center; and the Theodore
Kheel Arbitration Awards and E. Whtie Bakke Papers at the Kheel Center for LaborManagement Documentation and Archives at Cornell University, both of which give some
insight into workers’ informal resistance practices.
While some rank-and-file organizations are well represented in archival collections,
recovering some workers’ voices requires greater creativity. Oral history has been invaluable to
reconstructing internal upheaval within several unions, and especially so with unions whose
archives are either not made accessible to researchers or have not survived. During my research,
I conducted several interviews with former members of Local 2 plumbers’ union, CWA Local
100, and Teamsters Local 553 fuel oil drivers, each of whom gave first-hand accounts of
working conditions, internal union politics, and rank-and-file attitudes and concerns during the
period. Contemporary print media including the New York Times, Daily News, Post, and El
Diario provide extensive accounts of strikes, but more importantly, they contain interviews with
workers and photographs of picket lines, which help recover workers’ sentiments in the period.
Important holdings at the Tamiment include the extensive New Yorkers at Work Oral History
collection and the copious Taxi Rank and File Coalition Oral History collection also extend our
understanding of the predominant attitudes, concerns, and desires of the city’s rank and file and
prominent labor activists. Without oral history, an investigation into the era’s upheaval would be
woefully incomplete because in many cases, archival sources from unions and rank-and-file
organizations are incomplete, edited, or completely unavailable to researchers. For example, fuel
oil rank-and-file publications are not available and the union’s records are not open to the public.
I was also unable to access the Uniformed Sanitationmen’s Association archives, nor was I able
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to find any rank-and-file produced leaflets or publications. In some cases, the lack of sources has
made the story more difficult to reconstruct, but I have done my best to use oral history and nonunion archives to make up for the occasional dearth of union sources.
My study is organized chronologically, beginning with the rebellion’s essential
foundations, explaining its high points and key contours, and finally exploring its decline and
defeat. Chapter one investigates rank-and-file upheaval within the TWU and the United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry (UA),
Local 2 between 1964 and 1967. Black workers influenced by the Civil Rights movement and
the 1964 Harlem riot were a growing minority within the TWU, and the black-led Rank and File
Committee for a Democratic Union emerged in 1965, pushing for greater contract demands and
running an opposition bid to take the reins of the union. While other works have argued for a
diffuse sentiment leading Quill to strike, I argue that the Rank and File Committee helped push
TWU president Quill to the 1966 subway strike and in turn sparked a broader wave of militancy
in the city. Though historians have given more attention to the transit strike, the plumbers of
Local 2 also struggled with their leaders in the mid-1960s, and their corrupt leader Jack Cohen
led a strike to attenuate growing anger in the union. Cohen miscalculated however, and his
inability to deliver on the much-coveted hiring hall—that would allow the union to allocate
work—led to he and his cronies’ ejection from office. The strike continued for several months,
and was only ended when the UA International threatened to put the local union into trusteeship
and force the plumbers back to work. While popular imagery primarily portrays buildings trades
workers as bigoted and pro-Vietnam War, some of them took part in important challenges to
their labor leaders and some of the city’s biggest businesses. This tale of internal upheaval helps

11
reexamine the militancy of such workers as well as their role in the city’s wider labor
movement.11
The second and third chapters try to capture the breadth of the rebellion, delving into its
myriad manifestations between 1967 and 1972. The first half of chapter two explores rank and
filers’ use of wildcat strikes, absenteeism, and contract rejections to exercise greater control over
their working lives, and it also explains the growing alienation and anger that beset many
workers. Unexpected sources of militancy including rising crime and job safety sparked rebellion
in the ranks of some unions, as did a broader discontent with the workers’ place in America’s
socioeconomic hierarchy. The second half of the chapter explains how such anger fed into the
rank-and-file 1968 sanitation strike and how it developed into fleeting support for George
Wallace’s 1968 presidential run, in which the southern segregationist openly appealed to New
York’s rank and filers with populist rhetoric and public events prominently featuring union
leaders. Chapter three investigates distinct moments of rebellion, including the contract
rejections of Teamsters Local 553, the continued and ultimately failing efforts of the TWU Rank
and File Committee, and a gathering of radical rank and filers in New York City, none of which
have received much mention in labor histories of postwar New York. The chapter concludes with
an examination of the more prominent 1970 postal wildcat strike and the 1970 Hard Hat riots.
These five vignettes help elucidate the limitations workers confronted during the rebellion
including union leaders, recalcitrant employers, internal divisions, and their own attitudes toward

11

For the most substantial examination of the 1966 transit strike, see Michael Marmo, More
Profile Than Courage: The New York City Transit Strike 1966 (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1990); for the complicated political legacy of the hard hats, see Joshua Freeman,
“Hardhats: Construction Workers, Manliness, and the 1970 Pro-War Demonstrations,” Journal
of Social History vol. 26, No. 4 (Summer 1993); Derek Nystrom, Hard Hats, Rednecks, and
Macho Men: Class in 1970s American Cinema (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009);
Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 136-137.
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the workplace and workplace struggle. Within these limitations and early defeats, the legacy of
defeat, frustration, and withdrawal begins to take shape.12
The final two chapters explore the decline of the rank-and-file rebellion amidst largescale public defeats, growing political polarization, and elite resistance. Chapter four focuses on
two distinct rank-and-file movements—the militant CWA Local 1101 telephone workers and the
newly unionized yellow cab drivers. In the telephone industry, the principled unionism of older
workers combined with the restiveness of the young, generating one of the city’s most militant
rank and files, which took part in myriad wildcat strikes and acts of sabotage. In 1971, however,
Local 1101 rejected a contract put to them not only by their local but international leadership,
leading their own strike against the powerful New York Telephone (NYT). After seven months,
NYT defeated the union, firing militant workers, and the CWA International split up the
insurgent local. In the words of one rank and filer, “The era was lost”; defeat and demoralization
set in just as the local and national economic picture began to seriously deteriorate.13 The taxi
drivers took part in an inchoate fight against their union leaders. Internal divisions made workers
fight with one another, but they also fought against the growing livery cab industry, which both
the union leadership and some rank and filers associated with growing crime and permissiveness
in the city. A leftwing rank-and-file organization emerged from this maelstrom, putting forward
a significant, albeit short-lived challenge. Amidst the division and polarization, taxi rank and
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For the sanitation strike and New York City politics, see Vincent J. Cannato, The
Ungovernable City: John Lindsay and His Struggle to Save New York (New York: Basic Books,
2001), 196-204; the best work on Wallace’s appeal is Carter, The Politics of Rage; for the postal
strike, see Aaron Brenner, “Striking against the State: The Postal Wildcat of 1970,” Labor’s
Heritage, 7 (Spring 1996), 4-27 and Philip F. Rubio, There’s Always Work at the Post Office:
African American Postal Workers and the Fight for Jobs, Justice, and Equality (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 233-274.
13
Jim McMahon, interview with author, New York, January 10, 2017; Rocky Maio, interview
with author, New York, January 11, 2017.
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filers were unable to make serious progress and saw their efforts defeated by union leaders or
their anger channeled into a racist battle against the livery industry. The fifth, and final, chapter
explores the brief revival of rank-and-file rebellion amidst the business elite’s attempts to impose
fiscal austerity on New York City. Militant social workers, sanitationmen, police officers, and
teachers led mobilizations and strikes, challenging the causes and meaning of the city’s
budgetary shortfalls. Worker activism against fiscal austerity lends support to the left
historiography on the 1975 fiscal crisis, as workers rejected elite narratives that put the blame on
municipal workers, racial minorities, and social democratic provisions like the welfare and city
university system. Resistance to the business elite’s agenda ultimately failed however, and New
York’s workers, both as union members and community members, bore the brunt of budget cuts,
declining services, and a broken social fabric.14
While the defeat of New York’s rank-and-file rebellion occurred in the early 1970s, its
legacy retains relevance to national politics and the lives of working class people today. My
conclusion discusses this persistent importance, in particular how defeat led to new workingclass norms that focused on individual survival and self-preservation in the face of a
deteriorating local economic reality. Many authors have discussed the turn away from liberalism
in the 1960s as a turn rightward, but I contend that the turn away from such expansive social
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values was also a result of working class defeat and withdrawal. Furthermore, the short-lived
support for Wallace in 1968 presaged the swing constituencies that dominate many elections
today. Nowhere has this been more relevant than in the 2016 presidential election, which saw
Donald Trump, like Wallace before him, employ populist, anti-liberal rhetoric to tap into white,
working-class Americans’ growing resentment. Though his Democratic opponent, Hillary
Clinton, tried to build on the legacies of both Barack Obama and Bill Clinton, she powerfully
echoed Mayor Lindsay when she denounced many of Trump’s supporters as racist and sexist
cretins. While these political dynamics remain incredibly relevant, so do the impasses of the
rank-and-file rebellion. Notably the upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s was the last strike wave in
American history, and in an age of increasing wealth inequality and virulent polarization,
working-class people’s lives and aspirations remain stunted, much like those of their forebears.15
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Chapter One: Rank-and-File Strikes in Transit and Plumbing

On New Year’s Day 1966, tens of thousands Transport Workers Union (TWU) Local 100
members walked off the job for pay raises and better health and welfare benefits, shutting down
the city’s subway and bus services for 12 days. While newly-elected Mayor John Lindsay
declared that he still thought it was a “fun city,” several union leaders found themselves jailed
for violating a state law that barred municipal unions from striking.1 Later that same year, the
normally cacophonous construction sites that exemplified the city’s postwar building boom
would fall silent. The 4,000 plumbers of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices
of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry (UA) Local 2 struck their employers in hopes of
gaining greater control over work allocation.
In 1965 and 1966, unrest within the ranks threatened Michael Quill and the rest of the
TWU leadership. Older workers called Quill a fraud, arguing that in spite of his militant
posturing, contracts he negotiated were always inadequate. Some of them were skilled tradesmen
who saw themselves falling behind skilled workers in the private sector while others were longterm employees who felt they were barely keeping up with inflation. Meanwhile, the union’s
growing number of black members became increasingly emboldened due to the era’s civil rights
struggles and experiences with racial discrimination on the job. While historians have pointed
out some of the rank-and-file influence in the 1966 strike, they have primarily attributed it to
amorphous sentiment. I argue, however, that the Rank and File Committee for a Democratic
Union, a growing black-led opposition group, played a key role in challenging the TWU
leadership in the run-up to the strike. In the aftermath of the Harlem Riot of 1964, motorman and
1
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activist Joseph Carnegie began to agitate within the ranks of the TWU, and in concert with older,
white, leftwing activists, he established the Rank and File Committee, running an electoral slate
to challenge Quill during the TWU’s 1965 contract negotiations. Though unsuccessful at gaining
electoral power, the Committee’s pickets, interventions, and electoral bid helped push Quill to a
strike. With both widespread anger and an internal opposition group, Quill needed a large
settlement to appease his members, and he reluctantly led them off the job when negotiators for
the incoming Lindsay administration failed to meet his demands.2
Though historians have given it little attention, the 1966-1967 UA Local 2 strike provides
another important window into rank-and-file challenges. The ruling faction of the union, the
Yellow Ticket colluded with management and failing in some ways to keep up with more
powerful buildings trades unions. Unlike the more powerful Local 3 electricians union, plumbers
lacked a hiring hall, and contractors controlled work assignments. Cronyism and corruption
within the union worsened the distribution of the work. Plumbers increasingly supported an
opposition faction, the Blue Ticket. More pragmatist than politically minded, the Blue Ticket
gained some power prior to the 1966 strike when its leader Michael Pappalardo was elected
business agent. With a new round of elections set for December 1966, UA president Jack Cohen
gambled on a strike to win the long sought after hiring hall, hoping to shore up support against
the Blue Ticker. For five months, plumbers in Manhattan and the Bronx stayed off the job,
paralyzing billions of dollars of construction in the world’s most lucrative real estate market.
Buoyed by the region’s economic strength, many plumbers found intermittent work out of state,
and with the help of this backup work, rejected contract after contract. In December elections,
2
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they would fully repudiate the Yellow Ticket’s control, voting in the Blue Ticket and a new
union head, Pappalardo. With many plumbers working out of state and in it for the long haul, the
UA International leadership negotiated a new deal with the plumbing contractors in early 1967,
ultimately forcing the plumbers of Local 2 to accept it under threat of trusteeship.3

“Quill deserves an Emmy”: Transit Rank and File and the 1966 TWU Strike

TWU Local 100, which still represents New York City’s bus and subway workers,
emerged from the massive CIO unionization drive of the 1930s. As in many other fights to build
industrial democracy, the TWU brought together workers of a variety of different skills—
maintenance men, guards, station agents, motormen, conductors, etc.—but in this case they also
brought together workers across the hundreds of miles of rails and roadways of North America’s
largest transit system. In its early days, the TWU was majority Irish-American, and its leaders up
until the 1960s reflected this ethnic composition.4 During the union’s first two decades, leader
Michael Quill advocated a style of unionism that helped foster the rise of “social democratic
3
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New York,” advocating increased wages and benefits for workers as well as the maintenance of a
low fare for the working people of the city.5 Furthermore, Quill and others in the TWU openly
advocated against racially discriminatory hiring practices while also pushing for both the city
and the state to assume a greater role in subsidizing the operations of mass transit. The union
weathered employer attacks when the industry was private, survived government attacks when
transit infrastructure was municipalized in the 1940s, and by the 1950s, the TWU’s position had
stabilized to the point that its representation of transit workers was no longer seriously contested
from without.6
In 1948, TWU International president Quill, with the help of Mayor William O’Dwyer,
purged Local 100 leader and avowed Communist Austin Hogan and several of his allies. Hogan
and his supporters had become a threat to Quill, and Hogan’s political ties were becoming a
liability in an increasingly anti-Communist political environment. In addition to these purges,
Quill and city administrations came to a broader ideological agreement, with Quill advocating
exclusive bargaining rights for the TWU on the basis that it would foster greater industrial
peace.7 Though Quill maintained an emphasis on some social goals, he reneged on others,
trading fare increases for wage gains that same year. Historian Mark H. Maier argues that this
decline in social commitment was also reflected in the TWU’s accession to declining service
quality. In his words, after the late 1940s, “the union never seriously linked the interests of
subway workers to those of subway riders.”8 With service decline came thousands of layoffs,
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which would become a sore point for some workers in subsequent years.9 In 1954, Quill acceded
to TA demands for the first day of sick leave to be unpaid, rolling back an earlier win. Later that
same year, members displayed their displeasure with his leadership when nearly a third of the
more than 40,000 transit workers stopped paying union dues.10
With the union facing diffuse opposition such as the refusal to pay dues, skilled workers
began to organize against the TWU leadership in the second half of the 1950s. The TWU’s
negotiation of across the board wage increases resulted in skilled workers’ wages not keeping
pace with the rest of the city’s craft workers. Dissatisfaction set in, and some skilled workers
hoped to use strikes to get better representation in the TWU while others hoped to completely
secede from the union.11 The motormen who drove the city’s subway trains became some of
Quill’s strongest opponents.
Between 1955 and 1958, motormen and mechanics organized several wildcat strikes that
tied up trains and buses across the city. In 1955, 150 motormen carried out a short walkout that
disrupted train traffic for several hours. In June 1956, 400 walked off the job when instructed to
train potential scabs.12 In December 1957, motormen led a walkout of many craft associations in
another failed attempt to push for recognition of their unions. In spite of their strikes, the
Motormen’s Benevolent Association and other independent craft organizations rapidly faded
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away when they failed to win union recognition elections in the late 1950s.13 Their efforts
however demonstrated the ability of a small numbers of well-placed rank and filers to disrupt the
subway system.
Alongside the efforts of skilled TWU members to establish their own craft representation
was the leftwing Rank and File Committee of the TWU. The Committee originally emerged as
an opposition group during the anti-communist purges of the late 1940s, running slates and
pushing for a more broadly militant position in contract negotiations. Its membership initially
grew because many leaders were older, respected union members, but under the constant attacks
of Quill and anti-communist city organizations, the Committee was bleeding members by the
mid-1950s.14 Though many of its leaders were skilled workers, the Rank and File Committee
was vehemently against the craft union drivers of the late 1950s, calling such attempts “a weapon
of the raiders and splinter groups who would smash our union.”15 Instead, it advocated for its
own broadly social view of transit that was not too far off from Quill and the TWU’s original
positions, including maintaining an industrial union, keeping the fare low, and upgrading and
adequately servicing the subway system. They opposed some of the TWU leadership’s 1950s
tradeoffs, such as the end of first day sick leave and layoffs. Another source of their discontent
was the TWU’s unwillingness to adequately defend its members from TA-issued workplace
violations, some of which were incurred in the process of maintaining the timely operation of
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route schedules.16 Additionally, the rank-and-file group, like most members of the TWU, was
very concerned by the rates of compensation. At the same time that the TWU’s skilled workers
were losing pace with the rising wages of other crafts, so too were its less skilled members not
keeping pace with newly unionized civil servants.17 While it would publicly criticize contracts,
the Rank and File Committee always supported the union and told other rank and filers to “stick
with the TWU,” eventually folding as an organized opposition group in the late 1950s after
members retired or found their efforts ineffectual.18
New discontent and worker self-organization began to emerge in the 1960s on account of
demographic shifts within the union. The TWU’s leadership and rank and file had been strongly
Irish American from the founding of the union, but the union was already 10 percent black
during the late 1930s.19 After 1945, however, with a growing influx of blacks and Latinos to the
city, the TWU’s membership became increasingly integrated. This was not a natural or inevitable
process, however, and several unions, especially those in the buildings trades, were racially
exclusionary. By contrast, the TWU leadership, and Quill in particular, supported efforts to
prevent racial discrimination in hiring and promotions. At the TWU’s 1961 national convention,
Martin Luther King Jr. went so far as to praise the TWU’s “crusading spirit which broke through
the open shop stronghold, also broke through the double walled citadels of race prejudice...” and
16
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continued, “It is pathetic that our nation did not begin decades ago, as did you, to deal with the
evil of discrimination.”20 While Quill supported anti-discrimination efforts, black rank-and-file
advocates in fact provided much of the impetus for improvements, as TWU leaders were
sometimes reluctant to make racial equality a key public issue for fear of fueling opposition
factions or management attacks that could divide the union.21
By the early 1960s, more than one third of the TWU’s membership was black, and in the
summer of 1962, the Amsterdam News gave public attention to black transit workers when it
published a four-part series, “The Transit Authority and Its 12,000 Negroes.” Reporter James
Booker found a high degree of racial segmentation in the workforce, with blacks more often
found in menial jobs and only a few in supervisory positions.22 Interviewees expressed a wide
array of complaints including abuse by white supervisors and preferential treatment of whites in
promotions.23 They also described mistreatment by the TA court, the employer’s main
disciplinary mechanism, arguing that blacks were punished much more severely than whites.24
Black rank and file organizers agreed with the Amsterdam News’ assessment, though they were
more interested in fighting on behalf of workers through the labor movement than promoting
blacks to management.25
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Early 1960s organizers included Frank Robinson, motorman Joseph Carnegie, James
Gordon of the 207 Street shop, private lines bus driver Kermit Saltus, and Abram Allick of the
track department.26 As these organizers described it, the failure of the early 1950s leftwing rankand-file group and the craft strikes and organizing of the later 1950s led to widespread
disillusionment among white and black transit workers. They hoped however to initiate a new
round of organizing in the early 1960s based on the growing numerical importance of blacks in
the TWU.27 In 1961 black rank and filers began organizing for greater black representation, with
15 signing a letter calling on the TWU leaders to appoint a black leader to the Local 100
executive board. Though their group was small, their fellow black workers supported their
efforts even though they remained reluctant to join in rank-and-file efforts.28 That same year,
these organizers also helped elect a handful of black delegates from Local 100 to attend the
TWU’s national convention, where they pushed for black representation in the International’s
hierarchy. Shortly thereafter, Quill appointed Roosevelt Watts to the International’s executive
board, and by the end of the year Watts was also appointed vice president of Local 100. Though

26

“15,000 Negro Transit Workers And the Fight For Trade Union Democracy Within the TWU,”
1964, James Haughton Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, The New York
Public Library, box 10, Rank And File Committee For A Democratic Union Within The New
York City Transit Authority folder, 11.
27
“15,000 Negro Transit Workers And the Fight For Trade Union Democracy Within the TWU,”
1964, James Haughton Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, The New York
Public Library, box 10, Rank And File Committee For A Democratic Union Within The New
York City Transit Authority folder, 1.
28
“15,000 Negro Transit Workers And the Fight For Trade Union Democracy Within the TWU,”
1964, James Haughton Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, The New York
Public Library, box 10, Rank And File Committee For A Democratic Union Within The New
York City Transit Authority folder, 4.

25
organizers like Carnegie, Gordon, and Robinson believed that Watts would be primarily loyal to
Quill, the speed at which the TWU leadership had acceded to their demands emboldened them.29
In 1962, Carnegie, Gordon, and Allick began participating in the Negro American Labor
Council’s (NALC) Greater New York organization, meeting other black organizers interested in
mobilizing black workers to win the struggle for civil rights and the advancement of working
class people as a whole.30 Some New York NALC members were already involved in an ongoing
battle with the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) over its organizing
practices and lack of black and Puerto Rican leadership, a campaign that resonated with TWU
rank-and-file organizers.31 While many NALC members focused primarily on organizing black
workers, Carnegie was more concerned about the direction of the labor movement, including its
decline in militancy, sellout contracts, internal corruption, and the acceptance of automation’s
job elimination. The Greater New York chapter’s willingness to speak out on such issues swiftly
created a backlash, and AFL-CIO leaders pressured A. Philip Randolph to denounce them.
29
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Through a combination of red baiting and deft maneuvering, black union officials loyal to
Randolph ousted many of the militants.32
Internal divisions also began to develop among black transit organizers. Carnegie and
Gordon wanted to avoid the creation of a formal organization. They feared mimicking the
ossification of the labor movement and had “no intention of becoming a stagnant docile, black
base for a few people to bargain with the TA and the union for jobs for themselves.”33 In spite of
such reservations, they helped found the Transit Fraternal Association (TFA) in the spring of
1963. In Carnegie’s estimation, organizers like Allick and Saltus began to move away from
engaging with their fellow rank and filers, rejecting mass agitation for dialogue with the
leaderships of the TWU and TA.34 Carnegie, who was the TFA’s coordinator, maintained a
strong emphasis on mass mobilization and rank-and-file engagement, hoping to spur greater
black involvement with the labor movement.35
The growing split among the earlier organizers was best exemplified later that spring
when Carnegie and allies in the NAACP Labor and Industry Committee pushed for a public
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protest against the arrest of thousands of young people during the southern Civil Rights
Movement’s Birmingham campaign. From May 2-3, thousands of children as young as six
marched in Birmingham as part of ongoing attempts to defeat segregation in the city, resulting in
more than 1,000 arrests and influential media coverage that included attacks with water cannons
and police dogs.36 That weekend, Carnegie contacted his allies in the NAACP including James
Haughton, head of the Labor and Industry Committee, and New York City NAACP President
Reverend Richard Hildebrand. Together they began organizing for an emergency demonstration,
with Hilderbrand contacting Randolph to obtain Harry Van Arsdale Jr.’s support and Carnegie
working with the TFA and transit rank and filers. Van Arsdale argued there was too little time to
convene the AFL-CIO’s Central Labor Council and provided little help, and Allick of the TFA
wavered on the use of the organization’s name to endorse the rally. Disgusted with the
vacillation, Carnegie organized leafleting independently, and in response the TWU released its
own leaflet supporting the Birmingham movement. Hundreds of blacks maintained a vigil at
New York’s City Hall for three nights, and on May 8, there was a rally of some 1,500 white and
black New Yorkers with speakers like Mayor Wagner, Roy Wilkins, and Hilderbrand.37
Divisions between Carnegie, Gordon, and the TFA became stronger during the summer
of 1963. The NAACP’s Labor and Industry Committee held a one-day conference on organizing
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in the city with caucuses from transit, textiles, and buildings trades taking part. There, Gordon,
Carnegie, and Allick drafted resolutions that their caucus would not only attack racism in the TA
but also call for the end of the semi-autonomous agency. The TFA initially printed 5,000 copies
to distribute to transit rank and filers, but Allick withheld the leaflets for several weeks for fear
of damaging the association’s standing with the TA. Signaling the TFA’s increasing emphasis on
negotiations over mobilization, Allick instead organized a private meeting with the TA and the
TWU’s Watts to discuss job discrimination.38 By the end of 1963, this early wave of
mobilization had resulted in some concessions, but rank-and-file organizers like Carnegie and
Gordon found the changes to be inadequate and not keeping with the broader goals of
empowering rank-and-file transit workers.
Roughly one year later, the riots in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant reinvigorated black
rank-and-file organizing in the TWU. In mid-July 1964, white police lieutenant Thomas Gilligan
shot and killed 15-year-old James Powell after Powell and several other youths were involved in
an altercation with a building superintendent on the city’s wealthy Upper East Side. Several days
of protests and rioting ensued, spreading to Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn and sparking a wave
of unrest that would hit several cities in the Northeast over the course of the summer.39 Carnegie
was convinced that the Harlem riots were a turning point in black struggle. In his mind, the socalled leadership, which claimed to speak on behalf of black people, was actually very far behind
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the common person who had rioted in defense of black rights. In fact, those leaders were now
playing a game of catch up. 40
While he was inspired by the riots, Carnegie believed that black communities needed
some kind of organized force to focus the militant activity and that the time had come to
establish independent, black-led organizations in both neighborhoods and workplaces. 41 In an
initial organizational effort, Carnegie leafleted three transit depots with flyers denouncing police
brutality and the lack of criminal charges for the officer involved. His efforts put him in touch
with many sympathetic black workers, but both TWU and TA officials warned him to stop
distributing the leaflets.42 Carnegie’s evolving perspective, and perhaps renewed faith in the
struggling masses, operated as a self-criticism of his past activities: he had agitated within the
union in recent years and only reluctantly organizing a fraternal association. In mid-September of
1964, Carnegie announced to the Labor and Industry Committee that he was laying the
groundwork for a transit rank-and-file organization that would build upon increasing black
militancy, long-term disappointment with the transit union, and impending contract negotiations
in 1965.43
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The Labor and Industry Committee’s chairman, James Haughton, bolstered Carnegie’s
new organizing activities. Born to working-class West Indian parents, Haughton attended City
College and then both Princeton and New York University for graduate school, working briefly
for Mobilization for Youth in the city’s Lower East Side. Significantly, Haughton was A. Philip
Randolph’s protégé and under his aegis formed the NALC.44 Haughton left the NALC when
rank-and-file organizers in New York were ejected, and in 1962 he took the reins of the
NAACP’s Labor and Industry Committee with NAACP head Reverend Hilderbrand’s
invitation.45 In 1964, while Carnegie was beginning to strategize for rank-and-file renewal
amongst transit workers, Haughton founded the Harlem Unemployment Center, an organizing
space that would seek to assail discriminatory hiring in the buildings trades and serve as a
meeting hall for rank-and-file groups attempting to undermine racism within unions.46
Carnegie’s Rank and File Committee would meet at the Harlem Unemployment Center
throughout its life, and this organizational tie would persist for years, shaping rank-and-file
efforts to come.47
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While the early months of the Rank and File Committee are not well documented, their
record becomes clearer in the second half of 1965 as they began to publicly challenge TWU
Local 100’s leadership over contract negotiations. In mid-June 1965, at the Enlarged Joint
Executive Board Meeting that brought together both TWU leaders and representatives from
various divisions, Committee members aired a long list of rank-and-file grievances, demanding
higher wages, a greater social commitment to service upgrades, and democratic unionism. Their
intervention led to a confrontation with TWU stewards, and after some pushing and shoving,
stewards ejected the Rank and File Committee members from the meeting.48 A few weeks after
this open confrontation with union leadership, the Committee organized a picket of TA offices in
downtown Brooklyn against subway entrance closures and an increased fare. Committee
members argued that better services and a low fare were in the interest of working New Yorkers
like themselves and that any subsequent fare increases would be blamed on transit workers who
were only trying to better their piteous lot.49 Inspired by the growing militancy of black
communities, the Committee resisted every effort to depoliticize negotiations, appealing to both
their fellow TWU members and the community at large.50
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The Committee’s emphasis on the politics of TA funding reflected the complicated nature
of transit negotiations. After municipalization, negotiations involved a web of actors and
institutions, including transit boards, the mayor, and his various representatives; even state
officials were dragged into the mess from time to time. One of the TA’s counter arguments to
aggressive TWU demands was that transit should be a self-sustaining institution.51 To the
Committee, the notion that the TA would ever be self-sustaining was absurd. Their leaflets
pointed out that money always came from the city and that most contract demands were met
through deals hammered out between the TA, the mayor, and the TWU leadership. Furthermore,
the city took over the industry because it lacked profitability, and the Committee believed that it
was absurd to insist on this standard now that it was under municipal control. In August 1965,
when the Committee organized another demonstration against declining services and the
possibility of an increased fare, they called upon mayoral candidates to take a position on
upcoming contract negotiations of the TWU. To reinforce the point, their August flyer concluded
with a powerful declaration: “[t]ransit is not self-sustaining now and it never will be.”52 By
insisting on this fact, they advocated an inherently political understanding of transit functions
and financing, linking their demands to a much broader environment of struggle across the city.
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Amidst the Committee’s weeks of agitation, the TWU first made its contract demands
public. In late July, much earlier than anticipated, the union called for a 30-cent wage increase,
increased holidays, and greater TA contributions to workers’ retirement packages. All told, this
deal would cost the TA nearly $100 million, whereas the final settlement from the down-to-thewire 1964 negotiations had totaled only $40 million.53 While the package was larger than the
previous contract agreement, which some workers had picketed, the Committee was unsatisfied,
continuing its efforts to push for an even more substantial contract. In August, the Committee
organized a picket of City Hall, claiming responsibility for the TWU’s early issuance of demands
and arguing, “the only reason our union has submitted demand to the Transit Authority so soon,
without the approval of the membership of the TWU, is because of their embarrassment by rankand-file members of the TWU.”54
The Committee continued its agitation at the TWU’s October constitutional convention.
Transit workers elected Pat DeVito as a delegate to the convention, and he used to opportunity to
speak out in support of more aggressive demands for the upcoming contract. While speaking out
for higher wages and a shorter workweek, Quill loyalists quickly roughed him up and shouted
him down. A week later, DeVito sent a letter of protest directly to Quill wherein he denounced
his silencing but still expressed hope that Quill himself would still be supportive of his
positions.55 He had some cause to believe in Quill: after months of the Committee’s agitation,
Quill used the convention as a platform for dramatically increasing TWU Local 100’s contract
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demands. Before delegates and elected officials of the entire union, Quill announced that in
addition to the previous $100 million package, he would now seek a 32-hour, 4-day workweek, a
30 percent pay increase, retirement after 25 years, and a no layoff clause.56
In October, the Rank and File Committee looked to intensify the internal pressure with an
electoral drive as the Carnegie-DeVito Rank and File Slate. Named for its presidential candidate
and Financial Secretary-Treasurer respectively, the Carnegie-DeVito slate was the only serious
competitor to the TWU leadership in 1965.57 Carnegie was a natural choice for president as he
was the chair of the Committee, a long-standing rank-and-file activist, and a vocal advocate for
black rights. Pat DeVito as the second in command was also a clear choice; he was a staunch
militant during the 1950s–one of the organizers of the original rank-and-file committee—and he
had maintained agitational activity into the early 1960s.58 Significantly, the slate featured another
black candidate, George Hayes, for the position of 3rd vice president.59
Electoral materials did not foreground racial matters as much as picketing leaflets did.
The Committee’s electoral platform called for wage parity with other city workers, a shorter
workweek, improved working conditions, a 25-year pension, elimination of the TA court, and an
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end to contract ratification by mail.60 While Carnegie’s earliest efforts involved consolidating
black support, the Committee was now vying for power in a general election in a majority-white
union. It is unsurprising then that its electoral materials appealed to the broadest cross section of
workers in the union.61 That being said, the slate’s promotion of two black candidates, one for
president and one for 3rd vice president, was a visible reminder of the Committee’s stance on
racial equality, and if the Committee won the election, it would be in a better position to push for
such anti-discrimination demands.62
Later that month, Local 100 president Gilmartin advocated a transformation of the
TWU’s electoral process: the mail ballot. While contract votes had often been conducted by
mail, elections were conducted via polling places spread throughout the city.63 Gilmartin publicly
advocated the mail ballot as a way to increase participation in elections, which in recent years
had seen a roughly two-thirds participation rate on the part of transit workers.64 While he did not
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mention the Committee in the meeting minutes, the mail ballot was also a method whereby the
union could privately conduct vote counts and more easily control electoral outcomes. The union
already used it for contract ratification, and the Committee advocated for its abolition.65 Though
the local’s top official proposed the change, several Executive Board members were wary of the
mail ballot, with one voting against it and five abstaining from the vote altogether. In spite of the
opposition, Gilmartin’s proposal won the day with the remaining 22 delegates voting in favor.66
In November the TWU directly attacked the Committee’s electoral efforts. Less than a
month prior to the election, the TWU disqualified Hayes on the grounds that he did not attend
sufficient union meetings. He disputed his disqualification as dubious, arguing that he tried to
attend meeting, but since they lacked a quorum his attendance was not counted. Unsympathetic
to Hayes’ pleas, the TWU leadership had his name was removed from the December 1965
ballot.67
The transformation of the voting structure, the shouting down of opponents, the dubious
disqualification of candidates, and the upward revising of its contract demands demonstrate that
the TWU bureaucracy was very concerned with Committee’s opposition. While it was doubtful
the new organization would sweep elections, Quill and Gilmartin took no chances with their
restive membership base, and their countermeasures are broadly indicative of the lengths union
leaders would go to in order to maintain their grip on power, damaging the democratic nature of
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their organizations and reinforcing their membership’s claims that entrenched leaders were selfperpetuating cliques.
When the 1965 TWU elections finally took place in mid-December, the Carnegie-DeVito
Rank and File Slate lost, but its electoral showing indicated sizeable discontent within the union
ranks. After the TWU tallied the new mail ballot votes, incumbent president Gilmartin received
12,183 votes to Carnegie’s 3,678.68 While nowhere close to unseating the leadership, it was the
best showing of any opposition candidate since the beginning of the decade. In 1961 an
opposition candidate garnered only 1,000 votes to Gilmatin’s more than 10,000, and in 1963 the
Gilmartin slate had run unopposed.69 In 1965, of the roughly 60 percent of the TWU workers
who voted via mail-in ballots, roughly one quarter voted for the Rank and File Committee’s
opposition slate for every position, and the Committee managed to win in the Surface
Maintenance Division.70 All told nearly 4,000 workers across a dozen divisions were willing to
vote for untested rank-and-file candidates amidst one of the union’s most contentious
negotiations. Though Carnegie believed they had no chance of winning, it did give the
Committee some basis to claim that it spoke on behalf of angry TWU members.71
While most workers voted for the incumbent leadership, Quill and Gilmartin now had to
deliver the demands promised as the October constitutional convention. Many TWU members
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were long dissatisfied with contracts, and as some saw it, the contracts that Quill called victories
were actually delivering weak wage gains and undermining the union. To these workers, Quill’s
negotiating style was only play-acting, and his self-proclamations as champion of the
workingman rang hollow.72 While anger at the disjunction between a fiery negotiating style and
actual delivery could perhaps be attributed to a few disillusioned men, Alan Lawrence of the
TWU’s public relations team confirmed that Quill’s “orchestration process” was meant to
convince rank and filers that each contract was the best that could be obtained.73 In the run up to
the 1966 strike, skilled workers complained that Quill’s tough talk far outweighed the actual
delivery of tangible gains at TWU meetings and publicly aired their grievances with the city’s
three major newspapers.74
The 1965-1966 negotiations began to break down in the late fall as the state, city, and the
TA all sought to avoid taking direct responsibility for meeting transit worker demands. Mayor
Wagner appealed to Governor Rockefeller for state assistance in meeting demands, but
Rockefeller also wanted no part. After failing to get outside support, the outgoing mayor foisted
negotiations on the incoming Lindsay.75 Lindsay, meanwhile, wanted little to do with the TWU,
which he believed to be an anti-reform power broker. During early negotiations, the mayor-elect
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publicly refused to even send a representative.76 Lindsay began secret negotiations in December,
but talks ultimately went nowhere. Though technically an autonomous entity, the TA hoped that
either the city or state would intervene on its behalf with new subsidies to meet TWU demands.77
Quill advocated that everyone from Robert Moses, Rockefeller, and Port Authority Director
Austin Tobin take part in negotiating a settlement. Lacking a significant counter proposal from
either Lindsay or the TA, Quill had little to offer his rank and file, and when the clock struck
midnight, on December 31, the TWU ordered its members to strike.78
When the strike began, the TWU directed motormen across the city to park the system’s
thousands of trains in their proper rail yards or in designated tunnels and stations to avoid the
possibility of a winter storm. As workers left the job, the TWU leadership quickly organized
picketing through 42 headquarters that registered thousands of members for four-hour stints.
Because of the transportation hardships caused by the strike itself, the TWU allowed workers to
choose their own sites.79 Most signed up to picket close to home where they walked orderly lines
carrying union-printed “No Contract No Work” signs.80
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During the strike, transit workers openly discussed rank-and-file anger with news outlets,
with many of them pointing to the fact that Quill had lost a large amount of support in the union
due to the brokering of weak deals. One worker argued that for his militant posturing, “Quill
deserves an emmy.” Another clearly laid out the leadership’s conundrum: “Quill couldn’t dare
come back with what was offered…[h]e wouldn’t have a union if he did.”81 Even though the
rank and file did not organize the strike, some believed that Quill had struck in spite of himself to
obtain a good contract.82
The strike resonated with many rank and file union members in the city. A week into the
transit shutdown, Local 3 electrician Charles Henricks took the opportunity to not only express
his support for Van Arsdale’s stance on the transit strike but also to express his displeasure with
Van Arsdale’s leadership of the Local 3 electricians union. Complaining of high dues,
discontinued union meetings, and intermittent work—an issue central to the plumber’s strike of
1966—Henricks concluded that “[i]t is conditions like this that strain our loyalty to the union.”83
Others in the buildings trade would remember the strike for its militancy, arguing like Henricks
that in spite of it making it difficult for them to get to work, they supported the transit strikers.84
But the buildings trades were not unique: young militants in the Communications Workers of
America visited pickets and attended support rallies during their lunch breaks, showing their
support for the striking workers and bringing back leaflets and signs to share with their
81
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coworkers. Some workers connected to the strike through blood relations, with family members
who were transit workers, while others simply understood the strike to be part of the broader
terrain of working-class New York.85
The 1966 transit strike and settlement emboldened many workers across the city to strike
in the years that followed. With its twelve-day strike, the union won a 15 percent pay increase
for its 30,000 members, a $500 yearly contribution to each worker’s retirement fund, an
additional paid holiday, 3-day leave for deaths in the family, as well as increased health and
welfare benefits. While some workers were angry that the pay increase was not front-loaded—
they would only reach the full increase by July 1, 1967—it was a significant pay increase by any
standard.86 An illegal, citywide strike had generated a positive outcome for TWU workers, and
this lesson particularly affected teachers, sanitationmen, social workers, and other municipal
employees.87
In the immediate aftermath of the strike, the Lindsay administration feared the
settlement’s impact. Lindsay publicly proclaimed the strike’s resolution a success, but in a
working paper on municipal labor relations, the city’s chief labor negotiator Herbert L. Haber
argued that the transit strike “makes it hard to conceive of municipal employee organizations of
any strength or sophistication, agreeing to settlements that are not in the neighborhood of these
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terms.” He predicted that if the city stood firm against such efforts, “conflict, mass
demonstrations, slow-downs and strikes [would occur] as unions are driven to obtain percentage
settlements close to the transit agreement.”88
Haber’s prediction would prove largely correct, but the transit strike’s impact was not
purely municipal. In March 1970 militant postal workers in New York City sparked a nationwide
wildcat strike, and in an interview on the picket lines, a letter carrier acknowledged the influence
of the transit strike, stating: “Everybody else strikes and gets a big pay increase…The teachers,
sanitationmen and transit workers all struck in violation of the law and got big increases. Why
shouldn’t we? We’ve been nice guys too long.”89 In another New York Times piece covering the
strike, an anonymous, but prominent, union official (as identified by the paper) argued: “postal
workers in New York City watched city workers against the city. They were illegal strikes…And
what happened? Those strikers got fat raises.”90
The 1966 transit strike also heightened political polarization in the city, painting
Lindsay’s mayoralty as anti-working class. The media seized upon the diametrically opposed
personalities and politics of Mike Quill and John Lindsay, and Quill fed this dynamic,
deliberately mispronouncing the mayor’s name as “Lindsley,” calling him a pipsqueak and
lightweight, and heaping more and more invective upon him as the contract deadline
approached.91 Significantly, the clash with the transit workers led Lindsay to make a career-
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defining speech in which he railed against the “power brokers” like organized labor that he
believed held the city hostage.92 Lindsay position garnered him some support among people
hostile to labor and with some civil rights organizations distressed by the impact of the strike on
New York’s poor minority populations. Two days after the power broker speech, Van Arsdale
would tell his fellow union leaders that a “lynch labor” atmosphere permeated the city and the
state.93 This legacy of division was compounded by events shortly following the strike: on
January 28, 1966, roughly two weeks after the strike’s conclusion, the TWU’s storied leader died
of heart failure. For some of the city’s workers, Quill’s death was easily explained. In the words
of a Local 2 plumber who would go on strike later that year, “Lindsay killed Quill.”94
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amidst racketeering and corruption charges in the early 1990s, the union traced its history to the
labor struggles of 19th century New York when many plumbers were affiliated with the Knights
of Labor.97 For some time, it was the largest plumber local in the country, and in the early part of
the 20th century, it was among the militant skilled trades whose members took part in a variety
of cross-trade solidarity strikes.98 The Great Depression hit the union hard and rolled back some
of their gains, but in the aftermath of the war, a building boom and transformed labor relations
led to the flourishing of Local 2 and the UA International.99 Notably, Local 2 was the home
union of George Meany, the first President of the AFL-CIO in the aftermath of its merger.
Meany started in Local 436 plumbers, winning election as a business agent and then making a
quick lateral move out of the union and into the New York State Federation of Labor’s office of
the president and eventually to the top of American labor’s hierarchy. While authors have called
the buildings trades unions corrupt, nepotistic, and sometimes reactionary—all three being true
of the Local 2 leadership—such depictions do not fully encapsulate the plumber rank and file.100
In the mid-1960s, a construction boom was in full swing in New York City, with massive
new skyscrapers reshaping the city’s skyline as well important investments in municipal

96

For some notable works on the buildings trades, see Richard Schneirow and Thomas J.
Suhrbur, Union Brotherhood, Union Town: The History of the Carpenters’ Union in Chicago,
1863-1987 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988) and Grace
Palladino, Skilled Hands, Strong Spirits: A Century of Building Trades History (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 2005); sociologists have also produced some notable works
including, Jeffrey W. Riemer, Hard Hats: The Work World of Construction Workers (New York:
SAGE publications, 1979) and Marc Silver, Under Construction: Work and Alienation in the
Buildings Trades (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).
97
Martin Segal, The Rise of the United Association: National Unionism in the Pipe Trades,
1884-1924, (Cambridge, Mass.: Wertheim Publications in Industrial Relations, 1969), 19-34.
98
David Montgomery, Workers’ Control in America: Studies of the History of Work,
Technology, and Labor Struggles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 18-27.
99
Segal, 209-211; Freeman, 167.
100
Paul Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and
the Tragedy of American Labor (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), 95-97.

45
infrastructures such as hospitals and schools. In 1966 alone, nearly $1 billion of new construction
was slated, which was an increase from the already-massive $800 million construction
investment in the year prior.101 For workers in the buildings trades, plentiful investment meant
more available work, and such high demand for skilled laborers created the material basis for a
strengthening of their bargaining position. During the 1960s, the unionization rate for the city’s
some 200,000 buildings trade workers was as high as 80 percent, and these jobs brought with
them rapidly rising wages and growing fringe benefits that outpaced many other workers. Some
have even gone so far as to label this period a “golden age” in which “[c]onstruction workers
especially prospered.”102 Unlike municipal employees or the transit workers, who saw weak
gains or fell behind comparable trades, workers in the buildings trades obtained growing wages
and benefit packages. But not every union did equally well; some had shorter workweeks, some
had higher wages, others had hiring halls, while others had dental plans and paid vacations.103
While the plumbers of Local 2 kept up in the wage battle, many of them experienced periodic
bouts unemployment that cut into their earnings and savings.104 Thus while it may have been a
Golden Age when compared to the travails of the Depression and the anti-union assault that
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would come in the 80s and 90s, construction workers still found themselves contesting the length
of working days, labor processes, and employers’ rights to allocate work.105
The growing confidence that accompanied the city’s postwar building boom also
manifested itself in on the job behavior. Plumber pride was built on a combination of respect for
both physical prowess and mental ability. Strength was essential on the job, whether it involved
lugging heavy construction materials up many flights of stairs or the ability to thread pipe by
hand. Men used the job to show off such skills, with some individuals hoisting bathtubs over
their heads—normally a two-man job—and mounting more than ten flights of stairs. Others did
fingertip pushups at lunchtime, much to the awe and enjoyment of their coworkers, while some
like Jack Basilico, a former boxer born in East Harlem, garnered fame for their violent defense of
the union: when civil rights protesters tried to block entrance to the union’s headquarters in
Manhattan, Basilico beat up several of them.106 The pride, however, was not simply in the
physical side of the work. Plumbers also looked fondly upon the ability to navigate a wide
variety of materials, plan and properly organize work with other trades, and negotiate the
minutiae of contracts and regulations. Physical toughness was still paramount however, as
injuries, life threatening and not, abounded on worksites that were both harsh and crude.107
In the postwar era, pride and self-confidence grew amongst plumbers both on the job and
outside of it. With increased work opportunities, many Depression-era worksite behaviors,
including skill hoarding and public deference to contractors waned as both younger apprentices
and some older workers rejected them.108 Outside of work, plumbers and other skilled tradesmen
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took enjoyment in disrupting the sheltered spaces of higher-class New Yorkers through “wearing
rough work clothes as a badge of honor, riddling their speech with curses, and harassing women
who passed by construction sites.”109 This low-intensity counter-culturalism was incredibly
gendered, often taking on a sexist bent, but alongside other behaviors on the job, it reflected a
growing confidence amongst blue-collar workers.110
In the mid-1960s, Business Manager Jack Cohen and his political faction, the Yellow
Ticket, ran UA Local 2. Essentially, the Yellow Ticket was a patronage system held together by
its ability to provide material incentives for both union members and bosses. Without a hiring
hall, plumbing contractors ultimately decided who worked and who did not. In situations where
contractors could not fill jobs with their own preferred plumbers, contractors would call the
union to send men of its choosing. Until 1964, the Yellow Ticket controlled all of the union’s
highest-ranking offices, and through these offices, they doled out jobs to supporters and denied it
to challengers.111 While guaranteeing work to loyalists was important, Cohen had to convince a
majority of rank-and-file plumbers to support him, and this task included delivering contract
improvements as well as solving disputes at worksites with contractors and between trades. In
1962, for example, Cohen and the plumbers feuded with the carpenters over who had the right to
install sinks in the ILGWU’s new coop housing. The battle halted construction for two weeks
and was essentially a dispute between unions about guaranteeing work for their respective
memberships. To maintain the respect of the members, the Yellow Ticket had to stand fast
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against encroachment from other trades.112 Events such as these shed some light on the
limitations of both union and worker aspirations in the buildings trades, as they both exhibited
and reinforced parochialism among the trades.
Another way that the Yellow Ticket maintained its power was through collusion with
contractors, a relationship that was smoothed over by bribes.113 A sliver of corruption came to
light in 1963 when Cohen was indicted on bribery charges for allowing a contractor to do offsite
work in exchange for $4,000. In other words, when contractors used non-union labor, Cohen and
his cronies were willing to look the other way—for a price. Ironically, Cohen’s indictment
gained him a modicum of respect outside of his loyalists as many plumbers admired his taking
the full rap for corruption and not fingering any of his fellow leaders.114
The Yellow Ticket’s attempts to maintain its power produced loyalty among some
plumbers and garnered wealth for the leaders, but it began to lose ground to a competing
organization within the union, the Blue Ticket. Like the Yellow Ticket, the Blue Ticket
opposition lined up behind a single leader, Michael Pappalardo, an Italian American from East
Harlem who joined the union during the Depression. Pappalardo was a skilled organizer and
street politician who was able to build a competing organization within the union by being a
“good labor man who stood behind the men,” straightening out problems on job sites, and
standing up against employer abuses.115
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Pappalardo’s efforts gained him respect from other plumbers, but his refusal to join the
Yellow Ticket made him a target of the leadership, which prevented him from working for
extended periods of time. He built up his organization by utilizing the familial and personal
connection at the heart of the hiring process, relying on blood relatives to back him as well as an
extended network of work assistance that created loyalty to his group. When the Yellow Ticket
kept him off the job for several weeks, loyal supporters beat a Yellow Ticket business agent who
had blacklisted Pappalardo.116
Through steady organizing, Pappalardo became the first non-Yellow Ticket business
agent when he was elected in the early 1960s. In a sense, the Blue Ticket was a competing
patronage machine, albeit more militant.117 While some men became supporters of the Blue
Ticket by virtue of their personal connections, others had ethnic motivations for joining, as many
Italian and Jewish members joined up with the Blue Ticket. Opposition grew within the union
when Cohen was indicted for taking bribes from contractors, but longstanding grievances
concerning the precarity and availability of work predominated.118
A letter from Local 2 plumber Dennis Kelly to mayoral candidate John Lindsay in the
summer of 1965 exemplifies these problems. Kelly called on the would-be mayor’s help in
transforming the plumber’s local from a corrupt, undemocratic institution into an organization
that actually had its members’ best interest in mind. Kelly outlined financial irregularities such as
the non-disbursement of vacation benefits and the withholding of medical benefit disbursements
for which the union offered no explanation. In addition to these financial issues, Kelly also
complained of a variety of other problems in relation to the conduct of union business. He argued
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that though unemployment in the union was high, work was not being properly distributed
amongst members. Kelly closed his cry for help by emphasizing that the “officials of Local 2 and
the Plumbing Industry Board are pursuing a policy that is not only detrimental to Local 2
members, but it is also undemocratic and completely un-American.”119 Kelly would not have a
hard time finding common ground with workers in other trades.120
Inter-union competition and a desire for greater control over the normally precarious
allocation of work drove the demand for a hiring hall. Plumbers in Local 2 looked on in envy at
the electricians of Local 3 who had won a hiring hall from contractors.121 In spite of years of
anger, plumbers—like many other trades—made little headway because both employers and the
union hierarchy preferred it that way. If plumbing contractors controlled hiring, they could
choose loyal employees and manipulate plumbers into cutting corners and overlooking work
rules. The Yellow Ticket benefited from the lack of a hiring hall, handing out jobs to its
supporters.122
As one former plumber described it, the process of obtaining work could be agonizing. In
some cases, men would shape up at jobs much like longshoremen did on the docks, with some
men picked by a foreman while and others sent off to find work elsewhere. Aside from morning
shapeups, men would also chase down work, calling contractors to inquire about openings or
driving from job site to job site in the Bronx and Manhattan in hopes of talking the foreman into
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giving them a chance. Plumbers used personal connections to get vetted, or in some cases,
plumbers even underbid one another, taking pay cuts in exchange for work.123 Though the
building boom had made work more readily available in the 1960s—a young plumber related
that he was out of work twice in the 1960s for an extended period of time—plumbers feared
bouts of unemployment.124 While a hiring hall would not solve the problem of intermittent work,
plumbers hoped that available work would be more fairly distributed.125
The precarious and uneven distribution of work within the buildings trades speaks to the
importance of kinship and friendship therein. Many plumbers active in the 1966 strike entered
the trade through fathers and uncles, and other times through marriage into a family of plumbers.
At the time, Local 2’s constitution stipulated that two current members vouch for any
individual’s induction as a plumber.126 By requiring new members to be sponsored, new plumber
hires were practically required to come through networks of family, friends, and as many of the
workers were Catholic, institutions such as parochial schools, churches, and fraternal
organizations that were central to the social lives of many white ethnics in New York City.127
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In many ways, the vetting process for union entry acted as a mutual aid mechanism for
working-class New Yorkers, but familial arrangements sometimes favored employers.128
Plumbing contractors could tap family connections to fill short-term employment gaps, saving
themselves the trouble of having to find new workers or taking on the cost of training them.
Plumbers were more likely to share important knowledge and skills with family members—not
rejecting them as potential future competition—and the contractors could know that they spent
little money training a man who would eventually leave their company and work for one of their
competitors.129 While plumbers and other buildings trades workers used their personal
connections and vetting processes to help one another, it helped maintain a racially exclusionary
union.130
In spite of massive demographic shifts in New York City, in 1964 Local 2 had less than
25 black members out of 4,000. Local 2 was in no way exceptional, and in spite of public protest
the buildings trades as a whole were racially exclusionary.131 Black workers reported that they
were denied entry to unions. Some would apply for apprenticeships but never hear back. In other
cases, unions gave black plumbers the run around, repeatedly telling them they had incorrectly
filled out their paperwork or lacked proper documentation; after several trips to the union offices,
most would get the message and give up.132 Blacks that had worked in the buildings trades in the
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South were caught in a catch-22: contractors would tell them to obtain a union card but the union
would tell them to be hired by a contractor first. Both the employers and the union could blame
one another and deny culpability.133
If blacks or Latinos managed to somehow make it into the union, they would often be
relegated to B card status, which only allowed them to do small jobs and repairs, making an
inconsistent income even more unpredictable. Local 2 in particular was known for the refusal to
issue licenses to blacks or Latinos who were trained or had experience from out of state, which
given the massive migration patterns of black and Latino New Yorkers, would have been the
majority.134 Excluding blacks and Latinos from the buildings trades kept them out of a line of
work that had few educational barriers to entry and carried better wages than most others.135 In
the mid-1960s, construction work would have been a boon for non-white, working-class New
Yorkers; instead it became a divisive political battleground that damaged the standing of
organized labor.136
The hiring practices of the buildings trades and the plumbers in particular became
increasingly politicized in the 1960s. In 1963, activists with Congress of Racial Equality and the
NAACP led protests and non-violent direct actions for the hiring of black workers in city’s
construction industry. Protests shut down city and state construction sites in Harlem, Brooklyn
and the Bronx, as black activists pushed for expanded opportunities for minority workers in the
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industry.137 To avoid further protests, Harry Van Arsdale Jr. announced a plan for Local 3, the
city’s most powerful craft union, to induct black and Latino apprentice electricians. In doing so,
Van Arsdale hoped to appease black civil rights leaders and also maintain the union’s control
over its membership process. All told, Van Arsdale brought in 240 black apprentices and 60
Puerto Ricans out of a new class of some 1,000 apprentices. The city’s plumbers unions,
however, made no efforts to integrate whatsoever, and in 1964, the New York City Commission
on Human Rights decided to target Local 2.138
That April, the Commission attempted to force the hiring of four non-union Latino and
black plumbers at the Bronx Terminal Market. After initial resistance, Astrove, the company that
held the contract, agreed to hire the four men, and the Commission hoped they could then obtain
them union membership.139 When the Commission contacted Local 2, however, the union
immediately protested that this was in violation of their contract. Using the guise of an earlier
dispute around sanitation, Local 2 leaders pulled men off of the job, with one rank and filer later
telling the to National Labor Relations Board that the dispute occurred because, “[w]e don’t
work with non-union people.”140
Other accounts from activists at the time allege that the Local 2 plumbers and the four
non-union plumbers were changing into their work clothes, and an unidentified union business
agent told Local 2 men that they were going on strike due to sanitary conditions. One plumber
argued that the sanitary conditions were nothing new. A short argument ensued, and the
plumbers walked off the job. While most left work without conflict, an activist account also
137
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mentions that during the initial walkout one plumber shouted obscenities and racial slurs at the
non-white plumbers.141
For two weeks, Local 2 refused to work while the four city hires showed up each day
only to be turned away. Eventually the plumbers went back to work and three of the hires took a
union-administered exam, which they subsequently failed.142 The union refused to submit the
tests for outside review. The 20-day walkout made national headlines, drawing in the
International, AFL-CIO president George Meany, and even President Lyndon Johnson. While
some of the men were initially reluctant to walk out, all ultimately agreed that they would not
work with non-union workers, and in the aftermath of the dispute plumbers thought that the
black and Latino workers were not following the proper procedures, specifically entering
through the union’s apprenticeship program.143 For years, civil rights organizations had
documented hiring problems and discrimination, and few union were addressing the problem,
forcing activist organizations and the city government into action.144 Meanwhile, Local 2
members had effectively enforced a closed shop on most job sites through a refusal to work with
non-union workers for decades, and their militant defense of a closed shop at Astrove became a
militant attempt to prevent integration of the union, pitting the union in a public conflict with the
city government and the city’s racial minorities. While the 1964 walkout was not a rank-and-file
hate strike, it still heightened the political divide between organized labor and the city’s growing
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black and Latino communities, reinforcing organized labor’s reputation as a racially
discriminatory institution that lacked interest in the plight of working-class blacks.145
In spring 1966, union negotiators met with plumbing contractors to discuss a new
contract, and hiring remained a key issue.146 Local 2 leaders called for pay raises, a shorter
workweek, a dental plan, elevators on job sites, and most importantly a hiring hall. Several of
these were demands to catch up with the gains of the more powerful Local 3 electricians,
including the hall.147 Plumbing contractors rejected the hiring hall demand, and negotiations
reached an impasse.148
At a boisterous union meeting in the summer of 1966, Cohen gave an impassioned
speech against the plumbing contractors who had for so long dictated the terms of plumbers’
hiring and firing. Trying to rouse his members, he called for a strike to achieve a long-desired
goal of rank-and-file plumbers: a hiring hall.149 Both Yellow Ticket and Blue Ticket loyalists as
well as many other plumbers were excited by the list of the demands and the possibility of a
strike, especially as several other trades looked to walk off the job as well.150
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At the meeting, Pappalardo enthusiastically endorsed the strike call, and Cohen called for
a voice vote of all plumbers present. The men in the hall stood and roared their approval of the
strike move, opening up a months-long labor dispute that would rock the city.151 While, Cohen
could appear to be a militant leader rallying his troops, for years, his Yellow Ticket had benefited
from allocating work assignments to loyalists, and Cohen had done little to remedy this issue.
Some workers suspected Cohen was leading a strike not because he was a bold advocate of the
working class but rather because he was a corrupt leader who was losing his grip on power.152
During the first two months of the strike, negotiations improved little, but the plumbers
remained firm in their resolve.153 The union had originally argued for a full hiring hall, but it
then reduced its demand to 40 percent control and then 25 percent by October. Contractors
offered Cohen a compromise, agreeing to some wage increases and an all-but-worthless hiring
hall that would allow the union to select two out of every nineteen jobs, or slightly less than 10
percent. Denouncing the contract at a meeting of plumber rank and file, Cohen asked for a vote
of no confidence, with nearly all members standing against the contract.154 The Blue Ticket’s
Pappalardo agreed with this contract rejection, arguing that the terms were insufficient; he even
went so far as to praise his competitor’s stance, lauding the rejection of the builders’ terms,
which he considered a deceitful reneging on earlier talks.155
While it may seem that Pappalardo and Cohen were undergoing a rapprochement, this
was not the case at all. Records from the Lindsay administration confirm just how important the
power struggle within the union was to the continuation of the strike. Henry Shemin, Lindsay’s
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Commissioner of Labor, who was in daily contact with union representatives and contractors,
claimed that the Yellow Ticket leaders hoped to use the issue of the hiring hall to consolidate
their support within the union and that upcoming elections were hindering a settlement.156
During the strike, Cohen eschewed picket lines and relied instead on the favorable
economic climate, ordering his men to find work in other UA jurisdictions. In response to his
call, Local 2 members used their personal and familial connections to organize alternative work,
working short jobs in states across the northeast including New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, and Delaware. Seeking out of state work was an alternative to plumbers exhausting
their own savings or having to go through the nearly two-month wait for welfare benefits. Tightknit groups of men shared job opportunities amongst themselves, sometimes commuting together
in the early morning hours or renting hotels to be closer to distant work sites. 157
While more plumbers began working out of state, striking construction workers in other
trades began returning to work. By the end of August, operating engineers went back and by
mid-September, Local 1 plumbers were also back on the job in Brooklyn and Queens.158 With
men working out of state and without ongoing pickets, other trades even began to violate the
plumbers’ strike, turning on water at job sites in Manhattan and the Bronx. To enforce the strike,
a group of Local 2 business agents from both the Blue Ticket and the Yellow Ticket went to
scabbing work sites with chains to prevent water from being turned on, threatening members of
other trades.159 Out-of-state work quickly became an important part of the strike, with both
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contractors and city officials arguing that the men were not really on strike if they were simply
doing the same work elsewhere.160
With out-of-state work holding the strike steady into November, employers began
seeking help to end the strike from public officials and the union International. After the
plumbers’ rejection of their contract in late October, the Building Trades Employers Association
(BTEA) called on government intervention by Governor Rockefeller and Mayor Lindsay. The
BTEA also began negotiations directly with the UA International.161 With the combined pleas of
contractors and the city, the labor organization sent a special representative, John Regan, to help
foster an accord. Regan met with employers, assuring them he would do his best to end the
strike.162 They drew up a contract, but Local 2 leaders opposed it, and on November 2, with
Deputy Mayor Timothy Costello presiding, builders and plumbers met for two hours to no avail,
prompting a builder’s representative to state, “[t]o me, it looks hopeless.”163
In spite of both Cohen and Pappalardo’s opposition, Regan forced Local 2 leadership to
present his contract to the union’s membership on November 5. Regan hoped that with
significant forewarning, a greater number of plumbers would attend the meeting and pass the
contract.164 Regan’s plan completely backfired when the rank-and-file of Local 2 voted down the
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contract by a massive margin: 1,369 to 382.165 Dismayed by the contract rejection, the BTEA
telegrammed President Johnson, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, and U.S. senators Jacob Javits
and Robert Kennedy, warning that the strike had the possibility of lasting well into the next year
and that action was necessary to “restore industrial order.”166
Negotiations remained at an impasse throughout November, but in early December state
intervention alongside pressure from the UA International forced another contract vote on the
plumbers. Mayor Lindsay and employers had asked the State Industrial Commissioner to appoint
a board to make recommendations to settle the strike, and on December 7, after weeks of
consideration, the board, headed by Theodore W. Kheel, recommended improved wages, a study
of employment conditions, and an alternative to the union hiring hall: a jobless registry that
would allegedly help employers more easily sort out who should be assigned work.167 Though
they originally called for this state intervention, employers rejected these recommendations and
insisted on yet another weak contract.168
When President Jack Cohen brought these recommendations before Local 2 members–
only a few days prior to union elections—he recommended their rejection, perhaps suspecting
that the plumbers would reject them anyway. The meeting went on for hours, with rank-and-file
members attacking the leadership for failing to deliver and the contractors for refusing to give
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plumbers their due.169 Finally, after the anger and frustration built, Cohen called for a voice vote
on the contract, and in a roar, members roundly voted it down. Kheel commented the following
day that negotiations were deadlocked and that he doubted that further negotiations on his part
were even worthwhile. He still recommended that the union take a proper machine vote, but
there are conflicting accounts as to whether such a vote actually happened.170
On the night of Local 2 elections in early December, the tide turned against Cohen and
the Yellow Ticket. Despite half of Local 2’s plumbers working out of state, thousands of
plumbers filled the Manhattan Center. As the meeting got underway, various officials spoke on
the merits of their respective factions and the deficiencies of their opponents, but when business
agent John Barnett, a Yellow Ticket leader, began to denounce Pappalardo and the Blue Ticket, a
brawl broke out that brought pandemonium to the hall. Men piled on top of each other, trading
punches, and bloodying each other’s faces. As one participant remembered it, even men who
were normally friendly on the job found themselves exchanging blows in the name of their
chosen faction.171 The fight only ended when shouts rang out that the police were on their way.
To avoid police scrutiny, plumbers and officials got right back to the meeting as if the brawl had
never happened!172
When the police arrived, the fight was already over, but they arrested several men who
were visibly bloodied. While the police led some plumbers away in handcuffs, the mood of the
meeting had changed significantly. Factionalism had started a brawl during the meeting, but the
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men were united in its aftermath.173 Voting got underway and in a few hours, all of the ballots
were counted to a stunning surprise: Blue Ticket men won nearly every position. Cohen lost the
presidential election to Pappalardo, and Local 2 seated four new business agents with three
Yellow Ticket incumbent business agents voted out. 174 As Pappalardo’s nephew, Rocky Maio,
remembered the event, the consensus amongst the men came down to a simple phrase, which
encapsulated the Yellow Ticket and Jack Cohen’s loss of control: “he’s on the dime, and he can’t
even run the meeting right.” 175
A combination of factors changed the plumbers’ minds, including Cohen’s ineptitude,
corruption, and his inability to produce a decent contract after more than four months on strike.
Even Cohen’s own loyalists rejected him, arguing that he had proven himself an ineffective
leader. Cohen had called a strike with rank-and-file support in order to maintain his power, but
when he could neither deliver nor control his union, the men ousted him and nearly every single
one of his supporters.176
While plumbers had made their discontent felt at the polls yet again, the UA International
made its final move to put an end to the strike. In the last days of December 1966, Local 2
representatives and contractors met in Washington DC to hammer out an agreement, settling on a
contract that looked remarkably similar earlier rejected offers. Having failed to obtain victory in
previous votes, the International completely sidestepped internal democratic mechanisms and
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threatened the union with trusteeship if the strike continued.177 In spite of much autonomy, UA
locals, like many other union locals, were dependent on their charter from the International, and
the governing body had the right to put any local into trusteeship should it deem fit, a severe
sanction that submitted the local to direct International control.178 President Peter T. Schoenmann
of the UA International justified this move by arguing that plumbers working out of state were
prolonging the strike unnecessarily and primarily to the detriment of their non-working brothers.
While a little less than half of the union was working, it was actually much easier for
unemployed plumbers to attend union meetings and vote for contract because of their proximity
to the meeting.179
The International’s threats forced the newly elected Pappalardo to be the bearer of bad
news. In his first meeting before the rank-and-file, he recommended approval of a contract he
had previously argued against, announcing before more than 2,000 plumbers that should they
reject this contract, Local 2 would be placed in trusteeship and have the contract imposed
anyway. The meeting lasted for three hours and the Daily News described as an “emotioncharged meeting that threatened several times to erupt into violence.”180 Much of the meeting
involved the newly elected Blue Ticket pleading to the rank-and-file to accept the contract and
save the union from the threat of the International. After hours of talking, shouting, and jeering, a
desperate plea from former Local 2 president Cohen to allow the membership to vote resulted in
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a hastily taken yea vote in favor of the contract.181 Ironically, the International’s final account of
the Local 2 negotiations for 1966-1967, which it published in its general membership journal,
portrayed the affair as a rising vote of confidence in the contract.182
While they did not obtain a hiring hall, plumbers won a wage increase and dental plan,
but ultimately gained no control over the allocation of work within the industry. Many
Pappalardo loyalists would have continued striking if he had ordered, but they also understood
the precarious situation of the local.183 After a six-month strike, employer resistance, and threats
from the UA International, other plumbers saw the impossibility of achieving the hiring hall and
were content to simply get back to work.184
Rank-and-file opposition to the Yellow Ticket helped provoke a lengthy strike whose
results were ultimately mixed. On the one hand, it showed that buildings trades union could
oppose their entrenched leaderships as well as the power of contractors to dictate the terms of life
and labor. The incumbent leadership, under the helm of Cohen, refused to negotiate an inferior
contract that would result in his being labeled a “sellout” by the membership, and when they
could not deliver, they were ejected from office. On the other hand, their strike showed to what
lengths political actors locally and nationally would go in order to ensure labor peace. The
International showed its hand quickly, working very hard to end rather than win the strike. With
help from the International, employers were able to maintain control of hiring. A favorable
national boom in construction as well as a viable oppositional faction undergirded the plumbers’
resistance, but those two factors were not enough to deliver everything the men wanted. Though
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plumbers won a wage increase and dental plan and also voted out incumbent leaders, the
inability to win the hiring hall was a defeat that would not be overturned until roughly 25 years
later.185

Conclusion
While historians have acknowledged the rank-and-file pressures that led to the 1966
transit strike, they have described them as an inevitable result of demographic transition or as
primarily diffuse and informal.186 The growing black minority in the TWU certainly played a
role in pushing Quill to strike, but assuming inevitable accommodation to demographic transition
elides the history of black struggle in the union. Several years prior to the 1966 strike, the TWU
was already 30 percent black, but it was not until a handful of black activists began to organize
in 1961 that the union began to make concessions. Attention from the city’s leading black
newspaper probably helped as well, but militant organizers like Carnegie found both the process
and results underwhelming.
In the early 1960s, Carnegie described the general situation within the union to be one of
general disillusionment in the wake of the failures of both the first Rank and File Committee and
the craft mobilizations. Though he believed that the growing number of blacks in the union could
serve as the basis for a new round of struggle, he was not very hopeful given the widespread
apathy. For Carnegie, the 1964 riots in New York City signaled a break with the past and a
newfound mass militancy on the part of working-class blacks in the city. In the fall of that year,
he announced to the NAACP’s Labor and Industry committee that the time was now ripe for a
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real rank-and-file organization in the transit union. Building on earlier agitation, the 1964 riots in
New York City marked an increase in black organizing in the TWU, and demonstrates how
leadership accommodation to rank-and-file pressures was contingent upon both organized
opposition and unpredictable local events.
Historians are right to point out that anti-Quill and anti-leadership sentiment was in many
ways diffuse, but they have not acknowledged the degree to which the Rank and File Committee
for a Democratic Union began to organize and channel it in the latter half of 1965. The
Committee publicly challenged leaders at the meetings of Local 100 and of the TWU
International, organized pickets at TA offices and City Hall, and ran a multi-racial opposition
slate with older white rank-and-file activists. While never directly acknowledging the
Committee’s influence on its decisions, the TWU both dramatically increased its 1965 contract
demands and transformed election procedures from public machine votes to private, mail-in
ballots. Both the ramping up of demands and the tighter control over elections suggest leadership
concern with both the Committee’s activity and broader rank-and-file sentiment. While the
majority of the TWU rank and file did not flock to the Committee, nearly 4,000 voted for it in
mid-December 1965, suggesting that it had a real basis for its claim to speak on behalf of rankand-file opponents of the TWU leadership. Two weeks later, Quill led an illegal strike that shut
the city’s subway system for 12 days and whose legacy would shape labor negotiations for the
next five years.
Historians have given little attention to the 1966-1967 plumber’s strike, but as in the
TWU, rank-and-file dissatisfaction and internal opposition pushed leaders to call a strike. In the
early 1960s, the Yellow Ticket, led by Jack Cohen, dominated UA Local 2, sometimes working
in collusion with plumbing contractors. An opposition group, the Blue Ticket, emerged around
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Michael Pappalardo, an Italian-American plumber whose prowess and intelligence attracted his
fellow workers. Pappalardo won election as a business manager in the early 1960s, and his
oppositional activities as well as his attempts to create his own power base made him the target
of Yellow Ticket retaliation.
A postwar building boom buoyed the industry, and plumbers made strong contract gains
in the postwar era like many others in the building trades. The building boom and contract gains
also emboldened plumbers, leading to changing norms on and off the job, including a decline of
skill hoarding and greater public performance of blue-collar pride. Plumbers still experienced
bouts of unemployment and the fear of intermittent work and both employer and Yellow Ticket
favoritism motivated demands for a hiring hall. Employers dominated the hiring process and
many plumbers were subject to denigrating shapeups. The union hierarchy also played a role in
filling employment gaps for employers, and the Yellow Ticket showed preference to its
supporters and sometimes blacklisting its enemies.
Hiring became increasingly politicized when the city’s Human Rights Commission
targeted Local 2 for excluding nonwhites from its ranks in 1964. The Commission pressured
plumbing contractor Astrove into hiring four black and Latino non-union plumbers at the Bronx
Terminal Market construction site, and Local 2 leaders led a walkout of plumbers for nearly
three weeks. Bowing to public pressure, Local 2 allowed the men to take a plumbers’ exam,
which all of them failed, though the union refused to submit the test to outside review. While
rank-and-file plumbers did not lead the walkout against the nonwhite plumbers, many were
supportive of the union’s actions and believed that the non-union hires were unfairly
circumventing the union’s apprenticeship program. Meanwhile black plumbers, often with out-
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of-state experience, complained that they were being unfairly prevented from working in an
industry for which they were well suited.
In 1966 Cohen and the Yellow Ticket called a strike for increased wages, a shorter
workweek, and a hiring hall, promising to wrest job assignments from the hands of employers.
Though records are nonexistent for the initial union-management negotiations in the spring of
1966, their demands mimicked those won by Local 3 only a few year prior. Some plumbers
suspected that Cohen’s strike call was a result of growing internal opposition and the prospect of
Blue Ticket challenges in upcoming elections. Negotiations reached an impasse with employers
primarily opposing the implementation of a hiring hall. Both Yellow and Blue Ticket leaders
remained steadfast in support of the demand, but in the fall of 1966, city labor negotiators
involved in trying to end the walkout confirmed that internal opposition and upcoming elections
were behind the leaders’ recalcitrance.
With both factions supporting the strike and Cohen unable to acquiesce for fear of losing
upcoming elections, the UA International attempted to end the strike beginning in late October.
Throughout the fall and winter, the International’s special representative, John Regan, repeatedly
pushed for contract votes that neither Cohen nor Pappalardo believed could be sold to rank and
filers. Regan hoped that by forcing a vote on contracts, he could circumvent the battle between
the two tickets, but rank-and-file plumbers proved him wrong, rejecting contracts in November
and December by large margins. And just as Cohen feared, in mid-December plumbers voted out
the Yellow Ticket after a meeting filled with violence and disruption. With the plumbers’ resolve
confirmed multiple times in votes, the International threatened the union with trusteeship if the
strike were not terminated, and the newly elected Pappalardo had to persuade his men to go back
to work with wage gains and other fringes but without a hiring hall.
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While complex, and often union-specific rank-and-file pressures pushed UA and TWU
leaders to strike, the strikes and their settlements powerfully impacted other workers in the city.
The plumbers’ strike and contract rejections primarily resonated in the buildings trades, and
during the summer of 1969, steamfitters, sheet metal workers, and elevator constructors followed
Local 2’s lead, voting down leadership-endorsed contracts and fighting for increased wages and
trade-specific improvements.187While plumbers did not directly influence all workers who
subsequently engaged in contract rejections in the city, the phenomenon became increasingly
widespread in the latter half of the 1960s.188
In the wake of the transit strike, Lindsay’s chief labor negotiator rightfully predicted
further unrest from municipal unions who would try to either match or best the TWU’s wage
increases. The strike would also mark the Lindsay mayoralty as anti-labor, heightening
polarization in the city. When New York City’s sanitation workers led their union out on strike
in February 1968, Lindsay was an important target of their anger, with the strikers alleging that
he did not understand the plight of everyday workers.189 But the strike and its settlement
resonated with other rank-and-filers, including members of the buildings trades, New York
Telephone employees, and the city’s postal employees, many of whom rejected contracts, led
wildcats, or organized opposition groups in the years that followed.
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Chapter 2: Militancy, Alienation, and the Wallace Effect

Rank-and-file militancy intensified in the aftermath of the transit and plumbers’ strikes. It
was not simply that strikes were growing: more of them were wildcats, walkouts not authorized
by union officials, or began with workers rejecting contracts put to them by their union leaders.
Informal practices of resistance such as absenteeism and shirking of duties proliferated alongside
these public displays of rank-and-file anger. In the late 1960s, workers across the country seemed
to be suffering the “blue collar blues” and the “white collar woes.”1 While the workplace was
often the site of rebellion, New York City’s working people were not just angry about work. A
growing number detested Mayor Lindsay and hated the inferiority they felt as working people. In
his 1968 presidential run, the racist, populist George Wallace sought to tap into this growing
anger, connecting with the city’s rank-and-file rebels in both sentiment, and to a lesser degree,
votes.
This chapter delves into the alienation and discontent that drove New York City’s rankand-file upheaval by examining its myriad sources and manifestations. The first third examines
its diverse expressions between 1967 and 1968—wildcat strikes, contract rejections, and
absenteeism—while also uncovering its many sources. Far from a coherent, singly motivated, or
linear movement—e.g. a classical story of workers vs. bosses—diverse and often very
contradictory experiences and contexts led rank-and-file workers to rebel in similar ways. The
second part examines the rank-and-file driven 1968 sanitation strike and how it embodies a
broader social discontent in New York City. In February 1968, Uniformed Sanitationmen’s
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Association (USA) president John DeLury completely lost control of a contract rally, and his
men forced him into a strike he did not want. While economic issues drove USA members, an
increasing discontent and anger with their social position in the city’s socioeconomic hierarchy
also fueled their unrest. Tired of being looked down upon as garbage men, they unleashed their
anger on New York and singled out the Mayor Lindsay for particular scorn. Their strike, like that
of the TWU before them, heightened political tensions in the city and cemented Lindsay’s legacy
as broadly anti-working class. The third part of this chapter explores how George Wallace’s
1968 presidential run sought to tap into this growing worker alienation in New York City. While
New York was foreign territory for the Southern segregationist, Wallace won some support from
militant workers in the city when deploying populist language and making direct overtures
directly to union members. Labor leaders chalked up the support to a combination of confusion
and racism, and the latter has been shown to play a role in some workers’ support for Wallace.
Discontent with liberal institutions, many of which were doing very little to meet the demands of
white working people, has been underemphasized in the literature. In New York City, Mayor
Lindsay, who often pitted the interests of the working-class whites against that of poor blacks,
exacerbated these tensions as did entrenched union leaderships who offered up weak contract
gains in often worsening work environments. New York’s rank-and-file rebellion overlapped
with shifting the electoral alliances and constituencies that eventually came to define decades of
American politics.2
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Wildcats, Contract Rejections, and Workplace Rebellion

Labor upheaval, catalyzed by the TWU and the plumbers of Local 2, continued in 1967
and 1968. In New York City there were 201 and 191 strikes respectively, and though this total
represented a smaller number of strikes than in the early 1960s, the strikes involved more
workers than in years prior and resulted in many more days idle. Worker participation in strikes
had hit a nadir in 1963, with only 54,000, but steadily climbed upwards, hitting a peak for the
decade with just over 200,000 in 1968. Days lost climbed significantly from mid-decade, with
employers losing nearly 3.3 million workdays in 1968, a more than 50 percent increase from the
year prior.3 While strikes grew in number and size, workers’ actions were transforming
qualitatively, in fact some of the largest strikes in 1967 were rank-and-file led wildcats.4
During World War II and in its immediate aftermath, unions in the United States
overwhelmingly agreed to “no strike” clauses that legally barred workers from engaging in any
type of work stoppages for the duration of the contract.5 Wildcats had reached a highpoint during
that period, with many taking place in arms production plants, but by the mid-1960s, they began
to increase across the entire country and across different sectors.6 For many unions, enforcing no
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strike clauses was no easy task, and some workers used short-term walk offs in lieu of much
slower grievance mechanisms.7
In January 1967, just as the plumbers of Local 2 were being forced back to work, over
1,000 drivers of the Railway Express Agency wildcatted.8 In May, restaurant workers in the Pan
Am building began a wildcat when one of their coworkers was fired for being rude to customers
who did not tip. For three days, the wildcat shut down four restaurants of Waldorf Associates.9 In
June, when Greyhound management tried to change shift schedules on the Providence-New York
route from two days on/two days off to two days on/one day off, drivers walked out, picketing
buses, feigning being hit, and blocking traffic at the Port Authority bus terminal. The wildcat
spread along the line to Albany and Montreal and brought pleas from union heads to end the
strike.10 In October, a three-day wildcat strike of some 2,500 longshoremen shut down the Port
of Newark-Elizabeth, one of America’s largest shipping terminals.11 While in some unions,
wildcats were one-off affairs, Long Island Railroad engineers used wildcats and slowdowns in
1967 and 1968 to resist scheduling changes that would reduce their overtime pay. In fact, the
union had not struck since 1960.12
A statewide wildcat strike by Communications Workers of America (CWA) Local 1101
in the summer 1967 revealed not only the growing aggressiveness of New York’s workers but
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also growing concern with safety in a changing city. The wildcat began on the last day of July,
four days after the robbery and non-fatal shooting of a 22-year-old telephone repairman and
change collector in Brooklyn’s Bedford-Stuyvesant.13 In the city’s growing black ghettoes,
thieves targeted the mostly white collectors who serviced payphones, and in May, a worker had
refused to work unaccompanied in Harlem, prompting ponderous negotiations between union
and management. After New York Telephone (NYT) refused workers’ demands to be paired up
for assignments in dangerous areas after the July attack, 28 people walked off the job in North
Brooklyn without union authorization, and within a week nearly 25,000 workers were on strike.14
Increased labor demand had made many telephone workers confident enough to engage
in such a strike, and this event was important for the development of solidarity within the
CWA.15 The severity of the attack on the repairman exposed the growing dangers that many of
the CWA’s outdoor workers faced, bridging the gap between those who worked in
neighborhoods and those who worked inside of NYT plants. In Brooklyn where the strike was
initiated, the wildcat brought older and younger workers together in collective action, bridging
some of the generational divide. As one CWA rank-and-filer remembered it, this massive wildcat
for job safety prompted a new era of militancy, which will be examined in a later chapter.16
With the strike spreading, the union intervened in support the wildcat’s aims while
calling for its end. Previous negotiations had yielded little, but with this near total walkout,
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management nominally agreed to the strike demands but, in exchange, wanted to punish the
wildcat leaders. In response the union called for statewide solidarity and assumed full control of
the strike.17 After nine days and intense negotiations, the CWA ultimately agreed to the firing of
three workers involved in the walkout but obtained a 45-day pairing experiment in
neighborhoods in the South Bronx, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brownsville, East New York,
Williamsburg, and Harlem.18
While historians have discussed the rise of “law and order” discourse in national politics,
the Local 1101 strike suggest its salience as a workplace issue.19 In fact, such demands for
pairing in the face of crime and violence were not confined to telephone workers. In late May
1967, a police officer attacked a meter maid who he believed had an unfairly issued a summons
to a motorist. A scuffle ensued and when the news spread, some 20 meter maids walked off the
job.20 The women complained not only of this incident, but widespread harassment by both the
police and civilians. After a two-day wildcat, meter maids won a pairing agreement, which Local
1101 members would obtain several weeks later.21
After many abortive attempts to establish a union, taxi drivers with the help of Harry Van
Arsdale Jr. established the New York City Taxi Drivers Union (TDU) in 1965 with a
combination of well-organized garage elections and a two-week strike. Medical benefits,
vacation days, and pensions quickly followed for cab drivers.22 While these gains were
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significant, many taxi drivers felt that they were long overdue and Van Arsdale was not
delivering quickly enough. In spite of its fledgling status, the union quickly became the site of a
diffuse rank-and-file challenges only a year after its founding.23
Opponents of the leadership fell into two camps in the late 1960s. One side wanted
greater taxi driver representation but respected Van Arsdale’s leadership in the unionization
drive.24 The other oppositionists despised Van Arsdale, believing him to be a paternalist that
lacked direct knowledge of drivers’ daily concerns as well as confidence in drivers’ ability to run
their own affairs.25 Several opposition slates ran in 1966, and though the incumbents defeated
them, the collective votes of the oppositionist were substantial.26
The next year, as negotiations stalled between the newly established union and fleet
owners, rank-and-file dissidents organized pickets and walk offs in Manhattan when union
leaders postponed a strike deadline. Drivers went on strike at four garages in Queens, Manhattan,
and the Bronx, paralyzing roughly 250 cabs.27 At a union meeting in Queens, Van Arsdale Jr.
asked the 3,000 assembled taxi drivers to stand in support of extended negotiations; very few
did, and as a result, he fled the meeting as drivers called him a sellout and dictator.28 The
following day, angry taxi drivers wildcatted against their union’s decision to continue
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negotiations rather than strike. Picketing dozens of fleet garages, they prevented thousands of
taxis from going out and scared many on-duty drivers from working anywhere near the pickets.29
A mere two days after the driver-led wildcats, the union and fleet owners reached an
accord that would see an increase in pay for taxi drivers as well as a concerted effort on the part
of the union leadership and owners to push the city to increase fares.30 Mayor Lindsay’s support
of fare increases, however, was contingent on greater city oversight of the taxi industry as well as
plans to issue new medallions, regularize livery cabs, and address some drivers’ refusal to pick
up black passengers.31 Drivers who owned their own cabs and who stood to benefit from fare
increases more than their fleet driver counterparts, were particularly angry at the mayor,
threatening the city with more wildcats.32 But at the end of January 1968, the Mayor acceded and
the city council approved fare hikes, avoiding further walkouts.33
While wildcat strikes grew in number, so too did contract rejections. In late January
1967, tugboat operators, who helped larger ships dock and delivered sand, gravel, fuel oil, and jet
fuel, rejected a union-leadership endorsed contract.34 In April, firemen, rejected a contract
endorsed by their association’s heads for a third time, and in the very same meeting also rejected
a proposal that the next contract only be approved by top leadership.35 In June, welfare
caseworkers of the Social Service Employees Union went out on strike and rejected their
leadership’s recommendation to return to work while negotiations continued. Instead they
organized a picket of City Hall, and Lindsay denounced them for “their callous exploitation of
29
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innocent welfare clients.”36 Finally, on the first day of September, New York City teachers
walked off the job, testing the limits of the newly established Taylor Law and pushing Mayor
Lindsay into a contentious political situation. School was delayed for weeks, and the city’s
newspapers assailed the teachers, calling them greedy public servants that had forgotten their
professional commitments. When United Federation of Teachers (UFT) president Albert Shanker
finally negotiated a contract, a sizable minority of the rank-and-file voted against it, calling him a
power-hungry sellout.37
Worker dissatisfaction also found an outlet through absenteeism.38 Though many workers
considered white-collar labor as an escape from blue-collar drudgery, professionals experienced
what some called the “white collar woes.”39 New York City teachers for example, exhibited a
higher absentee rate than in other major cities such as Chicago, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco. In
fact, most teachers in New York took all 10 of their paid sick days each year, shortening by a day
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almost a quarter of their workweeks. The UFT’s Shanker was quick to defend them as a
necessary measure for people who were “on the stage six hours a day.”40
Arbitration papers for transit workers in the city, in particular amongst bus drivers, give
us insight into the practice among workers with much less sick leave. Theodore Kheel, the
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) and Transport Workers Union (TWU) mediator, dealt with
these issues repeatedly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Workers would routinely fake
sicknesses, either calling in the day prior or even only an hour before their shift. The problem
became so pronounced that the Transit Authority (TA) would call workers on the phone to verify
that they were at home and on occasion send a TA doctor to assess them.41 While absenteeism
was often stretched to its feasible limits, sometimes it went much further, with one worker fired
for missing 30 days of work in 1968!42
In addition to absenteeism, many white and blue-collar workers would engage in activity
that would decrease the intensity of their workday. In some cases these were longstanding
practices; in the early 1960s, the chairman of Walworth, a valve and tool manufacturer,
complained that his office workers: “used to have trouble with the trains…Then they had to have
a coffee break of about thirty minutes, and then by 11:30 they were making plans for lunch, and
most of them were back by 2 P.M. Then they had to leave to catch the train by 4:30.”43
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In the late 1960s, such practices were relatively common in many blue-collar jobs. A
young radical worker in the fuel oil industry found that many of his coworkers would park their
trucks and take naps. Since they worked independently, were paid hourly, and radio monitoring
equipment was not installed in trucks, drivers could make money while sleeping off part of their
workday.44 In the same years, younger telephone workers would sometimes sabotage equipment
to spark short walk offs, purposefully interrupting the workday in a way their older counterparts
did not.45 In other industries, workplace norms dictated a slower pace of work, and fuel
deliverers at airports maintained a large number of breaks, shirking their duties or deliberately
working slowly, and sometimes facing harsh disciplinary responses from management.46
Construction workers routinely took tools and construction materials home, and some engaged in
sabotage to shut down the job site.47
For some workers, the workplace itself, not simply rules and wages, was a source of
discontent. In his “Confessions of a Working Stiff,” Patrick Fenton described the daily
experience of unionized baggage handlers in the late 1960s at John F. Kennedy Airport in
Queens, who—as he succinctly put it—had two things in common: “they hate the work they are
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doing and drink a little too much.”48 Baggage handlers worked outdoors and in the cargo holds
of airplanes, unloading and transporting anything from mail to luggage within the airport
grounds. Fenton described the work as terribly monotonous, and its monotony was to blame for
its destructive effects on the lives of baggage handlers. Indignities spanned the range from
deafening noise and roll calls to horrible weather and clock-watching managers. Older workers
were the least content, and they complained often that their economic obligations—families,
mortgages, and car notes—kept them on the job. At the end of the day, Fenton described how his
fellow workers would “head down to the locker room, heads bowed, like a football team that
never wins.”49 While Fenton’s “Confessions of a Working Stiff” was certainly stylized for
effect, the conditions he described were found in other workplaces. In addition to being poorly
paid, postal workers worked in increasingly automated workplaces and complained of fatigue
and boredom.50 Autoworkers bemoaned the repetitive and monotonous nature of their work and
were diagnosed with the “blue collar blues.”51
Though Fenton describes a disheartening situation, some of this discontent manifested in
collective action. In August 1967, nearly 500 Pan American employees walked off the job over
unsolved grievances and deadlocked contract talks, ending their walkout after two days when the
leaders of the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks Local 3055 ordered them
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back to work.52 In May the following year, more than 100 cargo handlers working for Pan
American walked off the job in response to the dismissal of one of their workmates. The strike
spread from the cargo holds to the mailrooms, with another 50 Pan Am employees walking out.
Union representatives Local 3055 intervened, brokering a deal to bring the issue to mediation,
putting an end to the walkout.53
Some younger people in the 1960s expressed a generational discontent with workplace
discipline. Refusing to fall in line was reflected in high turnover rates and absenteeism, and some
young people articulated to have the mental and physical space to explore whatever else was
outside of work.54 Young people’s more vocal opposition was in some ways a result of better
times: they had more job opportunities available to them in an era of low unemployment and
lacked the experience of severe economic downturns.55 Cultural practices of the young also
brought conflicts with management: United Parcel Service workers briefly went on strike against
being disciplined for having long hair and wearing turtlenecks in 1969!56 Young people’s
attitudes sometimes reflected a broader youth movement that questioned hegemonic institutions
including the workplace, family, and government.57 In the summer of 1968, when nearly 700
young lifeguards and lifeguard supervisors organized a one-day wildcat against poor work
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conditions and ongoing grievances, their union leaders in District Council 37 denounced them as
“a bunch of wild kids.”58
Increasing neighborhood-based black militancy helped spur increased black organizing in
the workplace. Wilbur Haddock was a member of Congress of Racial Equality’s Bronx chapter,
working at a racially stratified Ford production plant in Mahwah, New Jersey. Influenced by
mobilizations in the city, in the mid-1960s he pushed the United Auto Workers to take a stronger
stand against job discrimination and racial segregation of the workplace. Efforts foundered,
however, and in the late 1960s Haddock helped form the United Black Brothers, which would
organize outside of the union’s framework, building its base of support primarily amongst urban
blacks who had more experience and proximity to ongoing civil rights struggles.59
Black Nationalism and growing racial pride influenced Haddock’s group and many other
newer black labor groups. While the Harlem riots contributed to the acceleration of black
activism in the TWU, in July 1967, Detroit, Newark, and New Haven exploded as ghettoized
black people looted stores, burned buildings, and fought back against the National Guard’s
attempt to impose order.60 While many whites looked on the events as outbreaks of lawlessness
and crime, many blacks saw the riots as politically motivated rebellion and even those who were
not direct participants sympathized with the riots or were proud that they had occurred.61 The
1968 Ocean Hill-Brownsville strike, which saw the primarily white and Jewish UFT facing off
58

“675 Lifeguards Walk Out Here For a Day Over Job Conditions,” New York Times, July 28,
1968.
59
“Conversation: Wilbur Haddock on the United Black Brothers,” Souls vol. 2 no. 2 (Spring
2000): 27-33.
60
Robert M. Fogelson, Violence as Protest: A Study of Riots and Ghettos (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Co., 1971), 43; Joe T. Darden, Detroit: Race Riots, Racial Conflicts, and Efforts to
Bridge the Racial Divide (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013), 2-3.
61
Kevin J. Mumford, Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in America (New York: New
York University Press, 2008), 136-140; James N. Upton, “The Politics of Urban Violence:
Critiques and Proposals,” Journal of Black Studies, vol. 15, no. 3. (Mar., 1985), 243-46.

84
with black community control advocates, added to racial nationalism in the city.62 As Detroitbased organizer Simon P. Owens recalled, many new black caucuses around the country were
much more radical in orientation, focusing less on traditional rank-and-file activism and more on
revolutionary aspirations and style. In some cases, the radical aesthetics and revolutionary stance
of younger blacks alienated older coworkers, and in Owens’ estimation allowed union leadership
to more easily undermine them.63
Worker dissatisfaction and practices such as absenteeism—as well as sabotage and
wildcat strikes—caused concern amongst government officials and major corporations. By the
last quarter of the 1960s, profits began to decline across most sectors and productivity growth
began to slow. Aggressive workers were not solely to blame, of course, and as economist Robert
Brenner argues, international competition played a driving role in the declining rate of profit.64
That being said, worker discipline is always a concern amongst businesses, and amidst a
declining rate of profit, absenteeism, shirking work duties, and pilferage cost owners more
money.65 While there was some dispute at the time concerning the degree to which workers
actions were responsible for declining profits, by the second half of the 1960s, profits had fallen
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33 percent in manufacturing and 22 percent in white collar work, generating managerial anxiety
and catalyzing attempts to reorganize the workplace in order to turn the trend around.66

Alienation and New York’s Garbage Men

While many remember 1968 as a year of student protest and rioting in the aftermath of
Martin Luther King’s assassination, in New York, the growing alienation of working class
people was also front and center. In February, the rank and file of the Uniformed
Sanitationmen’s Association (USA) forced their longtime leader into a nine-day strike, leaving
hundreds of thousands of tons of garbage to accumulate along the city’s tight streets. Organized
as Local 831 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the 10,000 sanitation workers
rejected a contract put to them by their founding president, John DeLury, pelting him with eggs
and chasing him off a speaker’s platform in front of City Hall. There was more afoot than mere
bread and butter concerns; as Charles R. Morris put it, New York’s sanitationmen “were angry at
the city, angry at the changes in working conditions, angry at the apparent preferences shown
minorities; they felt like second-class citizens (‘garbagemen’) and wanted to strike almost for
catharsis.”67 Combining grievances both on and off the job, the sanitation strike gives us an
important window into the myriad factors that spurred the city’s rank-and-file led strikes. It also
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reveals important fault lines in labor’s body politic, with the overwhelmingly white sanitation
workers embodying white working class anger at Lindsay.
Relations between the Lindsay administration and the USA leadership between 1966 and
1968 led to increasing anger on the part of rank-and-file sanitation workers. As city officials
predicted, the 1966 transit strike made unions more confident that major gains could be achieved
by challenging the mayor.68 When the USA’s contract expired on July 1, 1966, DeLury chose not
to call a strike, expecting a big settlement and assured by Lindsay that all wage and benefit gains
would be retroactive. Lindsay appeared to be changing course with unions, avoiding direct
confrontations and employing an appeasement strategy that previous mayors had used.69
Relations quickly took a turn for the worse when Lindsay appointed Samuel J. Kearing
Jr. to the position of Sanitation Commissioner. Amidst ongoing negotiations, Kearing began an
investigation into USA members, which resulted in the suspension of nearly two dozen sanitation
workers for taking bribes. DeLury responded with a work slowdown, urging his men to only
operate trucks that met safety standards, leaving nearly a quarter of the city’s sanitation fleet
idle.70 Within a week, the union won a $450 raise, increased city payments towards a dental plan,
and an increased margin of city payments into pension funds. DeLury thought the deal kept up
with the pattern set by the TWU, and upon agreeing to it, he put in a good word for the mayor,
saying, “Mayor Lindsay’s labor policy is beginning to take shape. So long as we have his
cooperation, we pledge him ours.”71
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In spite of conciliatory words and contracts, Commissioner Kearing continued
investigations, and in 1967, he reassigned some 450 sanitationmen from 25 sites in response to
allegations of large-scale corruption.72 Kearing also attacked the union with a series of costcutting measures, including eliminating a paid workday for participation in any one of the city’s
large parades (such as Saint Patrick and Columbus Day).73 While Kearing attacked the union, he
advocated solving the city’s sanitation problems with increased hiring, pleasing union officials
and USA members. When he hired some 200 new sanitationmen without Lindsay’s approval,
Lindsay fired him for ignoring the chain of command.74
The biggest point of contention between the administration and the USA leadership was
the newly created Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB). Lindsay hoped that the tripartite
commission—made up of one city representative, one union representative, and one impartial
mediator—would streamline labor relations in the aftermath of the transit strike. DeLury
resented the institution, preferring direct negotiations with the mayor, which he felt were a sign
of respect for the powerful organization he had built.75 When the USA’s 1967 contract expired,
DeLury refused to negotiate with the OCB, not only out of anger at the institution but also in
hopes that several ongoing disputes with public sector employees would helped raise the bar for
his own contract negotiations.76 DeLury’s plan backfired, however. After seven months without
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a contract, he issued a hard deadline to the city in January but ultimately balked when the city
did not budge. 77
On the icy morning of February 2, DeLury and the USA leadership called a mass rally of
sanitationmen at City Hall, pulling men off the job across the five boroughs in what was an
unofficial strike. By 7 a.m., some 7,000 USA members gathered, and DeLury hoped that the
rally would bring about the necessary pressure to produce a sellable contract.78 But as he walked
through the crowd, DeLury faced intense hostility, with sanitationmen jeering and jostling him,
and some trying to hit him with eggs.79 Like the transit workers with Mike Quill, the
sanitationmen called DeLury’s bluff. The men believed that others looked down on their
occupation, taking for granted a public service that was both backbreaking and dangerous.
Similar to a growing number of workers, sanitationmen felt very strongly that they occupied a
low rung in the social hierarchy, but unlike other workers, they felt that their line of work singled
them out; many were enraged daily at being called garbage men.80 Their resentment made its
way up the city’s social hierarchy, and as one sanitation worker concluded in the aftermath of the
strike, “[w]e’re hard-working men, and the Mayor just doesn’t understand us.”81
While widespread anger at both the Mayor and DeLury’s lack of delivery existed, it was
not without forewarning: several days earlier, when DeLury had failed to lead his men out on
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strike, the union’s 700 shop stewards rejected his contract recommendations.82 Such rejections
were becoming more common in the city, and in the days prior, 3,500 Local 272 Teamster
garage workers rejected a contract and went on strike, and a bus strike on Long Island paralyzed
the commutes of more than 20,000 riders after drivers there rejected a contract.83 Less than two
months prior, an angry meeting of taxi drivers had forced the city’s most powerful labor leader to
flee out of a side door. When calling his men out for a threatening rally that bordered on a strike,
DeLury not only miscalculated his own control over his members but also underestimated the
degree to which rank-and-file upheaval had emboldened workers in New York.
What began for DeLury as a piece of political theatre, a mass rally with himself at the
helm, evolved quickly into a worker-driven meeting where grievances were aired against both
the city and the union president. DeLury presented an OCB-written contract, which was voted
down, and when he motioned for a mail-in strike vote, the angry ranks shouted him down again,
forcing DeLury—who had only overseen one, single-day strike in his 30 years as USA
president—to declare, “I accept a motion for go, go, go.”84
While internal issues helped spur the strike, the growing political dissensus in New York
City also played a part. Many white rank-and-file union members had come to associate
Lindsay’s mayoralty with one that actively promoted the welfare of racial minorities at the
expense of whites. Lindsay tended to agree, telling one reporter after his first year in office: “I
understand how they feel...and I don’t resent it. But this had to be the year of the poor in New
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York.”85 In Lindsay’s mind the poor were black and Puerto Rican New Yorkers, and standing
opposite the progress of racial minorities was New York’s more well-off, white working class,
many of whom were organized in or affiliated by family relations with labor unions, whom
Lindsay had portrayed as entrenched power brokers that upheld unfair advantages for whites.86
Lindsay played this card during the transit strike and would do so again during the sanitation
strike, attacking their efforts with crisis rhetoric, or using what DeLury called a “rash of
clamors” to whip up anti-labor sentiment.87
Lindsay’s denunciation of union power and his broader disregard for many whites led to
a widespread feeling among white working-class people that the mayor favored poor blacks and
Puerto Ricans over poor and working-class whites.88 As one union cab driver put it in 1967,
“You tell me what he’s ever done for white people.”89 For sanitation workers, the growing
resentment against the mayor compounded with their on-the-job grievances. As such, going on
strike in 1968 developed as a way to not only make militant demands and but also avenge
themselves of the denigration of their occupational and class status.
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Determined not to lose the battle against yet another municipal labor union, the Lindsay
administration hoped to use emergency powers to put down the strike, a move that inadvertently
united the labor movement behind the striking sanitation workers.90 Lindsay’s first major
countermeasure came on the fourth day of the strike when he called 3,000 municipal workers to
emergency trash duty. The move enraged DC 37’s Victor Gotbaum and John Cassesse of the
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA), and both threatened a massive strike if their
members were brought in as scabs.91 Days later, Lindsay ordered the Emergency Control Board
to declare a public health emergency on the grounds of possible typhoid and cholera outbreaks
and the growing number of trash fires.92 The garbage piling up on the streets reached epic
proportions, with estimates running as high as 10,000 tons accumulating each day. Trash fires
increased nearly 750 percent in the first days of the strike as children and young men in poor
neighborhoods set it alight.93 Other residents organized protests against the trash, part and parcel
of ongoing struggles around sanitation in low-income areas.94
With negotiations at an impasse, Lindsay called for the harshest solution to the strike:
mobilizing the National Guard. While Lindsay had avoided asking the state to mobilize the guard
90

“The Strike of the New York City Sanitationmen,” March 15, 1968, Nelson A. Rockefeller
personal papers, The Rockefeller Archive Center, box 75, Labor folder, 3.
91
“Confidential Memo from Harry W. Albright Jr. to Nelson Rockefeller,” Undated, Nelson A.
Rockefeller Gubernatorial Records, The Rockefeller Archive Center, box 90, New York City
Sanitation Strike, Key Events folder, 3.
92
“John Lindsay to Nelson Rockefeller,” February 6, 1968, Nelson A. Rockefeller Gubernatorial
Records, The Rockefeller Archive Center, box 90, New York City Sanitation Strike, Key Events
folder.
93
“Confidential Memo from Harry W. Albright Jr. to Nelson Rockefeller,” Undated, Nelson A.
Rockefeller Gubernatorial Records, The Rockefeller Archive Center, box 90, New York City
Sanitation Strike, Key Events folder, 14.
94
Themis Chronopoulos, “The Lindsay Administration and the Sanitation Crisis of New York
City, 1966–1973,” Journal of Urban History 40, no. 6 (November 2014): 1138-1154 & Brian
Purnell, “‘Taxation without Sanitation is Tyranny’: Civil Rights Struggles Over Garbage
Collection in Brooklyn, New York During the Fall of 1962,” Afro-Americans in New York Life &
History 31, no. 2 (July 2007): 61-88.

92
during outbreaks of rioting during the summers of 1966 and 1967, one week into the strike he
called on Governor Rockefeller to bring in the troops.95 For many New York labor leaders,
memories of National Guard mobilizations and civil violence during the Depression remained
potent. Leaders like Van Arsdale of the AFL-CIO, Joseph Trerotola of the Teamsters, as well as
municipal labor leaders like Gotbaum, who Lindsay had already alienated during this affair,
threatened to strike in response to any guard mobilization.96 While DeLury had alienated other
labor leaders in the past, especially other municipal labor leaders, Lindsay had succeeded by
complete accident in uniting labor behind the strike.97
Lindsay’s attempts to put down the strike were an attempt to rewrite municipal labor
relations, and strike back against organized labor. Amidst the negotiating impasse, he told a
Rockefeller aide that he rejected settlement recommendations because it was excessively
compensatory and violated the principle of negotiating with an illegally striking union.98 This
position was spurious given that from his very first days in office, he had negotiated with an
illegally striking union. More importantly, the mayor wanted to undo the legacy of the transit
strike by any means necessary, and by 1968, in the recollection of Harry W. Albright Jr.,
Rockefeller’s Deputy Secretary, Lindsay now thought that it was “time to break these public
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employee unions and to draw the line.” In order to do this, he pit unions against the rest of the
public, arguing in a press conference on February 9, “My effort here is to do whatever I can to
establish the principle that the rights of 8 million people cannot be violated by selfish
interests.”99
With Lindsay hoping to put down the strike and transform municipal labor relations,
Governor Rockefeller reluctantly intervened. Many historians have rightfully emphasized that
Rockefeller opposed bringing in the Guard because he feared another Ludlow Massacre
besmirching the family name. His motivations were more complicated however. Rockefeller
enjoyed the support of organized labor in the state for many years.100 DeLury campaigned for
Rockefeller in 1966, even orchestrating an event in which Rockefeller spoke to USA shop
stewards atop a sanitation truck.101 Van Arsdale and the CLC equally cultivated a close working
relationship with Rockefeller, who they had endorsed in the 1966 gubernatorial elections.102
Given his political entanglements, it was no surprise that Rockefeller, under
consideration for nomination as the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, rebuked Lindsay
for his Guard demand. Rockefeller instead proposed a state takeover of the Sanitation
Department to end the strike, offering a $425 pay increase as compared to the $400 pay increase
the OCB offered. While DeLury, who was in jail for much of the strike, liked the possibility of
negotiating directly with Rockefeller, he and other USA negotiators found one major fault with
the plan. “The rabbit”—the name given in negotiations for Rockefeller’s state takeover—would
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require approval in the state legislature and offer nothing in the immediate term to strikers.
Negotiators were very concerned that the rank and file would not accept such a measure given
their initial rejection of a $400 settlement and the disastrous meeting at City Hall a week prior.
DeLury, who Rockefeller had managed to free from jail to continue negotiations, eventually
brought the contract to the sanitationmen, and after nine days on strike, USA members accepted
the improved deal.103
New Yorkers were delighted that the strike was over, but it left a bitter taste in the
mouths of many. For union leaders and many rank-and-file workers, Lindsay’s recalcitrance in
the face of the sanitationmen’s demands and his desire to use the National Guard to bring the
strike to an end only seemed to be further evidence of his disdainful attitude towards the city’s
working class. Many other citizens saw the strike and the mountains of garbage as a disgrace and
evidence of labor’s disregard for the rest of the city.104 In fact, many black antipoverty groups in
effect called for breaking the strike in protests against the growing trash piles in neighborhoods
like the Lower East Side and Harlem.105 And though many New Yorkers did not like the garbage
accumulation, there were still a number of them who did not agree with the mayor’s attempt to
use the guard, approving instead of Rockefeller’s attempts to bring the strike to a peaceful
conclusion.106 In the aftermath, Lindsay would explain that he had to hold out against the USA in
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order to fight an illegally striking union that rejected the OCB. Lindsay characterized his
opposition to the union as a stand of an entire city “against illegality, against violence, against
extortion,” cementing a divisive legacy concerning labor organizations and union rank and
file.107
New York City’s 1968 sanitation crisis exposed important political developments in the
city and reveals much about some workers’ political motivations. As Victor Gotbaum of DC 37
would later declare, “[t]he difficulty in the sanitation strike was a breakdown in many
relationships: the Mayor’s with the leadership; the leadership at one point with their own men;
their own men amongst themselves.”108 Furthermore, by 1968, labor insurgency pushed and was
pushed by a growing multilateral polarization in New York City.
While many historians have emphasized that public opinion ultimately turned the tide of
the strike, there is also evidence that sentiment amongst rank-and-file workers played a part.
Sanitation worker Joseph J. Chiarelli, one of the shop stewards who had rejected the initial
settlement with the city, expressed his thanks to Governor Rockefeller in the aftermath of the
strike. Chiarelli considered himself representative of many working people in the city: living in a
small apartment with his family and working hard to make ends meet. But Chiarelli resented how
maligned his class and line of work were, telling the Governor of a death on the job, two severe
injuries involving hit-and-run accidents, and emphasizing the need for better equipment and
better service to the public. While brokering a more favorable settlement was certainly important
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to his support of Rockefeller, Chiarelli also supported the Governor because unlike Mayor
Lindsay, he “understood the working man’s feelings more than some people realize.”109 Chiarelli
was proud of his hard work and proud of what he had earned, but he felt that politicians rarely
connected with the experience of working people. This sense of disempowerment, anger, and
alienation amongst working class people would remain front-and-center throughout 1968 as
George Wallace made his bid for the presidency.

A Southern Segregationist in New York City

In 1968, George Wallace would try to tap the anger of white working class New Yorkers,
intertwining pervasive sentiments of societal alienation and populist denunciations of the status
quo with fears of crime and thinly veiled racism. In fact, one of Wallace’s best-attended 1968
rallies was in New York City’s Madison Square Garden, where the candidate was met by a tenminute, standing ovation on the part of 16,000 fervent supporters.110 Denouncing radicals,
criminals, liberals, bureaucrats, and the undeserving poor, Wallace set the crowd to its feet
repeatedly throughout the night. Several union officials from Alabama and one from the
steamfitters in upstate New York accompanied the candidate on stage. Wallace was in a
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working-class city, and he went to great lengths to identify himself with the aspirations and fears
of working people there.111
Wallace’s 1968 campaign focused heavily on working class voters in the industrial north.
Wallace’s hopes of breaking into this demographic rested upon his concrete achievements in the
Democratic presidential primary of 1964, in which he polled quite well among white ethnic
voters in Wisconsin, Indiana, and parts of Maryland.112 Wallace’s all-volunteer New York City
campaigners agreed with this strategy; 19-year-old Thomas Stokes argued, “All those ethnic
groups that usually vote for Democrats—the Italians, the Irish, the Eastern Europeans—we’ll
really crack them.”113
As sociologist Stephen Steinberg has argued, ethnic concerns—of Jews, Irish, and ItalianAmericans in New York—are often a way of discussing class-based realities, thus while
ethnicity shaped the responses of New York’s different white ethnic groups, a discussion cannot
neglect a requisite label: working class.114 And as Jefferson Cowie has suggested, class was a
key dimension in the 1968 election and in the primaries. Robert Kennedy, in spite of his history
of investigating unions and union corruption, garnered considerable support from working class
Americans, white and black.115 But rank-and-file discontent also manifested itself in a growing
support for Wallace.
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In September 1968, a story in the New York Times indicated high levels of support, with a
New Jersey UAW straw polls, resulting in troubling figures for labor leaders: in Trenton, 62
percent of 500 autoworkers polled, and in Middlesex County, 73 percent of autoworkers polled
supported George Wallace as their choice for president. Union leaders deplored the polls’ results,
arguing that their membership was misled and had no appreciation for the gains won in the past.
They further feared that their members were no longer thinking in terms of economics.116
Ironically, the UAW rank and file was among the most militant in the country, the most willing
to walk off the job over grievances concerning speedups, managerial disrespect, or complacent
union bosses. In fact, these workers practically represented a vanguard of discontent. That union
officials would bring them up as people not thinking about economics demonstrates quite clearly
the growing gulf between workers and their representatives, which was to some degree
responsible for white workers turning to Wallace.117
In New York City’s police department, both rank-and-file anger and support for Wallace
grew in 1968. Ongoing conflicts with the Brooklyn branch of the Black Panther Party had
ironically begun to politicize officers. In August, after a melee involving police and Panthers, in
which the radicals were set free without bail, patrol officers founded the Law Enforcement
Group of New York (LEG).118 LEG was a rank-and-file group that argued for a police
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crackdown on radical groups and crime, the abolition of the police-led Civilian Complaint
Review Board (CCRB), and the prevention of another Warren Court.119
LEG’s rhetoric drew upon long-established right-wing narratives concerning police and
the court system, as well as the period’s growing law and order discourse.120 Emerging at the
national level in the first half of the 1960s as a result of the efforts of both Wallace and Barry
Goldwater, law and order politics connected the Civil Rights Movement and urban riots to an
increase in street crime and lawlessness. Wallace deployed this rhetoric to attack the Civil Rights
Movement, which threatened to overturn the racial order in his state, but Goldwater broadened
the rhetoric’s purview in his 1964 presidential bid to include a more comprehensive critique of
liberalism. This rhetoric gained strength from the rise in violent crime in cities across America,
and especially in New York.121 While there are indications that a portion of the city’s increased
crime rate was due to Lindsay forcing better bookkeeping on the police department, murders
grew by the hundreds and robberies grew by thousands into the 1970s.122
In the 1966 battle over the CCRB, conservatives and police drew upon law and order
rhetoric for television commercials and print ads, highlighting the destruction caused by the
Harlem riot of 1964 as well as the dangers of armed youths.123 LEG combined law and order
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with rank-and-file rebellion, contesting the parameters of police labor, calling for better
equipment, improved communications, and superior treatment for injured officers.124 They spoke
with a radical tinge however, and in the words of LEG spokesman and organizer, Lieutenant
Leon Laino, Judge Furey—who had freed the Panthers without bail—was not the problem,
rather: “it’s the whole system.”125
In New York, rank-and-file police officers angry with their union leaders and the city
government saw Wallace as a vehicle for their aspirations. When LEG and other police officers
mobilized for a September 4 court hearing, 150 off-duty cops attacked Black Panthers and their
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) supporters. Most of the officers were armed, either
with pistols on their hips or blackjacks in their hands, as they kicked, punched, and beat their
victims. Many officers wore pro-Wallace pins, and some shouted “Win with Wallace” and
“White Power” before the fighting broke out. Two members of the executive board of LEG were
also present at the beating, though they claimed not to have participated. Mayor Lindsay
denounced the beatings and called for an investigation. A LEG spokesman tried to distance the
organization from the violence, but the attack on the Panthers and SDS was part of an increasing
rightward trend within the NYPD, which LEG exemplified.126 In New York, the Wallace
campaign’s threats of retribution against protesters and radicals spoke directly to officers’ onthe-job experiences, tapping into what the New York Times called “the cop vote.”127
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While not all of Wallace’s New York supporters were rebel rank-and-filers, he had an
undeniable cachet with militant workers in the city. One New York Times reporter informally
polled attendees at Wallace’s Madison Square Garden appearance, finding amongst them a
number of workers who had wrangled with their union heads and the city, including police
officers, firefighters, sanitationmen, social workers, and other civil servants. The fall was a time
of intense negotiations between the city and the police, firemen, and sanitationmen. Notably, the
city’s firefighters had battled with the mayor for the last two years, and by the height of
Wallace’s presidential run, the rank and file rejected a city contract and voted to strike, with one
firemen arguing, “I think the threat of a strike is the only thing [Lindsay] understands.”128 To
avoid penalties of the newly enacted Taylor Law, the firemen’s union called for a partial strike
on October 23, with the men continuing only the most basic services while refusing drills,
training, hydrant inspections, and court appearances.129
While police officers’ concern with law and order requires little explanation, law and
order had become concern on the job for many workers in New York City. Uniformed city
workers reported increasingly frequent attacks.130 For example, in July 1968, there were 114
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attacks on firefighters, including physical assaults, thrown rocks and bottles, and occasionally
Molotov cocktails. Black and Latino areas of the Bronx and Brooklyn were the most dangerous
neighborhoods, and in journalist Joe Flood’s estimation, growing racial polarization drove these
attacks, as “firemen were virtually the only white authority figures left in neighborhoods with
little love for white authority figures.”131 But firefighters were not the only ones threatened, as
sanitationmen, taxi drivers, transit, and telephone workers recounted similar tales.132 As one
CWA rank and filer remembered it, in 1968 many older union men had Wallace stickers on their
lunch boxes, though he believed it was primarily confined to suburbanites who were culturally
conservative, sometimes racist, but still staunch unionists.133
The Ocean Hill-Brownsville strikes in the fall of 1968, which pitted the heavily Jewish
UFT against the black community in New York, raised similar law and order concerns. In the
face of black demands for community control of schools, which circumvented union gains, UFT
signs proclaimed themselves for teacher safety and “against mob rule.”134 In fact, a local political
columnist commented that UFT president Albert Shanker was only “an accent away from
George Wallace.”135 The strike was a complicated affair with many rank-and-file teachers only
reluctantly supporting it. Many teachers were already organizing against Shanker, spurred by on
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the job mistreatment, desires for more curriculum control, and wider labor militancy in the
city.136 At this very same time, there was widespread talk amongst teachers that they might vote
for Wallace, but this support was fleeting. For many Jews, who were the bulk of the UFT,
Wallace was too much of a demagogue, fitting a profile that was too similar to the historical
experience of fascism. As one teacher put it, “Being Jewish, I was afraid he would get me next.
He was too much like Hitler, and we don’t need another Nazi Germany.”137
Interestingly, racial polarization within teaching also emerged from black rank-and-file
efforts. The most significant teacher’s opposition group during the 1968 strike was the AfricanAmerican Teachers Association (ATA). Jerald Podair estimates that by 1967 some 2000 black
teachers in New York were dues-paying members of the ATA, with most joining the
organization because of the UFT’s failure to significantly oppose racist, anti-bussing protests.
The ATA’s beliefs were increasingly nationalist, articulating a cooperativist vision built on an
idealized notion of blackness, which was juxtaposed to a deeply immoral, materialist, and
individualist whiteness. According to the ATA, this conglomeration of negative traits was
especially manifest among white educators, who were damaging the life opportunities of black
students and inculcating them with a toxic ideology.138 The ATA’s nationalism disregarded the
lived reality of class for white New Yorkers, ignoring the white working-class’s building of a
social democratic polity as well as teachers’ constant battles with the educational system and
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union.139 But in the face of accusations of racism and complicity in black oppression, many
white teachers sprang to the defense of the values of competition and meritocracy, blaming black
failure on a culture of poverty, an equally stereotypical and damaging reification of black
attributes. The ATA’s vociferous denunciations of white teachers as well as their unnuanced
nationalism, while well intentioned, inadvertently helped build a fertile environment for Wallace
support among teachers and in the city as a whole.140
New York’s Wallace surge mimicked the growing fervor outside of the state. Wallace’s
support grew in September and October 1968 as the candidate crisscrossed the nation giving
rousing speeches in the bastions of union power. In Flint, 10,000 people came out for Wallace,
while Akron and Pittsburgh boasted equally large crowds. By early October Wallace was
garnering 21 percent support in national polls.141 Polls of union members indicated an even
greater support for Wallace, with some showing 25 percent support as compared to 34 percent
for Humphrey and 32 percent for Nixon. These polls also indicated a strong preoccupation on the
part of respondents with the Vietnam War, civil rights, and crime, but interestingly, a majority
agreement with nondiscrimination in hiring. With one month until the election and with far fewer
resources, George Wallace was making a substantial showing in national polls and some
editorials opined that perhaps the Alabamian’s dream of achieving a plurality of the popular vote
was not so farfetched after all.142
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New York’s labor establishment acknowledged Wallace’s broader appeal in the month
before the election. On October 10, the Central Labor Council (CLC) held a special meeting to
discuss Wallace’s third-party presidential campaign and his support within the ranks of labor.
Van Arsdale’s believed that Wallace support was overstated, bordering upon a total figment of
the media’s imagination. While it was true that no union officials in New York City publicly
supported Wallace, Van Arsdale was ignoring the rank-and-file appeal, ironically understating
the Wallace influence at an emergency meeting designed to address its very prevalence.143 In the
upper echelons of the AFL-CIO, there was a strong concern about Wallace’s influence, as shown
by a private memo to George Meany from the head of COPE, but this fear was rarely expressed
publicly.144 Clearly there was more support than Van Arsdale was letting on, but at a news
conference later that day, he claimed, “a fraud is being perpetrated” through the
misrepresentation of the labor movement and the AFL-CIO’s 1.2 million members in New York
City.145 Fundamentally, Van Arsdale’s concern with the Wallace voters was not that they would
lead to a Wallace victory, but rather, as indicated by many polls, labor’s votes would be split in
the incredibly tight election. New York Times labor commentator A.H. Raskin went so far as to
comment that “[a]s the leaders of organized labor see it, the man to beat in November is George
C. Wallace.”146
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While Van Arsdale claimed Wallace support was overstated, New York’s CLC undertook
a monumental effort to support the Democrats in 1968. On Labor Day 1968, Democratic
candidate Hubert Humphrey kicked off his fall drive, not in Detroit, which was customary, but in
New York City. With the help of local and national resources, the AFL-CIO led a massive
parade of over 100,000 participants, with AFL-CIO president George Meany and Democratic
presidential nominee Humphrey leading the festivities.147 The solid show of labor’s support was
more needed than ever if the Democrats were to win, but parades were not enough. New York’s
CLC was waging a virtual war for Humphrey’s election through the final months of the
campaign, mobilizing thousands of members and distributing millions of pieces of literature.
In September the CLC set itself to the task of voter registration, focusing on union
members and their families as well as unregistered, but likely Democratic voters. Union locals
played a large role both in the registration process and the campaign by ensuring that individual
members and their families were registered voters, purchasing mobile sound equipment, and
organizing stewards, shop chairmen, and the rank and file for the effort.148 In October, the New
York CLC effort shifted into overdrive for the Humphrey blitz. In the final month of the
campaign, the labor organization distributed 3.1 million pieces of literature and paraphernalia
including posters, buttons, and stickers at homes, subway stations, housing projects, rallies, and
union meetings across the five boroughs. Meanwhile 30 sound trucks targeted industrial areas,
housing projects, low-income neighborhoods, and shopping districts with the Humphrey
message. Over 1,000 union volunteers participated in a phone drive to contact every registered
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Democrat in the city.149 The CLC asked individual unions to publicize the campaign in their
publications, put up signs in storefronts, and distribute literature to the rank and file.150 Finally,
the CLC organized 28 torchlight parades across the city with hundreds of marchers in hopes of
highlighting the importance of the election. Ultimately, over 18,000 people contributed to the
AFL-CIO’s campaign in New York. In the final days before the registration deadline for
participation in the November 5th election, the AFL-CIO had registered an incredible 237,773
new voters in New York City, with more than half coming from Brooklyn and Queens.151 This
massive number of new registrants in the heavily Democratic city, alongside the parading, phone
calls, and literature helped to strengthen the pro-Humphrey forces in the tight race.152
The AFL-CIO’s Committee on Public Education (COPE) produced important campaign
propaganda for Humphrey, some of which helps explain how the national leadership was
attempting to deal with the combined Wallace-Nixon threat. One CLC foldout was titled,
“Warning: Wallace No Friend of Working People or Their Unions.” Signed as “An Open Letter
from Alabama Unionists.” It detailed the mistakes organized labor made in its support for
Wallace as Alabama’s governor, outlining a series of damning facts, including Alabama’s weak
per capita income, low educational expenditures, and Wallace’s connections to anti-labor forces.
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One highlighted portion of the text took on Wallace’s law and order claims, demonstrating that
in 1965 Alabama had the highest per capita murder rate in the country and ranked unusually high
for aggravated assaults, too.153 For the most part, COPE campaign literature focused on the two
main candidates in the race, Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon, comparing their
congressional records and their parties’ political platforms in detail.154 Other propaganda
implored working people not to “blow the elections of ‘68” for fear of not “surviv[ing] the
assault of ’69.”155 As many people across the country seemed fed up with the status quo and
were considering a variety of protest votes, the CLC’s rhetoric was clear: in spite of the
disillusionment many feel, Humphrey was the only vote that would not result in disaster for
working people.156
In spite of surging support in the fall, Wallace ultimately won only five states in the Deep
South and did quite poorly in New York, winning only 5.3 percent of the vote. The only silver
lining to his meager results was his support in white working class neighborhoods. On the border
between Brooklyn and Queens, in neighborhoods such as Greenpoint, Maspeth, Bushwick, and
Long Island City, Wallace received between roughly 8 and 10 percent of the vote. Further south
in heavily Italian-American Red Hook and Downtown Brooklyn, 9 percent of voters came out
for Wallace. Not coincidentally, these were some of the very same areas and populations that the
AFL-CIO targeted with their pro-Humphrey and anti-Wallace election materials in the run-up to
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the election. Further east in another border area of Brooklyn and Queens, which included East
New York, Cypress Hills, Ozone Park, and Howard Beach, Wallace received 8 and 9 percent of
the vote. In similar areas in the Bronx like Parkchester and Throgs Neck, support was the same.
In Astoria and Jackson Heights, Queens, Wallace votes appear to have contributed to a
Republican victory with Nixon winning out by a matter of 1 or 2 percentage points. In the
Republican areas like Bay Ridge, Wallace’s support averaged nearly 7 percent, but on Staten
Island, Wallace supported reached anywhere from 8.5 to 9.5 percent.157
In other parts of the deindustrializing North, Wallace won higher margins: 12 percent in
Ohio, 10 percent in Michigan, 8.5 in Illinois, 8 percent in Pennsylvania, 9 percent in New
Jersey.158 Conservative working-class New Yorkers had a more viable option in Nixon, and the
ad hoc campaign of Wallace had to fight with already established party organizations pushing for
the Californian.159 Republicans held a few strongholds in the city, and the leadership of the New
York’s Conservative Party fought off a small-scale, pro-Wallace rebellion within its own ranks
earlier that year.160 New York’s demographics also disfavored Wallace, with a significant Jewish
segment, who in spite of occasionally breaking ranks on particular issues, voted overwhelmingly
Democrat in presidential elections. Finally, the AFL-CIO’s vast effort, which historians have
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acknowledged as having played a large role nationally, was also a large factor in keeping down
Wallace support in New York City.161

Conclusion
In 1967 and 1968, strikes in New York City grew in number and size, but just as
importantly, they underwent an important qualitative shift with dozens of contract rejections and
wildcats in important sectors such as transportation, sanitation, energy, and logistics. In some
cases, workers used wildcat strikes when ongoing grievances were not being addressed. In the
summer of 1967, CWA Local 1101’s outside workers organized a nine-day wildcat demanding
paired assignments in dangerous neighborhoods after a change collector was attacked in
Bedford-Stuyvesant. Two months prior, a worker had refused an assignment in Harlem on
similar grounds, but talks between the union and management did not lead to quick results. The
strike grew from two-dozen workers to nearly 20,000—one of the largest strikes of the year—
prompting the union to more aggressively push the issue of worker safety and New York
Telephone to ultimately concede to workers’ demands. Shorter-lived strikes also vented anger
about past grievances, including those of lifeguards and airport workers.
In other cases, workers used wildcat strikes and contract rejections to increase pressure
on both union officials and employers during stalled or deadlocked negotiations. Taxi drivers of
the newly formed TDU publicly clashed with Van Arsdale—head of the AFL-CIO’s Central
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Labor Council and one of its most storied labor leaders—wildcatting amidst lagging negotiations
at the end of 1967. Thousands of taxi drivers walked off the job when leaders refused to call a
strike, resulting in a quick settlement with fleet owners, albeit one contingent upon city-approved
fare increases. Meanwhile during contract negotiations, firemen rejected leadership contracts
multiple times, as did tugboat operators, movers, and garage workers. In some cases rejections
turned into strikes, but in all cases workers hoped a rejection or wildcat would result in an
improved settlement.
Workers sometimes used wildcats to force discussion on issues outside of contract
negotiations or circumvent bureaucratic negotiating procedures altogether. Like their
counterparts in the CWA, meter maids wildcatted for on the job safety. Long-term harassment
and a scuffle with a police officer prompted their walkout, which successfully resulted in a
pairing agreement. In both 1967 and 1968, LIRR engineers disrupted train service for thousands
of commuters in protest of new schedules, with their union leaders eventually aggressively
pushing the issue. Workers fought what they considered to be unfair dismissals with wildcats at
Pan Am’s Kennedy airport offices in 1968 or in Railway Express Agency terminals across the
metro area that same year. While these moves prompted action from leaders, they were outside
of the context of ongoing negotiations and tended to be a form direct action at the job site to limit
employers’ power or obtain workers’ objectives.
Both new insurgent energies and simmering discontent intermingled with worker
opposition. For example, some younger workers, inspired by both cultural upheaval and
generally favorable economic environment, injected a new militancy into the workplace. When
more than 600 lifeguards and supervisors organized a wildcat strike, their leaders in DC 37
denounced them as “wild kids.” Younger workers were also involved in battles over fashion
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sensibilities because they more often wore longer hair, mustaches, beards, and “unacceptable”
clothing like turtlenecks. While the 1964 Harlem riot had prompted organizing among transit
workers, community activism and the spread of riots across the country increased black activism
in other workplaces as well. Formal and informal groups challenged issues specific to black and
Latino workers, especially racial stratification of jobs and racist treatment from supervisors, but
in some cases they attempted to be a rallying point for more radical platforms.
For some workers, simmering discontent at their perceived low social rank and growing
political polarization helped drive them to action. In February of 1968, sanitationmen forced
USA president DeLury into leading a strike he did not want, burying the city under thousands of
tons of trash. Rank-and-file discontent took the form of both union stewards rejecting a DeLuryproposed settlement, and a union rally in which rank-and-filers jostled and harassed the veteran
labor leader, forcing him to lead a strike. In hopes of overturning his previous failures, Lindsay
refused to negotiate for several days, imprisoned union leaders, and attempted to break the strike
by drafting other city workers as replacements and calling for the National Guard. Lindsay
cemented his anti-labor reputation, leaving Governor Rockefeller to work out a deal. While
sanitationmen wanted a better contract from the city, their attitudes indicated a broader
displeasure with their socioeconomic station, and USA members decried being misunderstood
and disrespected, treated like the garbage they hauled.
Amidst such anger some militant rank-and-filers in New York City found a champion in
George Wallace. In October 1968, he spoke before 16,000 people at Madison Square Garden,
with union officials from Alabama arrayed across the stage, forcefully showcasing his
connection to labor. While labor leaders like Van Arsdale believed that Wallace support was a
media invention, the CLC waged a major campaign to dissuade union members from voting for
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either Wallace or Nixon in 1968, distributing thousands of pieces of literature, marching and
organizing several parades, and registering hundreds of thousands of new voters. On Election
Day, Wallace’s main areas of support were white working-class areas of Staten Island, the
Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens where eight to ten percent of voters rejected the Humphrey-Nixon
dyad. With not only a growing black and Latino minority but also a large and longstanding
Jewish population, the city’s demographics were stacked against the southern segregationist.
Though there were some signs that working-class Jews might bolt from liberalism agenda on law
and order issues, many Jews the former had very little chance of supporting Wallace.162 In some
areas, well-established Republican and Conservative Party organizations also held off the
Wallace rebellion.
While Wallace’s pull on union members was discussed in both contemporary media and
in scholarly literature, there has been insufficient connection to ongoing rank-and-file activity
and the question of safety on the job. Wallace’s populism and strident criticism of the political
establishment gave voice to some workers’ sentiments as they battled with union leaders,
employers, and the city government for higher wages, unsolved grievances, and respect. The
city’s police officers were particularly attracted to the candidate’s law and order rhetoric, vocally
supporting the candidate in a public clash with Black Panthers and SDS members and leading to
the formation of LEG, a rightwing rank-and-file organization that campaigned on both
workplace and political issues. Police were not alone in their support for Wallace as
sanitationmen, telephone workers, firefighters, and even teachers declared their potential support
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for the Alabamian. Michael W. Flamm’s work has shown that law and order was a powerful
discourse in national and even local politics, but workers’ wildcats around the issue and their
support for Wallace also suggests that it had a distinct relevance in the workplace. While vocal
support for Wallace—and media amplification of the sentiment—did not ultimately result in an
upset, the margins of support suggest that some working-class whites would reject their normal
party affiliations if candidates not only openly appealed for their support but also spoke to their
material interests.
The tumultuous 1968 concluded with a series of rank-and-file led actions. In midNovember, incinerator stokers wildcatted for eight days, resisting a court injunction and leaving
massive lines of trash trucks with no place to dump.163 Later that month, hospital workers at state
mental institutions went on strike for new union representation, and Long Island Railroad
workers carried out a two-day wildcat strike against a new schedule that would eliminate jobs
and overtime.164 At the very end of the November, Con Edison employees rejected a unionendorsed contract that included a 15 percent wage increase, initiating a two-week strike—the
first in the company’s history—that threatened to plunge the city in darkness.165 The year ended
with 3,500 Teamster fuel oil drivers rejecting a leadership-endorsed contract, which deprived
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hundreds of thousands of people with heat at the same time as a virulent flu epidemic. 166 Like
the Hong Kong Flu of 1968, workers’ militancy was circulating across the city, infecting many
workplaces and causing great concern among politicians, employers, and union officials.167
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Chapter Three: Strike Fever

On January 9, 1969, the Executive Board of the AFL-CIO’s New York City Central
Labor Council (CLC) held a special meeting at the Hotel Commodore. The gathering brought
together some of the city and the nation’s most powerful labor leaders, including such stalwarts
as CLC President Harry Van Arsdale Jr., James Beamish of Local 1-2 Utility Workers, Ben
Cohan of the Office and Professional Employees, Raymond Corbett of the Iron Workers, Leon
Davis of the Drug and Hospital Workers Local 1199, as well as rising stars of labor’s exploding
public sector, United Federation of Teachers (UFT) President Albert Shanker and District
Council 37 President Victor Gotbaum. Special guests Joseph Trerotola, Teamster Joint Council
16 president, and New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, a personal friend and political ally of
Van Arsdale and the AFL-CIO in New York State, flanked the AFL-CIO leaders.
On that cold January day, labor leaders discussed the growing tendency of New York’s
workers to strike, or what Van Arsdale referred to as “strike fever.” These strikes, to highlight
only a few, had shut down sanitation service, the city’s schools, construction sites, and
threatened the provision of electricity and heating. According to Van Arsdale, strikes were
helping to foster an anti-labor political environment, with the city government and New York
Times cultivating an image of a runaway labor movement. Most AFL-CIO leaders in New York
City blamed the increasingly unpredictable strikes on their membership’s unrealistic
expectations, which they hoped could be tamed through educational programs, mandatory
cooling off periods, and a reduction of rank-and-file voice in negotiations. Trerotola of the
Teamsters was “disturbed” by the growing number of strikes in his own ranks, which he argued
undermined public support and, perhaps most dangerously, seemed to lack “specifics.” Governor
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Rockefeller blamed inflation and growing insecurity, but he also conceded a wider problem of
social unrest. According to him, “young people want action” and were to blame for the city’s
strikes just as they were to blame for campus occupations, the growing number of anti-war
protests, and urban riots. While the conference did not come to any particular plans for dealing
with the growing number of strikes, it sent a signal across the leadership strata of New York’s
labor movement that rank-and-file rebellion had moved front and center.1
Van Arsdale’s epidemiological comparison was quite apt. On the one hand, strikes spread
rapidly from workplace to workplace. This contagion circulated across the lines of profession,
skill, and race as sanitation and transit workers became just as likely to push for strikes and buck
back against union leadership as construction workers and delivery drivers. In fact, they often
cited one another’s efforts as helping to drive their own militancy, building an aggressive
confidence in the face of much more organized and much more powerful opponents including
the city, large businesses, and bureaucratic unions. While in many histories the boundaries of
white, black, conservative, and liberal are often hewn in stone—impassable for lack of want and
effort—workers in New York often came together fleetingly or exerted a large influence on one
another by example. On the other hand, like a fever, the outbreaks were often short-lived. Rankand-file revolt emerged from long-term grievances but exhibited a high degree of spontaneity
that often lacked longer-term organizing and strategies. Many labor leaders successfully fought
off challenges. Sometimes they used punitive measures against rebels, while in other cases, they
simply weathered the storm of worker anger. The most skillful among them channeled the
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energy into their own endeavors. Ironically, both union leaders and rank-and-file had trouble
recruiting and organizing workers for their efforts.2
This chapter discusses several important strikes and rank-and-file efforts between 1969
and 1972. The first section looks at contract rejections and strikes within the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) Local 553. Though Teamster unions are underrepresented in the
historical literature, in New York City they experienced rank-and-file rebellion, and their strikes
help us understand the inchoate nature of the movement as well as the consequences of its
failures. The second section traces the evolving efforts of James Carnegie and the Rank and File
Committee in the TWU. Convinced that union mechanisms were open to manipulation, they
hoped to build their base in the union’s growing number of black members, attempting to use
shifting demographics and the state’s public employee governing mechanisms to topple the
TWU. The middle portion of the chapter explores an important and as yet unexamined national
rank-and-file organizing conference in New York City, which brought together New York
leaders and activists such as Carnegie and James Haughton of Harlem Fight Back with Detroit’s
League of Revolutionary Black Workers, members of opposition caucuses in the United Auto
Workers, and representatives from a dozen other rank-and-file struggles. The fourth part
examines the 1970 postal wildcat strike. New York’s postal workers, emboldened by local
strikes in the public sector, pushed their leaders into an illegal strike that grew to national
proportions, leading to real collective bargaining and the founding of a new national union of
postal workers. Ironically, some of the union leaders who had opposed the 1970 strike used its
aftermath to catapult themselves to national prominence. The final portion of the chapter looks at
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the complicated events and legacy of the 1970 Hard Hat riots, which give an important window
into the intertwining of class resentments with the growing political polarization in New York
City.

A Rebellion in the Teamsters

The strike fever that concerned union leaders in 1969 manifested itself in many
industries, but in particular, fuel oil. In 1968, a multi-day fuel oil strike amidst freezing
temperatures threw the city into disarray.3 After years of threats and near misses, rank-and-file
drivers of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) Fuel Oil Delivery Drivers Local 553
overcame their union leadership and its loyal followers, voting down an inadequate contract.
Homes and hospitals’ heating oil supplies dwindled, leading the city to declare a public health
emergency.4 As with many strikes that began with contract rejections in the late 1960s, the 1968
strike resulted in moderate gains around wages and fringe benefits.
In December 1970, after the previous rank-and-file won contract expired, New York’s
fuel oil drivers once again voted down a leadership-endorsed contract they felt inadequately
compensated them. This time, the membership burned copies of the contract and even physically
attacked their elected leaders.5 The IBT remains an outlier in historical literature because of
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widespread corruption and its unapologetic embrace of business unionism. But the union was
home to powerful rank-and-file activism in the 1960s and 1970s, including a national wildcat by
truck drivers in 1970 and successful reform organizations. The contract rejections of fuel oil
drivers help us understand worker activism within the Teamsters as well as the way that
persistent rank-and-file efforts intertwined with but ultimately were unable to capitalize on
growing militancy.6
IBT Local 553 had begun like many Teamsters unions, as drivers of teams of horses, but
it began switching over to trucks in the early 20th century.7 The drivers and repairmen who made
up the largest portion of IBT Local 553 never numbered more than 3,500 men, but at their peak,
they delivered the majority of the city’s coal and oil, though over time the proportion of fuel oil
increased and coal ceased to be a major home or business heating resource. Prior to the advent of
fuel oil, drivers delivered coal for both commercial and home heating use, and union leaders had
used strikes to achieve benefits for their members.8
Like many other unions, Local 553 members made significant gains in the 1950s, and
their wage improvements were higher than most other Teamster unions in the city. The
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importance of fuel oil made the drivers powerful.9 They could not only halt the profit making of
fuel and coal distributors but also disrupt the normal functioning of the city. From the 1940s to
the end of the 1960s, a fuel oil strike was something akin to a natural disaster. The union’s
makeup was primarily white ethnics, specifically many Italians, though there were a few black
drivers in the union by the 1950s.10 While Local 553 negotiations received plentiful coverage in
the city’s newspapers, presumably because of the threat of fuel and coal strikes, their struggles
and internal dynamics are not present in secondary literature.
Timothy Costello left the only written account of the union’s rank and file. Costello was a
young radical from Massachusetts who was a fuel driver in New York from approximately 1969
until 1971 while attending the New School for Social Research. Costello was a member of
Students for a Democratic Society, but his politics were not typical of those of the New Left.11
He was involved with a group called Root & Branch, which was inspired by council communist
ideas and drew on the works of Paul Mattick, a German émigré who participated in the worker
uprisings in Germany after World War I. Costello believed in the power of the working class to
transform society, but he was not necessarily pro-union; at that time, his hopes lay in rank-andfile self-organization against both the employers and the unions, which he argued acted as a force
of mediation upon the working class.12
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In a pseudonymously published piece for Root & Branch entitled “Keep on Truckin’,”
written in the second half of 1970, Costello described the attitudes and work experience of Local
553 fuel oil drivers, giving us an excellent picture of the daily work routines of fuel drivers and
the manner in which they organized within it. Unlike factory work, where many people worked
in the same space for most of the day and cooperated directly with one another on variety of
tasks, fuel oil delivery was intensely isolated. Individual drivers went out on daylong delivery
runs, servicing multiple homes and businesses, and for the most part, the fuel men of Local 553
spent the day alone. Costello argues that this isolation produced a strong individual relationship
with bosses. In response to direct discipline and one-on-one conflicts with bosses, many fuel
drivers resisted work as individuals, commonly taking longer breaks, sabotaging the companysupplied rigs, or parking their trucks and sleeping off part of the day.13
Despite structural limitations to developing collectivity in fuel delivery work, drivers
managed to find ways to develop solidarity and organize themselves. Costello remarked that it
was normal for drivers to come together at various points in the day, with the two main points of
intersection being refueling stations at the barns and pre-work gatherings before being assigned
their runs. During the course of a workday, drivers could make multiple small deliveries using
the same load of gas or they could make large runs requiring a return to the depot for a refill.
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While trucks were refilled, workers socialized. More importantly, drivers would routinely arrive
15 to 20 minutes early to work. While awaiting their assignments for the day, they would discuss
“new outrages of the company, or…how they beat the company in some way, or…what should
be done to change things and how.”14 From the outside this may have simply looked like a group
of men killing time before work, but it served as their primary place for sharing information and
developing a sense of commonality and trust. According to Costello, these informal relations
generated a collective knowledge of the wider labor process as well as a strong identification
with one’s particular fuel depot.15
While informal relations helped build some of the insurgent energy, Local 553 contained
its own small opposition groups of long-term drivers. Many had experience in contract fights
dating back to the 1940s, and to them it was obvious that the union leadership worked in
collusion with fuel owners.16 Other studies have shown that insurgent groups were active in
Teamsters unions large and small during the 1960s and 1970s because of corruption, antidemocratic elections, and racketeering, and some believed that kickbacks and corruption were
present in Local 553, though these allegations of corruption did not surface in any public way.17
It is quite possible that the corruption and collusion between the leadership of Local 553 and fuel
owners was not of the illegal kind at all, but rather representative of a tendency amongst some
14
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union leaderships to take on greater commonality with those they negotiated with rather than
those who they negotiated for. As one former driver noted, the union leadership “ran it with the
company, and they ran it against the men.”18
Just as fuel depots were scattered across the city’s five boroughs, so too was the union’s
opposition divided. As one former driver remembered, throughout his time in the industry,
opponents of the union leadership mostly lacked unity, coming together only for short periods of
time. The opposition groups were generally groups of five or six men at a single fuel depot.
While these groups tried to work together occasionally, men’s personal ambitions sometimes got
in the way, causing divisiveness and infighting that made joint action impossible.19
When Costello worked as fuel oil driver, the opposition groups were more united, and he
referred to them as a coalition. The opposition coalition was very active in strike votes and
outside of the realm of negotiations, they maintained a publication and ran candidates,
unsuccessfully, for the various posts in the union. Their monthly newsletter was critical of union
officials and their unwillingness to properly advocate for their membership. The coalition had
gained strength in the late 1960s, and Costello attributed the 1968 contract rejection to their
rising prominence, though he does note that their election bids, while sometimes close, always
failed.20
Politically, the insurgents were staunch unionists advocating for reform and a change of
leadership. In Costello’s words, “the coalition never transcends trade-unionism, nor does it ever
advocate direct action,” which he believed would lead to an inevitable reincorporation into the
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union machinery.21 Estimating the size of the insurgent group is difficult to do, but a walkout
from the final contract vote in 1970 points to the existence of some 200 men who were willing to
picket a rank-and-file approved contract as well as the union itself, much like in the 1950s.22
While the core of the group was perhaps not this large, it serves as an indication of those who
were prepared to picket union leaders and points towards a degree of organization and discontent
on par with many other insurgent organizations in the city.23
Despite their internal opposition organization, informal organizing, and many individual
acts of sabotage, Costello argued that passivity dominated the daily travails of the fuel deliverers,
and that their strikes, such as in 1968, represented a break with this norm. The record does not
show any wildcat strikes or temporary walkouts, and the one attempted wildcat Costello
organized in response to his own firing. While the drivers did not often take part in collective
action, Costello contended that their attitude was becoming more militant.24 While union leaders
and politicians blamed young workers for much of the labor disorder of the period, it was the
older workers of Local 553 who had waged a protracted struggle for control of the union and
better gains in contracts.25
The 1970 strike, like the 1968 strike, began at a boisterous meeting, but this vote was an
intensely anti-leadership event that included many of drivers verbally assaulting McGuire.26
Prior to the contract negotiations, the leadership of Local 553 was in dialogue with the Mayor’s
21
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office, which relayed to Governor Rockefeller’s labor advisor Vic Borella that the possibility of
a strike in the fuel oil industry was highly unlikely in 1970. They believed that the reelection of
President James McGuire and his slate would result in less stormy negotiations because these
officers did not need to prove themselves. City labor advisors grossly miscalculated, and the
strike occurred for the exact reasons that they believed it would not: union leadership did not feel
the need to deliver a significant contract.27 At the union meeting, contracts were burned,
hundreds of men shouted and gave the contract thumbs down under the impression that the
money wasn’t enough and that their over-time agreements had been left out of the contract.
Beyond that, Local 553 leadership failed to even comment on the agreement other than to say
that they had endorsed it.28
Throughout the meeting, McGuire—who had taken the reins of the union in the late
1950s—was the focal point for the anger. Some members, seemingly the insurgent group,
claimed that he had been illegitimately reelected as president. Other men pushed him or shouted
him down, while another tried to attack him. His mere presence seemed to enrage the fuel drivers
who were let down once again by the terms offered them. As one driver interviewed by the New
York Times stated, the contract was “ridiculous,” that they “got no cooperation from the
leadership,” and “deserve $225 dollars now.”29 In the face of shouts of “sellout” and “no heat,”
McGuire backpedaled before the crowd, arguing that the leadership had never agreed with the
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final offer at all. Once the votes were tallied, drivers voted down the contract 981 against and
433 in favor. The drivers celebrated, throwing unburned contracts in the air.30
The mood of the strike was jubilant and conflictual, as the fuel drivers carried forward the
scenes of excitement and violence from the strike vote.31 While some men in the Bronx somberly
carried officially printed strike signs, others shown in a photograph of one picket in Queens on
the first day of the strike were quite different. These 553 members were not carrying signs
outlining their grievances to inform passersby. Instead a group of six men stood nonchalantly in
front of the gate, some laughing and smoking cigarettes, while one read the newspaper and two
others practiced their golf swings; though one might also infer that these golf clubs were not just
for killing time.32 After all, the same day in Brooklyn, strikers attacked a non-union firm’s trucks
for scabbing, stopping one in transit and setting it on fire. Strikes attacked another truck entering
the depot, smashing its window with a brick; 50-year-old Anthony Santaro was arrested. On the
second day of the strike, El Diario-La Prensa reported that strikers attacked an office worker
delivering fuel for Chevron with “fists and a piece of pipes.”33
Three days in, a harried 553 leadership announced a new contract proposal, but the
union’s president warned the news dailies that approval would be difficult. According to
McGuire, a “small faction” was using “hoodlum tactics” to get their way, and these same
“hoodlums” had taken advantage of the larger restive rank and file.34 This was clearly a topic of
intense conversation at the negotiations, which involved the chairman of the State Mediation
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Board, Vincent McDonnell.35 After the negotiations, McDonnell publicly decried a “faction that
had strike signs up without knowing the conditions of the offer.”36 In order to avoid a potential
repeat of the first strike vote in which McGuire was assaulted by the membership, Local 553
leadership mailed out a plea to its membership, calling for calm, asking “Are we rabble-rousers
and rioters or are we responsible citizens?” The union was attempting to draw a comparison
between their men’s violence and that of the New Left and black rioters. Hoping to further
shame the fuel drivers and cause a division in their ranks, the letter opined that “Our officers
were insulted, abused and attacked by a seemingly well-organized small group of men whose
conduct was a disgrace to the American labor movement.” 37 The message was clear: act as a
respectable citizen and support the Local leadership or reject the leadership in the name of
violence and disorder. But why, in the face of such opposition, would McGuire expect the
membership to approve an only slightly modified contract?38
The 1970 strike could not reproduce the social crisis the fuel oil drivers had caused in
1968. City administrators and many private landlords had learned from their earlier mistakes and
either stockpiled fuel or had their buildings’ tanks refilled prior to the strike.39 By 1969, the
city’s Emergency Control Board–Civil Defense (ECB), an inter-departmental coordinating
agency, was working with the employers’ group, the New York Oil Heating Association
35
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(NYOHA), to develop plans to deter any fuel shortages caused by emergency conditions. The
board outlined a strict set of actions to be followed in case of a fuel emergency, which employed
a systematic verification and delivery process that included the Departments of Health and Rent
and Housing Maintenance, the Local 553 bureaucracy, NYOHA representatives, and if
necessary, police. These emergency fuel deliveries would be brought to both public institutions
and private homes and paid for by the city. While one could make a humanitarian argument for
delivering the fuel, the simple fact of the matter is that the emergency deliveries amounted to a
breaking of the strike on the part of the union itself. Once the Department of Health verified a
public or private emergency, the Department of Purchase would then procure the fuel and the
joint committee of labor and management would determine which particular fuel depot to use
and who would drive the truck. Additionally, the labor-management committee would determine
the threat violence or other “obstructionist tactics,” and if such a threat existed, they would then
arrange for the police to accompany the delivery.40 In the process, the NYOHA members could
continue making money in spite of their employees’ walkout, and the other key weapon of the
fuel deliverers, paralysis of the city, would be undermined.41
In addition to these preemptive measures to stave off a fuel shortage, the weather was
simply not as cold. This time residents and landlords were not inundating the city with
complaints of freezing temperatures, and by the fourth day of the strike, there were only 200
calls an hour registering fuel shortages. Compared to the tens of thousands calls recorded by the
city during the 1968 strike, and their estimate of tens of thousands of calls missed due to a
40
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system overload, 200 an hour was relatively small. Hospitals did not run out of fuel and that the
majority of homeowner’s and private tenants had no fuel shortages. Ultimately the only city
institution to run out of fuel oil was public housing, resulting in 200,000 people without heat and
another 100,000 more on rationed fuel.42
On Monday, December 21, roughly 1,300 members of Local 553 gathered at the High
School of Fashion Industries in Midtown Manhattan to vote on the new contract. In spite of the
pleas for calm, there was still a large and vocal opposition. Drivers shouted out their disapproval,
hoping to dissuade others from voting in favor of a contract whose only modification was the
reduction of the time necessary to achieve the new raises from 15 to 12 months.43 One man
draped himself in a sign that read, “The owners got their $$$$, let’s get ours.” In spite of the
opposition's best efforts, drivers overwhelmingly approved the contract, 901 to 415.44
A group of some 200 drivers challenged the vote, calling for a recount and picketing the
decision outside. Carrying signs like “Scrooge McGuire killed Our Christmas,” “Cost of Living
Clause Now,” “Vote No!” and “McGuire Uses Gas Heat,” the oppositionists manifested their
continuing disapproval of the contract and leadership, while one man simply wore his old sign,
proclaiming that he was still “on strike.”45 While some drivers protested their union outside of
the meeting, the strike had already broken down the night before, with some men returning to
work. The 1970 strike ended with a small, but vocal opposition group divided from the rest of
fuel drivers who were ready to get back to work.46
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Tim Costello related to labor historian and activist Jeremy Brecher that the drivers of
Local 553 were “little Lenins,” strategists within the work environment trying to figure out all of
the angles to not be ground down by the boss. While a lone fuel driver might feel powerless in
the face of the forces that surrounded him, they still resisted, albeit in ways that the structure of
the work allowed.47 This informal Leninism did seem to translate into the strikes of 1968 and
1970. In 1972, contract negotiations hit another impasse, but with the failure of the 1970 strike to
achieve gains, the majority decided to stick with the union’s recommendations. To date, the
union has not gone on strike again.48
As one former driver remembered it, fuel oil drivers found themselves opposed on all
sides by powerful institutions, including their own union, and the 1970 strike yielded no material
gains. While he remembered the job with fondness, arguing that he liked its challenges and that
his real major concerns at the time were the Yankees and the fight for the working class to better
itself, the lesson he learned in battling the union was that nothing could be done. The asymmetry
of power, held in the hands of unions, politicians, business owners and the like, was far too great
to be overcome. Amongst working people, there was too much division and not enough
solidarity or leadership. His strategy was to turn inward, to step away from fighting and close his
eyes to what he could not change. Only in the context of a broader strike wave sweeping the city
could Local 553’s small and divided opposition groups spur their fellow drivers to strike against
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their own union, but like a fever, rank-and-file power seemed to rise quickly but dissipate
rapidly, especially when easy victories did not emerge.49

Transit Battles and the Shift to Dual Unionism

While smaller unions like Local 553 underwent their own rank-and-file rebellion, larger
unions like the TWU were home to more persistent and more public insurgent efforts. The Rank
and File Committee for a Democratic Union, which helped focus some of the anti-Quill energy
in the 1966 strike, pushed for greater, lasting power outside of the more ephemeral strikes that
characterized labor upheaval in New York during this time. Transit rank-and-file activity was
embedded in the broader insurgent energy of the 1960s, and the Committee focused on issues
important to black and Latino workers. Unlike in many of the city’s unions, the racial makeup of
the TWU was changing rapidly, and basing one’s group in the concerns of black workers was to
situate the organization in the new majority. But in spite of this shift, power was not quick in
coming.
In the years immediately following the 1966 strike, the Committee took part in the same
relatively small activities as before: picketing the union over changes in the workplace—the
implementation of radios in buses for example—pushing back against the “kangaroo court,” and
organizing to overturn the use of mail ballots, which the Committee felt was a way in which the
TWU bureaucracy maintained its power. In fact, their 1967 “mass picket” against mail ballots
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only gathered together a dismal eight rank-and-filers for the protest. The Committee’s power
would grow significantly after 1967, and ironically, the foundation for this increased power lay
in the victories won by TWU leadership in 1967 contract negotiations.50
In typical fashion, the 1967 TWU-TA contract negotiations went down to the wire in a
high-stakes gamble that saw talk of another devastating strike. As had become standard, the TA
and the TWU hammered out a deal in the final hours of negotiations. The 1967 contract’s most
significant detail was an agreement allowing transit workers to retire at age 50 with 50 percent of
their pay after 20 years. For many older workers, this was music to their ears, and a slew of
retirements quickly followed.51 This resulted in a swift demographic shift in the union, as many
older, white workers accepted retirement and the TA hired many blacks and Puerto Ricans to
replace them. In fact within two years, nearly 40 percent of the union was black according to
TWU statistics. Carnegie believed that the union was closer to 70 percent black by 1970, and that
the union deflated the number in order to hide the demographic shift.52 In spite of the fact that
blacks were approaching a majority representation in the union, the same issues plagued them:
lower level assignments, less defense before the TA disciplinary board, and black
underrepresentation in the highest ranks of leadership, though the official slates began to add a
handful more blacks to the Executive Board.53
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Just as it had in the past, the Committee mobilized to denounce discrimination in the
union, and one case in particular stands out. In July of 1968, a white TA cop beat a black
conductor, John Wharton, when he defended a group of black men and women who had stood up
against the harassment of a drunk white passenger. The officer wanted them ejected from the
train and Wharton disagreed. When an argument ensued, the TA officer detained the conductor
and severely beat him, leaving him hospitalized for days. When Wharton awoke, he found
himself charged with the crime of harassment and maligned as a victim of his own inability to
control himself.54
The Committee jumped to Wharton’s aid, producing leaflets in his favor and organizing
people to attend court dates. In spite of the resistance put up to Wharton’s mistreatment, he was
convicted of harassment and eventually fired from his position in the subway system. Out of the
Wharton case and out of the racial transformation of the union, the Committee felt itself poised
to take their fight to a much bigger level, putting in the forefront the fight against discrimination
and systematic inequality within the TWU’s ranks.55
The Committee hoped that forefronting the fight against racism would recruit more black
TWU workers dissatisfied with their union leaders. The increased focus on racism and
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specifically organizing black workers can be seen in a shift in rhetoric and focus in the
Committee’s irregularly published Rank and File News. In its November-December 1968 issue,
the main articles were dedicated not to the travails of transit work, but to the politics of the
teachers’ strike, which the Committee argued was a powerful example of racism in the ranks of
organized labor.56 Carnegie’s public rhetoric had become less conciliatory on race as the TWU’s
makeup shifted. As he put it in a 1969 interview:
For the first time...nearly 20,000 black transit workers have the
opportunity to be involved in a struggle in which their numerical
strength can decide whether transit workers will be represented by a
union in which they have no real voice (no other workers do, for
that matter) or whether we will be represented by an independent
union that is not tied to management and the rotten, racist power
structure of this city.
Carnegie believed that with racial turnover in the TWU, blacks would be able to decide the
direction of labor struggles in subway, which Carnegie hoped would translate to the decline of
the TWU and the rise of the Rank and File Committee in its place.57
While the Committee increased its focus on racism in the transit system, it also changed
its organizational focus in two key ways, organizing open meetings and aiming to decertify the
union using state mechanisms. In October 1968, the Committee began organizing public
meetings to draw on the increasing number of black transit workers, experiencing some
growth.58 As before, meetings were primarily held in the offices of the Harlem Unemployment
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Center (HUC), which was in the process of changing its name to the more militant Fight Back
Center.59
Though records of their meetings are not archived, a white worker sympathetic to the
union recorded the events of one in December 1969. According to his informant’s report, there
were more than 70 people in attendance at the meeting, including five white workers and six
women, but the rest of the meeting attendees were primarily black members of the TWU. At this
particular meeting, Carnegie spoke on the goals of the Committee, and David Lubash, the
group’s lawyer, spoke about upcoming motions to have the TWU decertified through the New
York State Public Employees Relations Board (PERB).60
After failing in the election of 1965, the Committee believed strongly that the mail-in
ballot would always prevent them from ever winning an election, even if, as they contended, the
union was majority black. The Committee hoped a PERB election would be fairer. Like the
1950s Motormen’s Benevolent Association, which hoped to build on the motormen’s grievances
as well as their critical place in the subway system to split the union, the Rank and File
Committee hoped to build an alternative organization but one based on black union members’
grievances and growing demographic power. This change of tactic in the face of secret mail
ballots would pose its own difficulties.61
In order to decertify the TWU, the Rank and File Committee needed to demonstrate to
the PERB that 30 percent of the nearly 30,000 employees across the industry’s different
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divisions supported the decertification drive. A petition was the key to demonstrating this
support, and Committee members needed to organize where their fellow workers were most
likely to congregate in order to gather that number of signatures. Unions themselves had already
broken into the workplace against the wishes of most employers, but an insurgent group’s efforts
were perhaps more difficult: both employers and the union often opposed them. After all, the
Committee’s decertification challenge called for the end of the TWU, and small insurgent groups
had disrupted the subway system more often than the union.62
During the petition drive throughout 1969, the TA and the TWU harassed rank and
filers, sometimes calling the police. When Committee members tried petitioning outside of the
Surface Line Operators Fraternal Organization, its directors sent a memo banning Committee
members from the premises and promising the expulsion of members involved in such
activities.63 After much harassment, the Committee challenged the TWU and the TA at the New
York State Supreme Court in Queens for the right to distribute printed material. TWU officials
and Committee members gave testimony concerning the dispute over access to TA facilities and
the ability to distribute literature and organize petitions. Committee members argued they were
poorly represented by the TWU and needed to have their voices heard, alleging endemic racism
within the ranks of the union’s leadership. Secretary-Treasurer Ellis F. Van Riper countered with
Martin Luther King Jr.’s positive remarks about the union, casting Carnegie as a racist that
wanted to “peddle his divisive, poisonous and utterly untruthful racist propaganda.”64 In October,
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the court upheld the Committee’s right to petition, but when they submitted signatures, the PERB
rejected their petition.65
In spite of these setbacks, the Committee’s activity remained steady, and in an interview
with New York magazine in 1970, Carnegie argued workers faced the same problems as ever.
Safety issues and tight schedules particularly concerned TWU members, and Carnegie argued
convincingly that these problems were harmful to both workers and commuters. In fact, a May
1970 crash on the IRT line (now the 7 line) that killed two and injured 71, prompted New York’s
article in the first place. Carnegie went on to argue that the TWU leadership was just as
conservative in negotiations as ever. Though the 20-year retirement package gladdened some
workers, many wanted better gains than leaders were willing to ask for, let alone deliver. In
Carnegie's words, the 1969 negotiations yielded little:
They asked for a 30 per cent increase, and actually got an 11 per
cent increase over two years. The workers wanted 20-year
retirement pay at any age; they didn’t even ask for it. The shorter
work week? We never got that. Management still has the
prerogative of drawing up schedules; that question has never been
settled.
In Carnegie’s mind, the complete racial turnover of the union’s membership compounded the
anger. By 1970—with the help of much improved retirement packages— the union had become
perhaps as high as 70 percent black and Puerto Rican. The Committee promised that the
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confluence of such changes with such lingering problems would eventually lead to an outburst of
anger the TWU could not control.66
In 1971 the Committee’s tried again to decertify the TWU, but their attempt quickly
became mired in a legal back and forth with the PERB, which seemed intent on rejecting the
rank and filers application. With their right to collect signatures and distribute literature affirmed
by the lawsuit during their previous decertification drive, Committee members went to work in
April 1971 to gather signatures, and after months of work the Committee submitted 9,110
signatures to the PERB in late September, demonstrating support from 30 percent of the union.67
In the first days of November, however, the PERB rejected the Committee’s petition on the
grounds that their signatures were not accompanied by dates, which made it impossible to
determine whether or not the application was timely.68
While timeliness was a longstanding evaluative criterion, at the time of the Committee’s
filing, dated signatures were not required, and it was only in October 1971, weeks after the
Committee’s submission, that the PERB amended its own rules to require such dates. To
Carnegie and the rest of the Committee, the PERB’s attempt to retroactively apply the dating rule
was evidence that the board stood on the side of both the TWU and the TA. The militants
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believed that a fair election ought to determine who represented the city’s transit workers, but the
board wanted to refuse them their chance.69
When the Committee challenged the PERB’s dismissal, a New York State Supreme
Court judge agreed with the rank and filers. Because of a subpar contract, a transit wildcat broke
out only a few days prior to the court ruling, and the time seemed ripe for an electoral challenge.
Carnegie believed that there was insufficient leadership for the wildcat of more than 1,000 bus
drivers to continue, and he hoped his election challenge could provide a constructive outlet for
the anger.70
Unhappy with the Queens Supreme Court ruling, PERB officials appealed the decision.
Before an Appellate Court in July 1972, the PERB failed a second time to strike down the rankand-file effort, with the court affirming the early ruling and sending the hearing back to the
PERB.71 While Carnegie and the Committee remained positive about these court outcomes, a
second PERB hearing did not mean it would approve of the petition, and on August 31, 1972
when the PERB again convened to decide on the Rank and File Committee’s application, it
unsurprisingly rejected the petition on two grounds: first, that it was untimely and second, that it
did not show sufficient interest. While the PERB remained unconvinced of the timeliness, a
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decertification application required that 30 percent of the union sign an application. 72 Though
estimates of the union’s size varied wildly, with the union presenting itself as having 38,000
members, the most commonly agreed upon number was closer to 30,000, which would have
provided the Committee’s petition to overcome the sufficient interest bar.
After this second denial, PERB rules barred Carnegie’s group from petitioning for
decertification for another four years, a lengthy prohibition that would leave the Rank and File
Committee no viable route to power. For some members this was the end of their activism in the
workplace. Years of agitation brought them into conflict with both management and the union,
and as one former Committee organizer remembered it, “I came to the realization that I had to
cover my own ass.” As an autonomous labor organization with no legal right to defend its
members, the Committee had limited power to protect leadership opponents from either
management or union retaliation. 73
Within the ranks of the TWU, the Committee made a concerted effort to try and channel
the inchoate discontent of the rank-and-filers into a longer-term political program. Over several
years of organizing, Carnegie and the Committee came close to obtaining a decertification vote
within the TWU, but the PERB’s repeated denial of the Rank and File Committee begs the
question: did its decertification challenges stand a chance of being approved?
Burton Hall, a prominent New York lawyer who represented several groups of rank-andfile insurgents during the postwar era, argues that working within the web of legal systems that
govern and reinforce union representation left a minimal possibility of success because these
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legal systems tended to entrench labor bureaucracy and produce intimate working relationships
between union heads, business owners, and state actors. While Hall’s legal work often involved
rank-and-file challenges within the frame of federal law as opposed to the PERB, his point still
stands.74
The PERB’s efforts to prevent the Committee’s challenge should not be surprising. New
York State created the board in order to stabilize labor relations in the aftermath of the 1966
transit strike, and a rank-and-file challenge for control over the very same union threatened to
seat an untested and more militant leadership. The PERB existed within a broader institutional
matrix that favored power players like the TWU and its President Matthew Guinan. Big Labor
ally, Governor Rockefeller, with whom the TWU had an on again off again relationship,
appointed the three-member board, and Rockefeller had been on hand at CLC discussions on
stemming the city’s strike fever. While there is no smoking gun, preventing the Committee’s
election drive was certainly in line with the PERB’s goals.75

Rank-and-File Radicals Gather

While the Committee and its supporters battled for control of the TWU, Carnegie was
equally involved in broader attempts to capitalize on the renewed militancy of American
workers. Alongside, his ally, James Haughton, Carnegie and others pushed for greater
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communication and coordination amongst rank-and-file rebels, participating in long distance
discussions and supporting efforts to organize a national conference on rank-and-file struggles in
1969. Thus, while union leaders and politicians were organizing themselves to deal with the
unleashing of rank-and-file energy in New York City, militant workers, leftwing political groups,
and rank-and-file organizations across the country were planning their own gathering to discuss
what should be done with labor’s increasingly combative mood.
Initial meetings and discussions were held in the industrial heartland around Detroit to
decide participation and focus of the conference, bringing together a variety of UAW rank-andfile groups as well as many small, leftwing political organizations that were installed in the city.
Initially scheduled for February 8-9, the conference’s first day was to involve discussing rankand-file revolts, the situation of black workers and black caucuses within unions, as well as the
situation of white workers and the issue of Wallace, racism, and rebellion. The second half of the
conference was dedicated to a discussion of building up working-class consciousness, interfacing
with the student movement, and then lastly to practical steps, in particular a publication.
Connecting workers with students was a key goal of groups like Students for a Democratic
Society and the many small leftwing socialist parties of the period, and is indicative of the New
Left influence on the conference organizing. Due to a series of planning errors, the Detroit
conference organizers were unable to host the conference, leaving the conference without a
home.76
Haughton, Carnegie, and Silvio Mello of the longshoremen salvaged the conference,
pushing for a smaller and more limited gathering in New York in early April 1969. Building on
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the initial proposals from the Detroit conference, Haughton and others maintained most of the
important debates but refined their focus. Under their watch, the first major discussion addressed
racism in the rank-and-file movement, and the final discussion involved solutions from workers,
by workers. Most importantly, Haughton and allies placed themselves in the role of keynote
speakers on both days, with the opening given by Mello, a longtime militant of the International
Longshoremen’s Association (ILA). The second day included Haughton’s organizational
proposals, as well as a closing session about ongoing struggles in different areas of the country.
Stepping back from a massive come one, come all approach, Haughton and Carnegie pushed for
a tighter conference that would act as a foundation for rank-and-file efforts in the years to
come.77
A variety of highly politicized rank-and-file organizers from some of America’s biggest
cities attended this hastily organized conference. There were UAW members from Cleveland and
Detroit; transit workers from New York City and Chicago; longshoremen and sailors from
Berkeley and Baltimore; and a host of rank and filers including long haul drivers, packinghouse
workers, machinists, and teachers from places as diverse as New Haven and Fremont, California.
Organizers from New York and Detroit played a central, and highly vocal, role in the conference.
New Yorkers included long-time organizers such as Carnegie, Haughton, Mello, and Steve
Zeluck of the American Federation of Teachers. Some of the city’s largest and most militant
unions such as the UFT and USA as well as many smaller, primarily white unions were
unrepresented at the conference.78 Many organizers came from Detroit, including Chuck Wooten
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and John Watson of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW), a Marxist-Leninist
and Black Nationalist organization that operated at the intersection of autoworker wildcats and
militant black mobilization. Also from Detroit were Arthur and Edith Fox, left organizers active
in the United Caucus, an opposition group within UAW Local 600 in Dearborn, Michigan.
Wayne King, founders and editors of the New Rank and Filer, also came from the Motor City.
The New Yorkers and Detroiters who would guide the conference’s agenda and set the debates
over the course of the two days, opening major discussions on both the problems and prospects
of a rank-and-file workers movement.79
The conference began at the Hotel Diplomat on the morning of April 12 with a keynote
speech from Mello of the ILA. His opening remarks, “Toward a Rank and File Movement”
outlined some of the necessary characteristics and problems for the emerging movement,
including the need for militant caucuses within unions, black and white unity, and independent
political candidates. For Mello, an older Communist, the heart of the issue was that unions in
America no longer believed in class struggle but rather had reached a position of total
accommodation with business interests. The ILA militant had developed his ideas within the
day-to-day struggle of longshoremen against their own union, the federal government, and
shippers, a rank-and-file battle that had declined by the mid-1960s in spite of some continued
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wildcats. While his speech was mostly well received, the majority of the discussion on the first
day of the conference took place around the question of racism.80
Many rank-and-file organizers identified racism as the main problem in the struggle for
workers’ power. Some such as Ed Topp of the painters union in New York as well as Haughton
argued that opening jobs in the construction trades was an essential element of the struggle
against racism. John Watson of the LRBW argued a much broader position, that racism was in
fact the lynchpin of the revolutionary struggle. Citing white betrayal of blacks at various points
in American history including the Populist movement of the 19th century, Watson, Wooten, and
other participants like white radical Noel Ignatiev, argued that whites were not only racist but
also benefited directly from racism, constantly acting in defense of these “privileges.” Ignatiev
went so far as to suggest that the seniority system had to be torn down because it was structurally
racist–keeping older whites in better, higher paying jobs and confining blacks to lower paid
positions—and ultimately forwarding the notion that white workers were “white supremacy
scabs.”81
Others, like Edie and Arthur Fox, strongly countered this position, arguing that white
workers did not benefit from racism and any assertion that they did was part of a ruling class
fiction and certainly not a conscious and calculated reality in the workplace. Arthur Fox added
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that missteps by the League had helped contribute to racial division in the workplace in Detroit
and that unity in the face of racism and continued dialogue was the only way forward for
workers. Carnegie of the TWU Rank and File Committee intervened in the debate, arguing that
the union bureaucracy found its base in the white membership, a point that mostly agreed with
the position of the League without necessarily saying so.82
Deep political divisions undergirded the debate on racism in the workplace. While many
argued that educational events and classes for white workers would help build an understanding
of the historical role of racism and illuminate the degree to which it was an impediment to rankand-file efforts, some like the LRBW thought that independent black political organizing was
paramount. The League’s argument was fairly straightforward: due to the legacy of racism,
whites and blacks had to organize in separate organizations and also due to the legacy of racism
and the widespread nature of broader social movements like Civil Rights and Black Power, black
workers constituted the vanguard of any workers’ movement in America. This leadership
position was so absolute, the League argued, no one had the right to question it. Many in
attendance agreed that the League was the best-organized group of any rank-and-file
organization in the country—rapidly expanding in 1968 and 1969 to various auto plants but also
to a UPS center—but they challenged the extension of vanguard status to blacks as a whole and
the necessity of always organizing separately. Gary Beneson, a New Haven hospital worker
trying to unionize his workplace, countered the black vanguard theory with his own experiences
in which two white organizers were pushing for unionization while the majority black staff was
seemingly uninterested. Others, argued that such tactics would further divide workers, and that

82

“Conference Proceedings,” James Haughton Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black
Culture, The New York Public Library, box 10, Rank And File Workers Conferences 1968-1970
folder, 8-9.

148
joint struggle, not separate race-based workplace organizing, was essential. Ultimately, the main
discussion of the first day was an Old Left versus New Left debate of whether working-class
unity would be forged through broad class-based demands or whether anti-racism and
independent organizing were the beginning point for class struggle. While participants did not
arrive at a consensus position on the question of racism in the broader working class, the
divisions were not such that the conference devolved into sectarian denunciations. After all, the
conference’s goals and organization were such that jockeying for position was unnecessary; there
were no positions in a new national organization to fill, no media attention to garner, or at that
point, even practical proposals to vote on.83
The second and final day of the conference opened with James Haughton presenting the
history of HUC and proposing three plans for extending and strengthening the rank-and-file
movement throughout the country. Haughton asked, “How can rank and file workers organize a
power base from which to conduct struggle against trade union bureaucrats who have national
and international connections… [and] become the appendages of the employer class?”84 In
response, he forwarded three key proposals to build rank-and-file power. His first was the
extension of the workers’ center model, which he had pioneered, to cities across the country.
Such centers provided workers with a space outside of work to organize themselves for “struggle
against trade union bureaucrats, employers, and government.” The fact that the centers were
based in particular communities meant that workers would not only have a space outside of
union or government interference but also one in which their struggles could interrelate with
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forms of resistance outside of the workplace. Haughton confirmed the powerful effect that the
black militancy outside of the workplace had on rank-and-files blacks; drawing on this energy
and building support within it was key. While he emphasized that workers’ centers would bridge
the gap between workplace and neighborhood struggles, he argued that they would just as
importantly, bridge the gap between different kinds of workplaces, providing space for different
autonomous workers’ groups to organize and interact. While workers’ rebellious actions
influenced one another in New York City, there were rarely organizational ties between rankand-file insurgents. Haughton, unlike members of the LRBW, argued that such organizing spaces
could be interracial, as was the case in the HUC. Though Haughton proposed a broad form of
organizing, the workers’ center, he did not propose a broad program of activity for them because
he felt that local conditions were so varied that each city and by extension each rank-and-file
group had to develop its own tactics and goals. Furthermore, Haughton was strongly committed
to the notion that it was only workers themselves who should guide and shape their struggles,
that workers’ autonomy vis-à-vis the unions, government, and any outside group was
necessary.85
Haughton’s final two proposals spoke directly to the need for national coordination.
According to him, one impediment to expanding action was the lack of information concerning
workers’ activities across the country. To top it off, any information that was available rarely
came from the workers themselves; it tended to be about workers but not by workers. To fill this
gap, he proposed a nationwide publication to gather and disseminate information on rank-andfile activities, demands, and programs to inspire and promote greater self-activity across the
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United States. Haughton’s call for a nationwide publication, like the workers’ center proposal,
emerged from his experiences with the HUC and its bulletin Fight Back!. In this case, however, a
key goal of this new periodical was, “to overcome a deep sense of isolation that afflicts most
rank and file struggles and in overcoming this isolation to consciously instill in rank and file
activity a sense of direction toward building a nationwide rank and file movement.”86 The third
and final proposal was for the creation of regional rank-and-file workers conferences. Haughton
argued that they had limited the size of this particular conference in order to help set in motion a
wider process. In the future, Haughton hoped that conferences in other regions of the country
would open up in participation to a wider number of workers.
Haughton was aware of the strong ideological divisions in the conference, and as a result
he focused on very broad goals for this first-ever gathering of rank-and-file militants. In each of
Haughton’s proposals he left the definition of the rank-and-file movement wide open, neither
ascribing to it any particular political goals nor forwarding any particular set of tactics. It was
clear from even before the organizing of the conference that certain ideological differences
would not be overcome and that any organizational initiatives would have to succeed in spite of
those differences. After all, implicit in most of the discussion throughout the conference were
several other questions at work, including whether to work within or outside of the unions for
rank-and-file power, which workers constituted the most advanced section of struggle, and what
the nature of the on-going struggles really were—was it to reform the system or put an end to it
through revolution? Attendees had mixed reactions to Haughton’s proposals, in particular the
workers’ centers. Many had a strong ideological aversion to the idea because it invoked the
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specter of dual unionism, establishing a force outside of the unions rather than within their
framework. The Communist Party had advocated such activities in the past and many socialist
organizations denounced dual unionism as a tactic that divided workers and therefore weakened
their political struggle. Others felt that struggling within unions was a dead end: American
unions were only husks of their formerly combative selves and what remained was an
accommodationist bureaucracy. Organizations like the Rank and File Committee and the LRBW
both pursued this strategy though at various points in time running candidates within the union
framework. Meanwhile other conference participants insisted on using the unions’ own
frameworks with elections and opposition caucuses to push for more rank-and-file power. With
this deep division, the workers’ center proposal failed. Meanwhile, attendees unanimously
supported Haughton’s national publication proposal. Ironically, due to the costs and
commitments necessary to write, edit, fund, and publish any periodical, conference delegates
decided to empower the HUC’s Fight Back! as the national publication.
While Haughton and HUC may have forwarded particular tactical and strategic positions
on the movement—starting a national publication, organizing labor centers, fighting job
discrimination, and facilitating rank-and-file organizing—they never moved to establish an
organization or install themselves as the vanguard at the conference. On the one hand this was
perhaps a result of their longstanding experiences fighting for more workers’ power and
democracy within unions. They had experienced what they thought of as dictatorial behavior on
the part of union leaders for the better part of their working lives and were loath to raise
themselves up to such a position. Their democratic mode of organizing boasted a consistency
between both their means and ends. On the other hand, their refusal to assume leadership was
representative of an impasse of the rank and file movement as a whole. Though common
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experiences—battles, conditions of labor, similar or shared enemies—brought them together to
make a class, workers were divided. While racial division was a key topic at the conference,
American workers were also divided between thousands of different workplaces with different
concerns and realities, and to boot, they were geographically dispersed across a country that
spans a continent. Any rank-and-file movement would have to take up this geographic and
economic terrain, but it was not within the ability of any of them to do so. Later in his life,
Haughton would discuss the persistence of the problem, citing his experience with the NALC as
perhaps the greatest missed opportunity for militant workers. In his view, workers never had
“organizational strength…that could do battle with racism as A. Philip Randolph used to call it,
within the house of labor, racism in government, and in industry.”87

The 1970 Postal Wildcat

In March of 1970, what was once unthinkable had finally happened. In New York City,
tens of thousands of letters carriers, mail sorters, and clerks collectively walked off of the job and
shut down the largest mail facilities of the world’s most powerful nation, an act that went against
their leadership, the law, and a legacy of weakness that overshadowed decades of bargaining.
Other public sector workers had shown the way in the years prior, shutting down essential
services against the wishes of their elected representatives—both in the union and in the
government—and winning impressive gains. Deteriorating work conditions, low pay, speedups,
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and a lack of respect motivated postal workers, but only a risky strike could change their
situation.
New York City’s was home to a huge number of postal workers, all of whom were
organized into different, and sometimes, conflicting labor organizations during the 1960s and
1970s. There was the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), a craft union that
organized those who delivered and cased the mail, whose most prominent local was the 7,000member Branch 36 in the Bronx and Manhattan. The city was also home to Branch 41 in
Brooklyn and Branch 79 in Queens. Then there was the Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union
(MBPU), which boasted some 25,000 members.88 The more industrial MBPU brought together
the thousands of maintenance workers, mail sorters, and clerks. In the 1950s it had seceded from
a more conservative parent union, the National Federation of Post Office Clerks, and on its own
was one of the largest and most influential postal unions in the country.89 In addition to the
MBPU and the NALC branches, a large number of black postal workers in New York City and
elsewhere were members of the National Alliance of Postal Employees (NAPE), a sort of dual
union that had lobbied heavily on behalf of blacks since the Progressive Era.90
In spite of the high levels of unionization, postal workers did not have the right to
collectively bargain. Though recognizing the right of workers in the private sector to form unions
during the Great Depression, the federal government kept a tight leash on its own employees,
leaving them in a sort of limbo state that weakened their ability to shape contract outcomes.
Relegated to lobbying Congress—what many members called “collective begging”—the unions
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developed political connections that they could leverage for some gains, but they failed
ultimately to improve the lives of the many postal workers in urban areas like New York City
who faced high costs of living.91
Among the postal workers that formed the vanguard of the national walkout, the issue of
pay was paramount. In 1969, first-year postal employees made roughly $6,100 and required 21
years of work to make it to maximum pay of just over $8,000. Postal workers made less than
almost every other government employee, sometimes as much as 25 to 30 percent less.92 For
example, newly minted sanitationmen were making $9,871 a year while new police and
firefighters were making $10,950.93 In New York City and other large cities, pay rates made it
such that some letters carriers and clerks qualified for public assistance.94
Increasing inflation in the city at the end of the 1960s made pay raises even more
pressing.95 Consumer prices had risen at 2.7 percent for most of the 1960s, and in 1969 and
1970, prices spiked 7.4 percent and 5.8 percent respectively.96 Not only were their wages behind
many other workers, they were increasingly falling behind as inflation outpaced their pay raises.
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For some workers, the pay was so little that they would quit postal work altogether, with
complaints that the importance of their job was in no way reflected in their compensation.97 The
unions similarly argued that postal work’s centrality to American business—delivering checks,
contracts, products, etc.—ought to warrant their memberships significant pay raise, with NALC
President Joseph Rademacher claiming, “the economy literally rides on our back.”98
Abysmal work conditions added to the indignity of low pay. Manhattan’s General Post
Office’s exterior boasted a beautiful neoclassical façade, but its interior bordered on medieval,
with broken and exposed flooring, intermittent heat and air conditioning, and completely filthy to
boot. Workers dragged bags of mail across the ground, and, amidst a beehive of activity, still
hand-sorted most of the mail.99 Some of the work was monotonous, and its pace intensified in the
1960s. Mail volume increased significantly, requiring a massive speed up and leading to
declining service quality and itinerant hires at lower pay grades. And with daily conflicts with
post office managers—who union leaders argued were undertrained and overcompensated with
dictatorial behavior tyranny—the situation was ripe for an outbreak of anger.100
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Ironically, a pay increase prompted New York City’s postal workers to action. In the
spring of 1969, union leaders were “begging” for a 10 to 15 percent raise, but the Nixon
administration only agreed to 4 percent, slated to take effect on July 1. In response, NALC
members picketed in front of the central Brooklyn Post Office on June 20, blocking off traffic.
The police moved in to clear the strikers from the road and a melee ensued, with two strikers
arrested and two police officers sent to the hospital. In Manhattan, a protest of some 2,000 postal
workers chanted for a strike and held signs calling for sickouts and the disruption of mail
delivery.101 Meanwhile some postal workers posted pro-strike flyers on union bulletin boards,
calling for a “Postal Clerks Independence Day” sickout for July 4. Tensions became so high that
union officials in the city met with postal management on June 30 to discuss contingencies for a
wildcat strike.102
On July 1, workers at the Kingsbridge station in the Bronx staged a sickout. Seventy-two
postal workers, both letter carriers and clerks, called in sick at the station, sparking another dozen
more sickouts at a station in Throgs Neck. The postal service immediately suspended the
wildcatters without pay, accusing them of disrupting the delivery of checks to the elderly and
impoverished on public assistance.103 The MBPU paid its suspended members’ salaries, but the
NALC only did the same after a groundswell of pressure from letter carriers. In fact, the NALC
president had gone so far as to denounce the strikers, only changing course in the face of much
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rank-and-file pressure. 104 Though the MBPU more quickly defended the militants, rank and
filers across the city called union headquarters demanding action and a handful sent letters to
MBPU President Moe Biller expressing their support for their comrades, but some questioned
why more militant action was not taken.105
The summer walkout resulted in increased rank-and-file activism within NALC locals in
the city. Members began attending regular union meetings, defining their own set of demands.
Militant members of Queens NALC Branch 41 forefronted pay increases that would make the
1969 top rate of $8,5000 the starting rate for postal employees. They also demanded reaching the
top rate in 5 years and retirement after 20 years with a full pension paid for by the federal
government.106 Other letter carriers issued similar demands, but called for a 35-hour workweek,
the right to strike, and rank-and-file ratification of all pay related agreements.107 These demands
were much more militant than those sought by the NALC leadership in concert with the Nixon
administration at the end of 1969, which included a 5.4 percent increase in pay, top pay reached
in eight years, and binding arbitration for disputes, all of which were contingent upon a
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reorganization of the post office.108 In January 1970, NALC rank and filers rejected their
leadership’s endorsement of the Nixon plan, calling instead for a strike survey amongst the
membership to assess possibilities for further militant action.109
For New York City’s postal workers, the surrounding environment of labor upheaval was
paramount in helping to transform anger into action. Illegal public sector strikes had produced
significant wage gains in the city: the TWU’s strike in 1966 resulted in a 15 percent pay increase,
teachers won union recognition and similarly large pay increases with several illegal strikes,
while other unions used threats of walkouts to do the same.110 As one postal worker put it during
the 1970 wildcat: “The teachers, sanitationmen and transit workers all struck in violation of the
law and got big increases. Why shouldn’t we?”111 Some militant postal workers circulated flyers
that criticized union leaders and drew even wider comparisons: “Window Washers won
themselves a $60 raise over three years, Longshoreman won $5 over three years, Private
Sanitation won an immediate $20 raise plus $20 over the next two years, the President got
himself a $100,000 raise, Senators and Congressman got themselves $20,000 raises…”112
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Postal workers had reached a breaking point, and on March 12, in a general membership
meeting, NALC Branch 36 letter carriers excoriated their union leaders. Branch 36 President Gus
Johnson was concerned that the militant workers attending NALC meetings would outvote the
opposition, thus he recommended tabling strike discussion and a private vote. The meeting
revolted, rejecting both the call for a mail ballot and passing a motion forcing the leadership to
hold a strike vote. Biller, fearful of a strike, wrote the Nixon administration of the growing anger
amongst postal workers, warning him that the inadequacy of current offers might result in a
walkout.113
At the Manhattan Center on March 17, the NALC held its strike vote meeting, with the
leadership working in the background to manufacture a no vote. Militant rank-and-file letter
carriers practically invaded the meeting, chanting for a strike and refusing to leave until the
results of the vote were read. Interestingly, the NALC members were not only rebelling against
their own leaders but against the heads of the MBPU, who attended the meeting in support of
NALC leaders. Biller adamantly wanted to avoid a strike, and in hopes of undermining the
growing anger, appealed to the letter carriers to wait for the outcome of the MBPU membership
meeting the following month! NALC rank and filers booed the MBPU president, and after hours
of voting, NALC Branch 36 leaders announced a final tally of 1,555 to 1,055 to strike. NALC
President Gus Johnson, who had been booed repeatedly throughout the meeting, announced that
the union was on strike, disappointing the MBPU leaders who believed he should have refused
the illegal maneuver.114
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In prior discussions with Johnson and the NALC leaders, Biller had agreed to hold an
emergency strike vote meeting of the MBPU should the NALC rank and file vote to strike. The
MBPU leadership immediately released a statement in the aftermath of the strike vote that the
NALC members had rebelled against their own leaders but that the MBPU would not be
following their lead into a strike, choosing instead to take a survey on attitudes towards the
strike.115 But postal workers had already taken the initiative, and as the clock struck twelve, the
largest work stoppage against the federal government in history began. Letter carriers and mail
sorters picketed at post offices across the city, carrying signs for higher pay and manning police
barricades to prevent scabbing. Mail handlers and clerks who reported to work honored the
picket lines though they themselves had not voted to strike, joining the pickets and calling on
their leaders to strike.116
That same night, the rank and file took over the MBPU’s emergency meeting, refusing
the union leadership’s pressures to follow by-laws and adhere to a secret ballot rather than a
voice vote. Members chanted, “power to the people” and Biller described the more than 6,000
members as being in an “angry and hostile mood.” When a vote finally did come, the margin was
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overwhelming, 8,242 to 940 in favor of a strike, giving a formal stamp to what was already a
fact.117
The joint rank-and-file votes in favor of striking resonated across the country. By the
afternoon of March 18, postal workers in Detroit walked off the job as well, and the wildcat
spread up and down the east coast to Newark, Philadelphia and Boston. Days later the strike
spread to Chicago as rank-and-file workers pushed through union channels to vote for a strike,
and the factionalized postal unions either stood aside or recommended honoring picket lines.
Across the country, the postal strike ebbed and flowed, with various cities and towns alternately
striking or returning to work. In total, some 200,000 workers struck the federal government.118
The strike caused massive disruption of the postal system. On the first day alone, the
New York Police Department and the United States Postal Inspectors chased problems back and
forth across the city, including trucks that blocked delivery bays or that were abandoned in
roadways after spontaneous walk offs. Picket lines were huge at many stations, and picketers
climbed atop postal vehicles and organized themselves to block entrance into major post offices.
Confusing matters even more, postal rank and filers called in dozens of bomb hoaxes, shutting
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down even more facilities.119 Some of this activity was probably coordinated, with some
militants in the GPO circulated flyers in the run up to the strike calling for sabotaging the postal
system with phone complaints, letters without stamps, and boxes with onions and ice cubes
shipped to warmer areas of the country.120
By the morning of March 19, strikers completely paralyzed New York City’s post
offices. One of the largest impacts of the strikes was halting checks by mail, which damaged a
variety of businesses and economic sectors. For example, the strike interrupted Con Edison’s
ability to gather $3 million in payments on a daily basis, a number that is paltry in comparison to
disruption inflicted on banks, who were prevented from garnering their usual $300 million a day
in payments by mail.121 The rest of the financial sector was affected as well, and several days
into the strike, the president of the New York Stock Exchange feared a market shutdown as a
result of the walkout.122
While the post office sought an injunction to end the strike, the Nixon administration
opted to break the strike with the National Guard. While Mayor Lindsay had tried to muster the
National Guard to end the 1968 sanitation strike, Governor Rockefeller nixed the plan. President
Nixon had no such check, and on March 23, he ordered the New York National Guard to picketguarded post offices across the city. By that same time, postal workers in many other states had
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returned to work, but New York’s postal workers scoffed at such calls.123 Nixon hoped to use the
Guardsmen to both intimidate the strikers and deliver the mail, but the intricacies of postal work
and the mountains of accumulated mail baffled Guard members. Some historians describe a
degree of solidarity between troops and strikers because it was not uncommon for letter carriers
or postal clerks to join the Guard to make up for their paltry wages.124 Leaders like Biller,
however, reported that they were frightened by the troops, feeling that they must order the rank
and file back to work.125
Local labor leaders denounced Nixon’s actions. The Uniformed Sanitationmen’s
Association president condemned Nixon’s attempt to “Vietnamize relationships with Federal
employees.” Further removed leaders like President Meany of the AFL-CIO were more
lukewarm, opposing the use of troops but advocating the end of the strike. While troops were not
able to deliver the mail, they certainly changed the tone of the strike and helped to speed its
end.126
On the first day of Guard mobilization, NALC President Rademacher brought word of an
offer from the Federal government, with 12 percent pay increases, wage adjustments for large
cities, amnesty for strikers, and collective bargaining rights.127 Biller was initially skeptical, both
wanting verification of its authenticity and arguing that New Yorkers needed a much higher pay
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increase to get them back to work. Rademacher, who claimed to have brokered the deal, had
local proxy, Branch 36 President Gus Johnson, assure Biller that it was a legitimate deal but only
if the strike were ended. With many postal workers in other cities returning to work and fear of
the Guard, Biller acceded to the Rademacher plan. In reality, Rademacher had completely lied,
receiving no agreement from Nixon.128
Nationally, many strikers were less resolute than their New York counterparts, and by
March 23, most postal workers in Boston, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco were back on the job
and many had begun to return to work in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit.129 In New York
City and nearby Newark, most postal workers remained on strike the day the National Guard
arrived, but picketing had decreased.130 Some workers became concerned that continuing the
walkout might endanger the viability of their unions, which could face massive fines and the loss
of automatic dues check off. Some workers were also intimidated by the Guard mobilization, and
after a week, many were unsure whether staying off the job longer would yield any benefits.131
On March 25, some carriers in Jamaica and Flushing, Queens voted to return to work, while in
the Bronx, some postal workers simply reported for duty. After a weeklong walkout that grew to
national proportions, New York City’s postal strike rapidly faded away.132
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Just as its end came from both above and below, the 1970 strike’s results were mixed.
The strike led to serious victories like the recognition of full collective bargaining rights for
postal workers as well as retroactive pay raises and full amnesty. What the workers had imposed
in fact—a force of collective bargaining—would be legally inscribed in law by 1971, putting an
end to the era of collective begging that had for so long defined the plight of mailmen and
women.133 Postal workers also threw less militant leaders out of office: rank-and-filer leader
Vincent Sombrotto became NALC Branch 36 president following the strike and ultimately
president of the entire NALC.134
On the other hand, the union leadership won these demands at the bargaining table in the
months after the strike. Biller, who strongly advocated against the strike, claimed all positive
settlements and blamed losses on Rademacher. Like the government, union leadership was
fearful of another wildcat, and when negotiations had stalled, the NALC placed Branch 36 into
trusteeship in order to prevent it and its allies in the MBPU from organizing another strike.
Ultimately, the strike led to the 1971 merger of several national into the newly formed American
Postal Workers Union (APWU), which would represent the majority of postal workers for years
to come.135 In subsequent negotiations a Rank and File Bargaining Advisory Committee would
take part in decision-making, yet the complaints of a feeble and non-militant leadership
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continued, and Biller, who initially opposed the strike, would go on to lead the APWU for many
years.136

Hard Hat Riots
In the city’s financial district, just before noon on Friday, May 8, 1970 about 200
longshoreman and construction workers, carrying American flags and gathering a crowd of
supporters as they marched, violently confronted students protesting Nixon’s expansion of the
Vietnam War and the killing of four students at Kent State University in Ohio. Lines of police
did little to hold the workers back as they drove their way into the thousand or so students, who
either retreated or stood their ground and fought with their fists. Bystanders intervened on both
sides, finding themselves bloodied by construction workers if they came to the students’ aid.
After breaking up the anti-war protest on Wall Street, the growing crowd and its vanguard of
construction workers wound its way up to City Hall where it overturned barricades and stormed
the inner halls, forcing city officials—Mayor Lindsay was not present—to raise the American
flag back to full mast from half, to which it had been lowered in honor of the four dead in
Ohio.137 In the days following, rank and filers took efforts in to their own hands, resulting in
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weeks of demonstrations primarily involving construction workers.138 Swiftly thereafter, the hard
hat emerged as a symbol of the silent majority, and in the words of historian Jeffrey Bloodworth,
“add[ed] to the nascent class war within the Democratic Party.”139
Workers’ motivations for participating were diverse, but support of the Vietnam War and
support of American troops was a major, albeit complicated, motivation. According to some
estimates, construction workers opposed the expansion of the war into Cambodia just as much as
students did, and in this period, a working class person was actually more likely to be against the
war than someone from the class background of most university students.140 Powerful union
bureaucracies stoked pro-war sentiment amongst memberships, with Local 3’s Electrical Union
World featuring pro-war letters and articles. Some issues had letters from drafted members of the
union who received a $10 contribution from the union each month, along with a letter from the
leadership about anti-war opposition and encouragement. Some letters simply expressed thanks
while others expressed hatred of draft opponents. As one Local 3 GI put it in 1968, “I wish they
draft them HIPPIES, they are a group of sick people!”141 Some construction workers came from
much more conservative backgrounds and supported the war as an effort to prevent communist
subversion worldwide.142
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While supporting the troops sometimes came from conservative political leanings,
sometimes it represented respect for sacrifice and fulfillment of duty and a disdain for those
protesting the war.143 In fact, in many interviews during and after the Hard Hat mobilizations,
construction workers expressed significant disgust for students. Several days prior to Hard Hat
Riot, violence had already broken out between construction workers and students multiple times
across Manhattan. In immediate response to the killings at Kent State, thousands of students shut
down both public and private colleges. At City College, construction workers building a new
science facility attacked a student on the way to the protest on May 5, with one shouting, “I was
in Vietnam and I love to kill Gooks;” the student defended himself with none other than a conch
shell.144 On May 7, shoving matches broke out between protesting students and construction
workers in downtown Manhattan, prompting some workers to participate in the riots the
following day.145
Opposition to students mixed class resentment and envy. As Robert Romano, a foreman
at the World Trade Center argued, students “have been with the silver spoon in their mouth too
long.”146 When interviewed on the subject, older workers often expressed dismay at the “kids”
who seemed to them to be ungrateful, self-righteous, or confused. They further lamented the
destruction of property and rioting on college campuses in the year prior, identifying it as a
breakdown of law and order. Ironically, though many construction workers resented the students,
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they yearned for their own children to attend college and leave behind demanding physical
labor.147
The Vietnam War and resentment of student protestors were important drivers, but
Mayor Lindsay was a focal point of the Hard Hat anger in both the initial violence and in the
weeks of protest that followed. The first Monday after the riot, some 2,000 construction workers
and longshoremen from docks on the city’s west side mobilized. The group marched for nearly
two hours, chanting “Lindsay is a bum,” carrying signs that read “Impeach the Red Mayor,” and
attacking a handful of bystanders.148 In the week that followed, several hundred construction
workers marched around the Financial District at lunchtime waving flags and singing songs like
“The Star-Spangled Banner.” On the one-week anniversary of the original riot, some 5,000
workers marched through the Financial District, carrying amongst other signs and symbols, a
coffin with an epitaph that read, “Here Lies the City of New York, Killed by Commissar
Lindsay.”149
While conservative, anti-communist rhetoric dominated signage, even some conservative
New Yorkers had voted for Lindsay in his 1965 electoral run because he was a member of the
Republican Party. By 1970 though, a large number of working-class whites living in the city’s
outer boroughs questioned the mayor’s ability to comprehend their struggles and concerns,
abandoning him in the 1969 mayoral race for either conservative Democrat Mario Procaccino or
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Republican John Marchi.150 In one plumber’s estimation, construction workers “feel they’re
getting stepped on. We built this country, and I don’t think we have a say now.”151 In 1969,
Procaccino gave working-class whites a verbal vehicle for their anger, labeling Lindsay and his
elite supporters “limousine liberals.”152
With some notable exceptions—blacks in the carpenters and drillers and Mohawks
amongst the ironworkers—construction work in New York City persisted as a socially isolated
enclave for white working-class men. It was particularly tight-knit because unions and
contractors relied on familial, ethnic, and religious ties to recruit workers and because unions
were strong enough to back up a degree of workers’ autonomy on the job and stave off outside
attempts to enforce nondiscriminatory hiring.153 In New York, protests had brought major
attention to exclusionary practices, and in the second half of the 1960s, the battle over hiring had
gone national, with Nixon pushing his own version of the Philadelphia Plan to promote increased
hiring of racial minorities in the buildings trades. In the summer and fall of 1969, protests took
place across the country against the slow or in some cases nonexistent integration of buildings
trades unions and violent street clashes took place in Chicago, St. Louis, and Buffalo.154 In
Chicago, construction workers even clashed with a group protesting the trial of the Chicago 8.155
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In New York City, Lindsay strongly supported affirmative action attempts, and historians
have argued that the Peter Brennan and the Buildings and Construction Trades Council (BCTC)
organized the protests to fight affirmative action measures. On the day of the initial violence,
many reported the presence of men in suits–presumably union officials— directing the violence
of the construction workers, but the identities of anyone engaged in such action was never
confirmed. Brennan denied union involvement, but he did little to denounce the violence,
arguing that the antiwar protesters deserved what they got and that hopefully the beatings
knocked some sense into them. While initially not claiming involvement in any of the protest,
the Building and Construction Trades Council (BCTC) held a special meeting on May 13 and
announced plans for a large rally to show “love of country and love and respect for our country’s
flag.”156 On the day of the march, 150,000 people inundated downtown Manhattan, with many
construction unions marching with banners and flags. Construction workers working in
downtown Manhattan who took part were compensated for their missed time at work, but some
reported that they felt forced to participate.157 The week following the massive patriotic
demonstration, Peter J. Brennan, president of the BCTC, met with President Nixon at the White
House, pledging his support and the support of construction workers everywhere for the war and
their commander and chief.158

156

“Special Meeting of the Executive Board meeting,” May 13, 1970, Building and Construction
Trades Council of Greater NY Minutes 1936-1984, Executive Board microfilm, Tamiment
Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives; quote from, “Huge City Hall Rally Backs
Nixon’s Indochina Policies,” New York Times, May 21, 1970.
157
On payment and compulsion see, Philip S. Foner, U.S. Labor and the Vietnam War (New
York: International Publishing Company, 1989), 105-108 & “Why the Construction Worker
Holler, ‘U.S.A. All the Way,’” New York Times, June 28, 1970.
158
Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New
York: Scribner, 2008), 497-499.

172
Historians have focused on the riots, but they have given little attention to the fact that
the large protest and work interruptions fit a formal pattern of BCTC threats over the preceding
seven years. At a 1964 BCTC Executive Board meeting, Brennan threatened a “holiday” and
march on City Hall against what he saw as the Wagner administration’s undue interference with
the rollout of various city projects.159 Again in February 1966, Brennan addressed a BCTC
meeting and threatened to “strik[e] the whole city” because Mayor Lindsay wanted to force fair
hiring concessions by delaying projects like the World Trade Center and Richmond
Expressway.160 In April 1966, Carpenters Vice President Charles Johnson denounced Lindsay
for “paying more attention to the minority groups than to the majority of the people,” calling on
the BCTC to declare a strike and march on City Hall, and by May, the organization’s executive
board voted unanimously to organize a mass march.161 Brennan and the BCTC’s threats
ultimately led to negotiations with the Mayor, and though conflicts with Lindsay continued, for a
time the threats subsided.162
After protests in the summer of 1969 and battles over the Revised Philadelphia Plan
reached a fever pitch, Brennan met with Lindsay who told the union leader he would issue an
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executive order on non-discriminatory hiring.163 In response, Brennan told a BCTC membership
meeting that the Mayor’s plan “might call for a complete shut-down.”164 In March, Mayor
Lindsay, in concert with the BCTC, announced the New York Plan, which many civil rights
activists immediately denounced because they believed it created a lower trainee tier for black
hires while whites would move directly into apprenticeships.165 Later that month, the city
obtained compliance on minority hiring by withholding funds from elevator contractors who
pledged to work in concert with Local 1 Elevator Constructors.166 In mid-April, Lindsay
announced an improved New York Plan that would require 25 percent minority hiring on all
construction jobs that were financed with city money, which Brennan adamantly opposed.167
Three weeks later, the BCTC was orchestrating attacks on student protesters, capitalizing on
their popularity with a mass march to both attack Lindsay and cozy up to the Nixon
administration.
The Hard Hat riots left a complicated legacy in the city. Municipally, the riot and protests
served as a rallying point for many who were anti-Lindsay and led to increased organized labor
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endorsement of conservative candidates like James L. Buckley.168 Nationally, the hard hat would
become synonymous with a conservative turn, as Brennan both courted and was courted by the
Nixon administration, becoming Secretary of Labor after supporting Nixon’s reelection run in
1972.169
While the Hard Hat Riots signaled some unity of purpose between construction workers
and their leaders—many feared the Revised Philadelphia Plan’s threat to their economic
livelihood—many construction workers opposed Nixon’s anti-inflationary measures, especially
as inflation in New York City ate into wage gains.170 In 1972, more than a 60,000 construction
workers would strike in the city, asking for a variety of changes including wage increases, more
shop stewards, stronger seniority protections, and protection of overtime opportunities. In nearly
every case, construction workers fought for contract gains opposed by Nixon’s anti-inflation
measures.171 And like their support of the war, support for Nixon was not overwhelming. In the
1972 presidential elections, more than 50 percent of union households—and manual laborers—
did go over to Nixon, but their levels of support were dwarfed by support for Nixon among
white-collar workers and professionals.172
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Conclusion

In the aftermath of 1968’s rank-and-file driven strikes, union leaders in New York City
perceived a widespread problem: “strike fever.” Just as the AFL-CIO convened a special meeting
to address the Wallace campaign in October 1968, in January 1969, it again brought together top
labor leaders to discuss the ongoing problem of strikes and contract rejections in the city.
Alongside Teamster leader Joseph Trerotola and Governor Nelson Rockefeller, attendees
lamented the loss of control over union memberships, analyzing the reasons behind renewed
militancy—inflation, youth rebellion, ungratefulness—and brainstorming ideas for subduing it—
cooling off periods, monitoring memberships, binding arbitration. Harry Van Arsdale Jr. feared
that if union members were not brought to heel, labor’s standing with the general public would
be severely damaged.
While strike fever could often take the form of a one-off rebuking of a contract or leader,
Teamsters Local 553 was the site of multiple contract rejections and strikes in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Though the source base is meager, there was active opposition within the union,
primarily small groups of workers based in one or another fuel depot who sometimes worked
together to picket leaders or run opposition slates. Throughout the 1950s drivers had made
significant gains, though there was internal opposition to these settlements: after a short strike in
1955, some 200 drivers objected to a return to work, denouncing their leadership as sellouts. It
was not until 1968, amidst the city’s broader labor upheaval, that fuel oil drivers voted down
leadership contracts, forcing strikes that crippled home, commercial, and city heating. Two years
later, in an even more combative contract meeting, drivers burned contract copies, attacked union
leadership, and called for better pay and benefits.
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Drivers’ militancy brought diminishing returns however. In 1970, preparation by private
landlords and coordination between the union, fuel companies, and the city dampened the impact
of the fuel oil shortages. With a lack of public outcry, fuel drivers returned to work, accepting
roughly the same contract they rejected the week prior. In 1972, there was some talk of trying to
reject the leadership’s contract recommendations, but workers ultimately approved it by a
significant majority. As one former member of the opposition coalition remembered it, opposing
the union leadership and the employers was fruitless, and he learned to simply focus on his own
economic survival.
While strikes like that of Local 553 grabbed public attention, ongoing, somewhat
subterranean, rank-and-file organizing also challenged labor leaders. In the TWU, Joe Carnegie
and the Rank and File Committee built on early organizing, expanding the group’s base in the
latter half of the 1960s. A growing number of black workers entered the city’s subway system as
union contract gains saw the retirement of many older white workers. Hoping to capitalize on
this growing demographic strength, the Committee fought against the discrimination against
black workers, organized public meetings for members, and made a bid for taking over the
union.
Though they ran an opposition slate in 1965, Committee members determined that such
campaigns were doomed to fail because of the union’s control of voting procedures. Instead, the
Committee tried to use the state’s Public Employment Relations Board to decertify the union and
challenge it in a state-mediated election. Collecting thousands of signatures from subway
workers across the city, the Committee tried to prove to the PERB that it had the support of 30
percent of the membership base for the decertification of the TWU. In 1969, the PERB rejected
their application, and in 1971 it did the same, ruling that the more than 9,000 signatures were
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untimely. The Committee challenged this second rejection resulting in a series of court battles,
just as bus drivers briefly wildcatted against the TWU’s 1972 settlement. Carnegie hoped the
decertification drive could transform this anger into organizational strength, but though favorable
decisions brought the Committee back for another hearing, the PERB again rejected their petition
in 1972.
While the PERB claimed bureaucratic reasons for not authorizing decertification, it
seems likely that the board preferred the predictability and stability of the TWU to an untested
and more aggressive rank and file leadership. Further, approving a decertification drive would
set a dangerous precedent, and probably lead to more challenges from public sector employees.
While it is difficult to definitively argue that the Rank and File Committee would have won or
lost a new election, a victory would have been incredibly difficult in the face of the TWU’s
organizational capacity, resources, and political connections, which far outweighed those of the
Carnegie or allies like James Haughton.
As one former organizer remember it, because of workplace rules in the United States,
the Committee lacked the legal standing to sufficiently defend transit workers from either the
Transit Authority’s discipline or the TWU’s negligence. Furthermore, with the PERB’s repeated
rejection of its decertification attempts, the Committee had no viable route to power. From the
aftermath of the Harlem Riot in 1964 and for eight years afterwards, the Committee sustained a
significant challenge to the one of the city’s most powerful unions, but with all of its options cut
off, the group folded. Some workers retired, moving on from the constant campaigning, while
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others determined that they had made themselves targets and needed to think about their longterm economic survival.173
While the bulk of the Committee’s efforts were focused on transit workers, Carnegie
maintained a wider commitment to workers’ struggle, helping James Haughton to organize a
nationwide gathering of rank-and-file rebels in 1969. After an abortive attempt by other
organizers to host a large rank-and-file conference in, Haughton and Carnegie stepped in,
playing host to a smaller meeting with a few dozen participants from across the country,
including Detroit’s League of Revolutionary Black Workers, various organizers in the United
Auto Workers, as well as militants in the International Longshoremen’s Association, American
Federation of Teachers, International Association of Machinists, and New York City’s painters’
union.
By and large, conference participants were leftwing militants, white and black. Key
discussions included the history of racism in the labor movement and whether or not white
workers and black workers should organize separately. While the League and some white
supporters argued for a fully independent approach, others including some black organizers
pushed for joint struggle albeit one that would not sideline the concern of blacks. Calls for
independent black organization outside of the unions led to a wider debate on whether to work
within unions or autonomously, with some participants decrying the latter as fomenting
divisions.
Haughton led the second and final day of the conference, forwarding a series of proposals
including workers’ centers, regional conferences, and a national publication. Haughton argued
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that attendees should take up the Harlem Unemployment Center’s model of creating community
spaces for both fighting discrimination in hiring and organizing rank-and-file struggles. Most
rejected the call for one reason or another, whether ideological aversion to dual unionism or a
lesser commitment to community issues. Attendees received the regional rank-and-file
conferences proposal more warmly, though there was little discussion of follow through. Finally,
Haughton’s proposal for a national publication received the most favorable response, and
conference participants suggested that Fight Back! become a publication focused on rank and file
struggles nationally.
While the conference concluded amicably—perhaps due to its smallness or the lack of
resources, positions, or platforms to fight over—it did not result in any major organizational or
theoretical developments. Like the rest of the labor movement, tactics, workplaces, and longterm goals divided rank-and-file organizers who hoped to channel the rebellion into one or
another, primarily local, strategic direction or organizational form. The hours of discussions
appeared to do little in shifting attendees to one or another position, and the Haughton-Carnegie
approach gained little traction. In spite of these divisions, all of the organizers recognized the
moment as one of great political possibility, and many believed that the upheaval would continue
unabated.
The following year, 200,000 postal employees wildcatted, with New York City’s leading
the way. Denied the right to collectively bargain, postal workers’ pay was terribly low: they
lagged behind other public employees in New York City, so much so that they would sometimes
leave the industry to seek higher pay or even qualify for welfare. Importantly, postal workers
were surrounded by militant struggles, and illegal strikes by municipal employees like the TWU,
teachers, and sanitationmen, as well as broader gains among militant workers emboldened them.
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In 1969, letter carriers and postal clerks in the Bronx organized a sickout in response to
the Nixon administration’s paltry pay raises. Union leaders had warned of potential wildcat
strikes, and when sickout participants were suspended, members of both the NALC and the
MBPU demanded action from their leaders. The sickout and outpouring of support led to
organizing within the NALC, including the formulation of rank-and-file demands and increased
union meeting attendance in the through the fall and winter of 1969-1970.
In March 1970, the demands and organizing allowed postal workers to overcome their
leaderships’ fear of striking. At a vote in which both NALC Branch 36 and MBPU leaders pled
for calm, letter carriers voted to strike the federal government, organizing pickets that shut down
postal service across the city as letter sorters and clerks honored the lines. The following night
MBPU members shouted down their leaders in a raucous meeting, putting a democratic stamp on
what was already a fact on the ground. Postal workers across the country followed New York’s
lead, either voting to go on strike or simply walking off the job. After nearly a week, the Nixon
administration mobilized the National Guard in to break the strike in New York City. Most
postal workers across the country had already gone back, and New York’s returned in the days
immediately afterward.
Union leaders used a strike they had adamantly opposed to exact concessions from the
federal government including the right to collectively bargain, pay increases, quicker pay step
increases, and increased benefits. Leaders in New York also used the strike as an opportunity to
help build a new nationwide postal organization the American Postal Workers Union, which to
its merit featured a Rank and File Bargaining Committee with some institutional power over
contract demands. While the strike achieved unprecedented gains, ultimately many of the leaders
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who had opposed independent worker organizing and action became more firmly established in
leadership positions.
Less than two months after the massive postal strike, New York was the site of yet
another labor event with national reverberations: the May 1970 Hard Hat Riots. With the
direction of union leadership, construction workers and longshoreman attacked students
protesting both the expansion of the Vietnam War and the National Guard’s killing of 4 student
protesters in Ohio. In raucous street battles from Wall Street to City Hall, workers ran amok,
even forcing City Hall to raise the American flag to full mast. At lunchtime in the weeks that
followed, construction workers paraded around the city’s Financial District, denouncing entitled
students and Mayor Lindsay while displaying hard hats and American flags as symbols of
protest.
While some construction workers were conservative supporters of Nixon and the
Vietnam War, complicated resentments factored large in initial confrontations. Polling during the
period indicated less support for the war among working-class Americans than among the middle
class, but many construction workers despised some protesters’ denunciation of troops and
military service. Many also objected to the ongoing protests and violence on campuses across the
country, seeing them as a general indication of ungratefulness and entitlement. Scorn for Mayor
Lindsay also loomed large, with denunciations of Lindsay for ruining the city or being a
communist. Anti-Lindsay sentiment had permeated several strikes in prior years and a 3-way
race in 1969 allowed the incumbent mayor to hold on to victory only by plurality.
With much public support favoring the hard hats, Peter Brennan, head of the BCTC,
organized a flag-draped demonstration with 150,000 participants, ingratiating himself with
President Nixon who embraced the hard hats as the vanguard of his Silent Majority. As some
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historians have argued, Brennan used the riots to push back against Nixon’s Philadelphia Plan,
which the president abandoned shortly thereafter, and by examining BCTC meeting minutes, the
connection becomes clearer. BCTC leaders had threatened mass marches in response to both
Mayor Wagner and Mayor Lindsay’s attempts to leverage non-discriminatory hiring by holding
up of city-funded projects. In early 1970, after growing conflicts nationwide around fair hiring,
BCTC leaders yet again discussed the possibility of fighting such attempts with a mass march.
While it seems unlikely that the initial riots were orchestrated with such foresight, the BCTC and
Brennan masterfully used the opportunity to ally with Nixon, who not only abandoned the
Philadelphia Plan but also eventually named Brennan his Secretary of Labor.
Rank-and-file upheaval in New York City at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the
1970s remained potent. While union leaders denounced, “strike fever,” the profound effects of
earlier strikes emboldened workers in a variety of industries to vote down contracts or engage in
wildcats, both embroiling the city and nation in labor conflicts. In fact, it seems unlikely that the
1970 postal wildcat would have occurred without the broader environment of labor upheaval in
New York City. The increase in militancy did not necessarily result in unequivocal victory. The
Rank and File Committee’s long-term organizing among transit workers built impressive
support—more than 9,000 workers signed their petitions to decertify the TWU—but institutional
opposition killed both their campaign to and their organization. A well-prepared city brought fuel
oil drivers back to work after their second rejected contract. Postal workers were more successful
however, winning the right to collectively bargain as well as wage increases that brought them
closer to their counterparts in the public sector. In the years that followed, other important rankand-file movements would flounder, and labor struggle would begin to decline in New York
City.

Chapter Four: Fading Fires

In the early 1970s, some of the city’s rank-and-file rebellions began to take on a darker
tone, with localized inflation and the beginnings of nationwide stagnation undermining workers’
confidence and economic stability. In 1971, telephone workers hoped to push their employers
into further concessions, as they had done several times in years prior. But after a seven-month
strike, New York Telephone (NYT) defeated them, nullifying their pattern breaking wage
demands and crushing their militancy. Complementing this public defeat, New York’s taxi
drivers also failed to make headway against their employers and union leadership. While pitted
in a racially charged battle against the livery cab industry, taxi drivers wildcatted, disrupted
union meetings, and organized challenges to their union leaders. Though anger was widespread,
drivers were divided. They fought each other and were increasingly angry at nearly everything
and everyone in the city, reflecting the darkening political mood towards the end of John
Lindsay’s second term.1
This chapter’s first section examines the major defeat of one of the city’s most militant
unions, Communication Workers of America Local (CWA) Local 1101. From the middle of the
1960s to 1972, Local 1101 members engaged in wildcat strikes, workplace sabotage, electoral
rejection of their leaders, and solidarity gestures with other striking unions, making them a
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problem for their employers and union leaders. To push for greater economic gains than the
International leadership obtained in nationwide bargaining, Local 1101 rejected a contract and
struck on its own in 1971. Their walkout was the reverse of the postal wildcat, beginning
nationwide and devolving into an isolated local strike. With the help of strikebreakers and an
automated workplace, employers held the line, defeating insurgent workers. In the strike’s
aftermath, managerial revenge and union reprisals shut the door on militancy within the local,
ending 1101’s rank-and-file rebellion. Finally, this important strike showed a changing attitude
amongst workers. While economic demands remained important to workers in the early 1970s,
the character of these demands was transforming. Whereas many rebellions were once
optimistic, amidst a localized inflationary spike as well as declining economic vitality in the city,
the strike signaled the beginning of desperation.
The second part of this chapter explores the rank-and-file anger within the Taxi Drivers
Union (TDU) and taxi workers’ inability to better their lot. Internal obstacles to rank-and-file
power in taxi were rampant, with different statuses and material interests dividing cab drivers. In
the TDU, part-time, often younger, drivers were mad about lower fare percentages while older
fleet drivers resented union paternalism and the financing of benefits from their fare percentages.
Meanwhile owner-drivers feared the livery industry’s threat to their livelihood but cared less
about fleet concerns. These differences, engendered by the industry structure and union
negotiations, prevented angry drivers from uniting and often impelled them to fight with one
another. While division weakened workers’ attempts to fight the TDU leadership, union heads
went to great lengths to maintain their power, including cancelling elections and putting the
union into trusteeship as a safeguard against lost elections. Union leaders also tried to direct
driver anger at the livery industry, embroiling yellow cab rank and filers in a racially polarizing
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battle. Though opposition groups like the Taxi Rank and File Coalition organized significant
challenges to the union leadership, they were unable to overcome internal divisions, union
recalcitrance, and an increasingly polarized city.

New York Telephone Strike 1971-1972

Local 1101’s militancy had contributed to the era’s broader restiveness, and their
defiance against their employers and union leadership resonated within the ranks of the CWA
nationally. But from 1971-1972, this celebrated, militant union would find itself in a protracted
struggle with employers and union officials, both local and national. What began as an exuberant
rank-and-file rejection of the union hierarchy ended as a devastating defeat, which closed the
door on rebellion. After seven months on strike, CWA Local 1101 members returned to work
nearly empty-handed, and in the months that followed NYT fired hundreds of workers, and the
union’s International helped split the local. This dramatic struggle, culminating in an equally
dramatic defeat, explains why the efforts of some of New York’s most militant workers failed,
what concerns and desires drove them, and how their loss contributed to a declining field of
struggle in the city.2
While the 1971 strike would bring President Joseph Beirne and the CWA International
into direct conflict with Local 1101 members, the International had longstanding problems with
the local. Part of the difficulty was that 1101 was the largest CWA local in the United States,
with some 20,000 members in 1970. This size gave it greater representation within International
2
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elections and negotiations, and in the early 1960s the International amended representational
rules to limit the local’s influence. In response, Local 1101’s then-President Hank Habel and the
rest of the Executive Board voted to take the union out of the CWA and into the Teamsters.
Arguing that they were fighting for the “rank and file and local autonomy,” Local 1101 leaders
attacked CWA President Beirne for his “‘don’t upset the applecart’ policies,” “no struggle”
unionism, and “rule or ruin” tactics.3 While Habel and others initially had rank-and-file support
for their denunciations of Beirne and attempts at secession, CWA International counterattacks
weakened them, as did their own self-aggrandizement. When Habel and his allies at the
Teamsters faced off with the CWA in elections a few years later, many rank-and-file workers
soured on their former leaders, believing them to be self-serving and power hungry. In fact, some
younger workers who opposed Habel and the Teamsters’ Telephone Employee Company Union
(TECU) made pins for their coworkers that read, “FU TECU.”4
The union went through a series of leaders in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Internal
quarreling seemed to reach new heights in the ranks of Local 1101, with cliques falling in and
out of favor, leading to a contested election in 1971 in which opposition candidate Ricky
Carnivale eked out a win against the incumbent leadership. Carnivale had relatively little
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experience and was not particularly militant, finding himself often outflanked by his own
members.5
The influx of young working-class New Yorkers in the second half of the 1960s
dramatically increased the union’s militancy. Influenced by the period’s cultural and political
tumult, they wore their hair longer, had mustaches and beards, and saw themselves as rebelling
against a series of authoritarian institutions in their lives. Many of their older coworkers viewed
them with deep suspicion, if not outright shock, for both their aesthetic and political differences.
One CWA rank and filer remembered a cafeteria conversation that turned into a brawl as older
workers remarked that the Chicago police should have shot the protesters at the 1968 Democratic
National Convention.6
What differentiated new workers was not a transformation in their class position: many
grew up in working-class neighborhoods where union membership and working-class identity
were commonplace. Instead, some younger workers had an anti-authoritarian streak, distrusting
institutions and representatives of all stripes. Many felt that there was no one on their side and if
anything were to change, they would have to do it themselves. Underlying the confidence of the
young was that they were born and raised in an economy with plentiful employment, and this
ability to move around in the job market gave them a sense of options.7 This fact was strongly
reflected in New York Telephone’s abysmal 50 percent retention rate.8
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Older workers, however, were still staunch union men. When younger workers began
initiating pickets against various company infractions, older workers consistently honored their
picket lines and called upon their preexisting social networks to build wildcat mobilizations.9
Though there was a clash of cultures, important working-class norms pervaded the lives of CWA
workers in New York City, and it was this combination of long-standing working-class values
and a youthful anti-authoritarian streak that birthed Local 1101’s militancy in the late 1960s.10
While generational transformation created cultural distance within the union, another
longstanding divider was the structure of work with many inside and outside workers feeling that
they had little in common. Local 1101 was a large union covering Manhattan and Brooklyn, and
many of its members installed telephone equipment and made repairs across the city. As
discussed in Chapter 3, when outside workers increasingly became victims of assault, wildcats
shut down work across the city. This 1967 walkout led to the establishment of two-man and
three-man areas where Local 1101 members would work with backup. With this initial success,
members led more walkouts in the years that followed. In 1969, another series of wildcats broke
out, and in November of that year, CWA members struck over a wage-scale progression. Rankand-filers in Brooklyn, many of them young, led the walkout, and their efforts resonated with
other CWA members in the state who walked off in solidarity. Only threats of massive fines and
the company’s agreement to negotiate the issue brought the men back to work, with both sides
claiming victory. While these wildcats did not disrupt service in any major way, the company

9

Jim McMahon, interview with author, New York, January 10, 2017.
Aaron Brenner, “Rank-and-File Struggles at the Telephone Company,” in Rebel Rank and
File: Labor Militancy and Revolt from Below During the Long 1970s, eds. Aaron Brenner,
Robert Brenner, and Cal Winslow (New York: Verso, 2010), 254 & 263-265.

10

189
was willing to negotiate in order to get the men back on the job to continue expanding and
repairing its system.11
Local 1101 members also led shorter-lived wildcats to address day-to-day concerns. In
the blazing summer months when air conditioners failed, managers would order workers to
simply suffer through the rest of the day’s heat. Younger workers rejected these conditions and
walked off the job, calling other men out. Challenging workplace discipline and unfairness on
the job, young workers grieved the company on issue after issue, becoming so obstinate in the
face of their employers that it would “make the pope kick in a stained glass window.”12
Local 1101’s restiveness attracted leftwing activists to the union. International Socialists
(IS), a small leftist organization with local chapters across the country, founded an opposition
caucus within Local 1101 called United Action (UA). Unlike the TWU’s Rank and File
Committee, which sought to unseat the union as a whole, IS members worked from inside the
union to take power. Like their coworkers, the UA opposed the CWA leadership’s complacency
and lack of militancy, but unlike their coworkers they advocated an expansion of the union’s
turf. New York Telephone’s female operators—many of whom were black or Puerto Rican—
were organized by the Telephone Traffic Union (TTU), which was practically a company union
that kept the women in poorly paid jobs with little protection. Though critical of the CWA
leadership, UA wanted to include operators in Local 1101 to not only provide better material
gains for the operators but also to transform the local into a multi-gender, multi-racial union
covering all of New York City’s telephone workers.13
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While UA worked within Local 1101’s caucus framework, another, more independent
rank-and-file organization advocated parallel workplace organizing. In 1970, the Progressive
Labor Party (PLP), a leftist organization that promoted a return to working class organizing on
the part of student militants, founded the Bell Workers Action Committee (BWAC). While the
PLP had played an important role in the decline of Students for a Democratic Society during its
1969 national convention, BWAC included PLP members, non-affiliated New Left militants, and
former-SDS members who had cut their teeth in anti-war and civil rights activism. Like UA,
BWAC promoted the addition of the TTU’s operators to Local 1101, but their program also
included organizational efforts outside of the union’s control such as independent plant
committees and cross-union building committees, which were designed to bring together plant
workers and operators. Both leftist groups were committed to wresting control from the union
leadership, hoping to do so along a broadly anti-discriminatory and socialist line. Of the two, UA
was the most successful, and in the run up to the strike, it was able to push some of its agenda at
Local 1101 General Membership Meetings, in part because most of the workers themselves had
already formulated similar militant demands.14
Aware of longstanding discontent within its ranks, especially in New York, the CWA
International began to discuss urban social and economic conditions with Bell Telephone. In the
summer of 1970, the CWA International leadership approached Bell for a discussion of the “Big
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City Problem.”15 The conversations revolved around the broader Urban Crisis, with the union
identifying crime, racial turnover, drug use, housing costs, transportation, and taxes as key
problems for it workers in large cities. The International’s highlighting of urban social conditions
acknowledged how public some telephone work was: CWA members worked in every
neighborhood of every city, no matter how poor, no matter how dangerous. Company
representatives agreed with the union that there were specific problems for workers in the
country’s biggest cities but preferred to focus on their own issues, especially the inability to hire
or retain a disciplined labor force. While the CWA put economic problems at the bottom of its
list of Big City problems, choosing to deal with those as a broader national question, New York’s
rank-and-filers prioritized them, especially as inflation increased. Though the union began to
address the conditions that CWA workers faced in cities, rumbling from the ranks indicated that
wages would be the most significant component of the 1971 contract.16
In the past, the CWA had used its Western Electric ranks to set the bargaining pattern for
its entire union, calling them out on strike in 1968. Among Bell System workers, however, CWA
President Joseph Beirne had garnered a reputation as a sellout leader who was afraid of strikes.
In November of 1970, Beirne sent a timid letter to members of the national bargaining
15
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committee, assessing the possibility of an “effective strike against the Bell System.”17 While he
received a variety of responses, many called on Beirne to lead a nationwide strike to unify the
ranks and achieve much needed pay raises. Even those who were anti-strike cited the need for
major contract improvements, though they doubted the CWA’s ability to dramatically disrupt
services due to automation of the telephone infrastructure. As one of Beirne’s assistants wrote,
“[r]egardless of how high Bell’s offer may be, we will almost have to strike to convince our
members that blood has indeed been squeezed from a stone.”18
While CWA leaders worried about their ranks across the country, New York was of
particular concern in these negotiations. In May 1971, as talks were reaching an impasse,
regional leader Morton Bahr wrote Beirne to emphasize that inflation was hitting the New YorkNew Jersey metro area so hard that workers there were actually falling behind. It was this
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localized growth in inflation, combined with a powerful militancy that would push Local 1101
members to strike against their International and local leadership.19
Bahr’s attention to inflation in New York came amidst declining economic health in the
region. While plentiful employment had undergirded the rank-and-file rebellion, in 1971, New
York’s unemployment hit a ten-year high at six percent.20 The rapidly accelerating decline in the
city’s manufacturing base was to blame for some of the uptick. In the 1950s, the five boroughs
lost around 90,000 factory jobs; in the 1960s, they lost another 117,000 with most of the job loss
coming at the very end of the decade. The contraction of the city’s manufacturing sector
accelerated: between 1970 and 1972 alone, the city shed 100,000 more manufacturing jobs. A
flood of cheap imports hit the city’s garment district incredibly hard, with the industry losing
50,000 jobs in 1970, a 20 percent decline.21 Manufacturing profits were down nationally by a
significant margin and many firms that could not compete went under while others had begun to
relocate in order to take advantage of more conservative areas of the country where unionization
and taxes were lower.22
Inflation also grew significantly in New York City at this time, and at a higher rate than
the rest of the nation. Food prices increased 15 percent, apparel by 16.1 percent, and medical
care by 20 percent. Rent was up by 10 percent in the city, with Governor Rockefeller’s rollback
on rent control regulations in 1971 only making rents higher. Even the subway fare was up,
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increasing from 15 cents to 20 cents in 1966 and to 30 cents by the beginning of 1970.23 Rising
inflation and unemployment threatened the economic mobility of younger workers who had
grown up amidst the postwar boom, while for many older workers the economic conditions
triggered memories of the Great Depression. This shakeup began to color workers’ anger with
inflation becoming an ineluctable force that dragged workers back down no matter how hard
they fought, injecting a sense of desperation into some struggles.24
With growing restiveness in the ranks and a threatening growth of inflation both
nationally and especially in New York City, Beirne and the Executive Council moved to strike.
The CWA was fighting for an immediate 30 percent raise. Bell’s own negotiators recognized the
inflationary effects on the former contract, and they were willing to concede to a 26 percent
increase, with the pay hike evenly divided over a three-year period.25 Many telephone workers
were unhappy with this offer because they feared that the roughly eight percent increases per
year would amount to very little real income gain in the face of rising prices.26
On July 14, in a well-coordinated event, the International led a strike of 500,000
telephone workers across the United States, and within days they had a new contract offer.27 It
outlined a 27.4 percent raise over a three-year period with just over half of the raise in the first
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year, an increase that was higher than those won in automotive and steel contracts.28
Furthermore, the contract included an agency shop provision, which would allow the CWA to
collect representation fees from all employees, whether they joined the union or not. Such
agreements were a financial windfall for unions, giving them greater stability and increasing
their war chests significantly. With an agency shop agreement and a 27.4 percent raise in hand,
the Executive Board voted unanimously to end the strike on July 19, ordering its men back to
work by July 20 before rank-and-file approval of the contract.29
Though the strike was called off, locals still had to approve the contracts, and some did
not heed the call to return to work. In New York strikers had gone out enthusiastically, and when
the Executive Board called them back to work, they refused to return. Rank and filers in New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Florida also rejected the CWA’s call, leaving more than 100,000
strikers on the picket lines nationwide.30
The CWA Executive Council feared that New York locals and Local 1101 would
spearhead a Special Convention to renew the strike.31 CWA Special Conventions required 20
percent of the membership or 20 percent of the locals’ consent, but after consultation with
lawyers, the International determined that New York locals lacked the sufficient numbers to push
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for a convention on their own.32 As expected, New York locals and many others across the
country did call for a convention, but with only 77 locals representing only 70,000 members, the
Executive Board denied the motion.33 With no means of reopening a national strike, every other
local within the CWA voted to accept the contract. Only Local 1101 voted it down. Leftists in
BWAC and UA praised the militancy and disobedience in the face of the CWA International,
hoping the New Yorkers would lead a nationwide rebellion. Like the postal workers the year
prior, New Yorkers certainly were out in front, but Local 1101’s militancy also left the local
isolated. If New Yorkers were in the vanguard, they alone would also carry the heavy burden of
defeat.34
In both the run up and aftermath of the nationwide strike, leftist militants within the Local
1101 pushed for militant demands and cross-union organizing. In Local 1101, BWAC, alongside
United Action, advocated a resolution declaring support for any TTU who honored the CWA’s
picket lines. They had worked in the months prior to the strike to build connections between
operators and CWA members who worked in the same buildings. Their argument for a resolution
to “support and defend operators and reps respecting the lines” made economic sense to some
TTU workers because their gains were often tied to the gains of CWA workers, but earlier strikes
saw the noninvolvement of operators with plant workers and vice versa. Through months of
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organizing at the New York Telephone 2nd Avenue plant in Manhattan where some UA and
BWAC members worked, strike activity briefly crossed organizational lines.35
But all was not immediately well in the effort. In fact, organizing with TTU members
only happened where militants like themselves worked and often did not involve the majority of
TTU members.36 BWAC felt that it was incumbent on the men of Local 1101 to create the
possibility of cross-union solidarity, and when most CWA members did not heed their call, and
in its publication, Strike Back!, it attacked the primarily white male members of the CWA for
undermining their own strike. BWAC primarily blamed the men’s sexism and racism, but many
members’ lack of interest was more complicated than prejudice.37
Rank-and-file militants’ rejection of the BWAC strategy was indicative of a broader
rejection of the group as well as practical limitations of the strategy itself. Many of the older
workers in the union were put off by avowedly socialist organizations.38 Anti-communism had
become a key pillar within the labor movement, and the CWA International had redbaited Local
1101 leaders during the Teamster raid, accusing them of working with communists.39 Meanwhile
during the 1971 strike, BWAC’s publication featured multiple pages dedicated to an anti-war
march, which it celebrated because some of its participants called for solidarity with the Attica
rebellion and Vietnamese communists. Like the hard hats, many telephone workers would have
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been hard pressed to dialogue with, let alone follow, those who proudly carried the label of a
socialist or communist and who praised the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.40
Even young workers more alienated from prevailing institutions, and who emerged from
a similar cultural matrix as the UA and BWAC members, were still critical of leftwing groups. In
fact, during the early days of the 1971 strike, members of the Socialist Workers Party tried to
intervene in Brooklyn picket lines, giving directions to the men and selling newspapers. Local
1101 members were skeptical of their attempts, and after a few days—and socialist pretentions to
leadership—they were beaten up and thrown out of the picket lines.41
Another difficulty with the UA and BWAC strategy was that many Local 1101 members
simply did not work alongside TTU members. Their solidarity with their fellow telephone
workers was not only built on a commitment to their union but also on day-to-day interactions
and short-term walkouts and grievances. United Action was more astute than BWAC in their
assessment of their fellow workers, and in the months prior to the strike, they decreased their
emphasis on a single union and emphasized economic demands instead.42
While leftists promoted cross-union organizing, NYT had progressively made its system
less susceptible to disruption. The company had long used technology to undermine workers’
power, and the company’s introduction of the dial system undermined the need for operators, and
a nationwide strike in 1947 for a closed shop, wages, and paid holidays lost when the phone

40

“Vietnam------Attica,” Strike Back!, vol. 1 no. 9 December 1971, 7-8.
Jim McMahon, interview with author, New York, January 10, 2017.
42
For UA propaganda shift from cross-union organizing, see the programs for CWA Local 1101
in “United Action #5,” Monday, May 10, 1971 & “United Action #6” June 7, 1971,
Communication Workers of America Printed Ephemera Collection, Tamiment Library and
Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, box 6, CWA Local 1101 United Action: Serial Publication,
Issues 1-21 folder.
41

199
system’s functionality remained mostly intact.43 By the late 1960s, most phone lines in the New
York area and increasingly across the United States were equipped with sensors that could
monitor their functionality and diagnose problems. Combined with earlier innovations, much of
the phone system could be maintained and run by supervisors in case of a strike. The CWA’s
International leadership recognized this fact, with the union’s head Joseph Beirne stating that,
“[i]t is not a very satisfactory discovery for a union to realize that the direct impact of its strike
weapon is quite moderate.”44
With an increasingly automated and strike-proof system, workers fought scabs and
sabotaged company equipment and phone lines in various parts of the city. In one case, several
cut lines left nearly 2,000 people without phone service until crews could repair them. New York
Telephone decried the sabotage, but was just as concerned during the strike by the intimidation
and property destruction at its facilities.45 Strikers harassed and roughed up scabs and supervisors
working to break the strike, and they damaged facilities by throwing eggs and paint, some of
which resulted in some arrests.46
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While a powerful, militant spirit marked the strike’s early days, CWA members sank into
a deep malaise after weeks of stalemate. Some in Local 1101 found continuing community on
the picket lines, but early in the strike most the picket lines dissipated as President Carnivale and
the union leadership stopped organizing them. Men who spent the majority of their waking hours
at work amongst a large group of coworkers with whom they often shared strong bonds now
found themselves isolated from their workmates. During the strike many stayed at home, often
without any activity to orient themselves around and occasionally in the company of spouses
they were not used to spending so much time with! As one militant worker described it, the
feeling that pervaded the strikers was something like depression, though that particular way of
describing it was not current at the time.47
Though many workers were demoralized, they maintained a commitment to the strike,
rejecting company recalcitrance and union attempts to end the strike. By late fall, talks between
the union and New York Telephone had reached an absolute impasse; the company was not
willing to budge, and the longer the strike dragged on, the more difficult it was for the ranks to
give in and return to work empty handed. The strike was slowing the rate of repairs—leaving
100,000 customers in the New York area without service—but it was not causing major outages,
and fewer than 1,000 out-of-state strikebreakers held the resilient telephone network together.48
Workers appealed to the Lindsay administration to apply a New York City law that made
bringing in out of state strike breakers illegal, but no action was forthcoming from the mayor.49
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Meanwhile, the International gave little support to the strike. The International needed to
prove it obtained the best deal possible and if a strike that defied their authority could produce
better, they might lose control of many more locals. With little initial help from the city
government or the union International—defense funds were only disbursed in November—Local
1101 had to rely on their own devices.50 Most rank and filers applied for unemployment
insurance to keep themselves afloat, and many younger workers took it upon themselves to help
their older comrades navigate the application process. For many of the male plant workers,
supplementary incomes of their working wives bolstered their position, making the economic
effects of the strike less dramatic.51 Twenty-three weeks in, when Local 1101 President
Carnivale gathered the men for a contract vote, the membership rejected it by a massive 3-1
margin. The militant telephone workers were down but not out.52
The show of unity in November temporarily broke the malaise, leading to a short-lived
coalition between militants, leftists, and former Local 1101 elected officials. Together they
organized renewed picket lines in the city and out-of-state pickets at CWA-organized, Bell
Telephone facilities, traveling to cities in New Jersey, Connecticut, Washington D.C., and as far
as away as Detroit in December 1971.53 CWA rank and filers in these cities respected the
pickets, and many sympathized with Local 1101’s plight, though local leaders were more wary.
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UA in particular saw potential in these pickets, hoping that it would become the springboard for
rank-and-file coordination within the CWA that no longer relied on any level of the union
bureaucracy. Carnivale opposed much of the out-of-state picketing, refusing to disburse funds
once it seemed to catch on.54
Even though the Local 1101 rank and file was mobilizing again, it still did not harm the
company. Frustration mounted, and in mid-January, at a rally of some thousand workers at City
Hall, CWA strikers began an impromptu march, blocking traffic, destroying telephone
equipment, and fighting with police. The following week another rally against out-of-state scabs
resulted in more arrests.55 But in the face of months of resistance, New York Telephone offered
the same deal as before with two insubstantial improvements: a one-dollar raise for employees
who had reached the top tier and a slight increase in Saturday pay.56
By mid-February the telephone strike had run its course, failing to cause major outages or
hinder the company. After fighting off the out-of-state picketing, the Carnivale leadership
attempted to get the men back on the job by conducting a mail-ballot election. At that point,
demoralization was rampant in the union and in spite of earlier exuberance, few were happy
about the strike.57 After a mail-in ballot, strikers voted 13,769 to 9,193 to accept the new
contract, which included an extra dollar per week for top craftsman and 15 percent extra pay for
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Saturday work.58 After nearly seven months, the militancy of CWA workers in New York was
unable to garner a significant local settlement and demonstrated an almost complete failure to
impact the company. In its aftermath, rank and filers would refer to the defeat as the “dollar
strike,” an appellation that calls attention to the almost worthless outcome.59
While Aaron Brenner also argues that the 1971 strike was a defeat, he neither adequately
underscored the degree of defeat nor its long-term effects.60 Following the strike, NYT fired one
UA member and two BWAC and a handful of other militant unionists. But in the two months
that followed, company reprisals expanded, and by the beginning of June, somewhere between
250 and 300 plant workers were fired, including shop stewards who helped lead the strike and
entire gangs of workers. Most fired workers were active in the strike, but the company only fired
thirteen for strike related actions.61 Instead, NYT used small-scale disciplinary measures to fire
many in the strike’s aftermath, with reasons as varied as leaving five minutes early, absences,
lateness, and managerial metrics for reliability and production. With hundreds fired, and a freeze
on hiring in the year prior, New York Telephone also punished its workers with a productivity
drive, forcing those who remained to shoulder the increasing load of expanding service and a
shrunken workforce.62
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Another major reprisal came from the International. Amidst defeat, several Brooklyn
leaders, who had been voted out of the Local 1101 bureaucracy in the 1970 elections, pushed to
secede from Local 1101. Many Brooklyn members of Local 1101 backed the drive because they
were disappointed in Carnivale’s strike leadership.63 Carnivale killed the proposal within the
Local, but the secessionists appealed to the CWA International for support.64 International Vice
President Morton Bahr, who had for many years overseen the Northeast’s District 1, backed their
drive. He believed that Local 1101 was a continuing threat to the International, claiming that
radical fringe groups controlled the organization because of inept local leadership.65
While it was true that United Action members had some influence, the militancy within
the union was neither directed nor fomented by leftists. Bahr believed that a stable and effective
leadership capable of reining in the ranks was nowhere in sight, and that backing a Brooklyn
secession would undermine both Local 1101’s political and numerical strength. In Bahr’s words,
“a Brooklyn Local could serve to bring about a desired balance within the New York plant
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bargaining unit. At present Local 1101 has a real stranglehold.”66 The International ultimately
approved the secession, and Brooklyn’s exit took away nearly a fifth of Local 1101’s members.67
Local 1101’s defeat was an important public rebuking of militant, rank-and-file action. In
the words of UA militant Joseph Nabach, “the telephone strike [was] the first major industrial
strike in recent memory which has ended in undeniable defeat for the labor movement.”68 More
than just a defeat for the labor movement, it was a defeat of rank-and-file workers. After all,
Beirne had led a strike, delivered a sizeable contract, and obtained an agency shop agreement.
While the strike perhaps confirmed Beirne’s reputation as fearful of strikes, it also resulted in a
major gain for the union’s organizational stability. For rebellious workers in the CWA, the story
was much different. Seven months of challenges had led to relatively little gains, and the
resistance came at great economic cost. All eyes were on New York City for leadership in the
1971 contract battle, and the local went down in flames. Unlike the 1970 postal strike, which was
remembered by and large as a victory–in spite of the limitations and problems discussed in the
previous chapter—the Local 1101 strike was a disaster for rank-and-file militants.69
The failed telephone strike also helps explain workers’ changing attitudes in 1970s New
York. A malaise had set in relatively early on in the strike as workers found themselves isolated
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from one another as well as from the rest of the CWA. The end of the strike brought a
combination of defeat and relief, with many so disheartened that they were simply ready to get
back to work. Though the battle had bound many people together and created some camaraderie
in the aftermath, many were no longer interested in fighting. In the strike’s aftermath, a new
mindset emerged among Local 1101 members in which they gave up on collective struggle and
focused primarily on their individual survival.70 In fact, the following year, when many women
began to enter the ranks of Local 1101—as well as a new set of leftist militants who wanted to
challenge the gender stratification in the workforce—they described a widespread state of apathy
in the union.71 In 1974, amidst national negotiations and nationwide stagflation, New York’s
militancy was neither a beacon of hope to other rank and filers nor a source of significant fear
among union leaders.72
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with the help of Harry Van Arsdale Jr. and the AFL-CIO. But shortly after the unionization
drive, Van Arsdale would become the focal point of anger over weak contracts, lack of internal
democracy, and fare raises that hurt many drivers. Union meetings devolved into brawls and
chair throwing, drivers attacked union officials, and rank and filers squabbled amongst
themselves. Driver anger was volatile and directed at many adversaries, and though union
leaders bore much of it, the rising threat of the livery cab industry–often colloquially referred to
as gypsies—brought yellow cab drivers into an increasingly racially polarized conflict with
Mayor Lindsay and the primarily black and Puerto Rican livery cab drivers. Amidst the discord,
the Taxi Rank and File Coalition emerged, bringing together long-term anger and the organizing
energy of young radicals. Leftwing activists would struggle to situate themselves amidst the
anger, leading a powerful but short-lived insurgency against the leadership. In spite of years of
anger and frustration with the TDU, opposition never coalesced enough to defeat the union
leadership, overcome stiff employer resistance, or deal with the livery threat either through
liquidation or accommodation. Taxi drivers became increasingly divided amongst themselves
and polarized against outsiders, suffering a series of setbacks that would leave them defeated and
scapegoating a lesser enemy.73
Initial discontent revolved around two specific issues: the conduct of the union
bureaucracy and the insufficiency of union gains. When Van Arsdale and the CLC intervened to
organize the taxi drivers, their rhetoric promised great changes, including “Industrial Democracy
and a Better Life.”74 Quite early on, however, taxi drivers began to resent the newly formed
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union for its lack of democracy and its lack of home rule. The union bureaucracy excluded many
original campaign organizers, and some taxi rank and filers considered Van Arsdale, who had
never driven a cab, a paternalistic ruler with little faith in the taxi drivers’ ability to run their own
affairs.75
There was certainly some truth to this claim. After staving off some initial electoral
challenges in 1966–some of which were pro-Van Arsdale and others anti—the union lengthened
the tenure of office for many elected positions, which both ensured steadiness at the top but also
stoked resentment from below. In the union’s second year, drivers wildcatted in hopes of
pressing fleet owners into a better commission, and in order to get the drivers back to work, Van
Arsdale called a membership meeting to vote on continuing negotiations. When it came time for
the vote, Van Arsdale refused to hold a yay or nay vote, choosing instead to only ask for yays!76
The anger at the new union’s conduct was always intertwined with a disappointment in
the speed of contract gains. The union had achieved some early successes including an increase
in driver commissions from 44 to 47 percent, a pension for those who retired after 25 years of
full-time driving, vacation pay, and some benefits paid by the fleets. But because they were only
recently unionized, taxi drivers were far behind many other workers, looking on in envy at
unions that had won health insurance, pension plans, a credit union, and even coop buying
programs. While the union sought to prove its worth, the city’s wider labor militancy began to
influence the taxi drivers. In 1969, an opposition candidate appealed to his fellow hacks:
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We have been called public servants, as are the police, the firemen
and the sanitationmen (although they are all under Civil Service).
Do they have unions where the leaders make the decisions or
where the members make the decisions? When they were
dissatisfied with their contracts, did the leaders listen to them? You
bet they did!77
Though the TDU was very new, it faced a restive membership: taxi drivers both wanted what
other workers had and felt impelled by their rank-and-file struggles.
While there was widespread anger at the union leadership, drivers never formed a unified
opposition and divisions in the workplace contributed to this disunity. The majority of the city’s
taxi drivers were fleet drivers, meaning they worked for a fleet owner who supplied and
maintained the yellow cabs. Unlike their counterparts in other industries, fleet drivers did not
work for wages but rather for a cut of the fares they booked each day. The more fares they
booked, the more money they took home.78 In doling out the work, employers used a shape up
system in which they chose those who booked more over those who booked less, encouraging
drivers to try and out produce one another.79
Demand for cabs was up in the postwar era, but the number of cabs had not grown,
leaving drivers to fight for assignments. This competition manifested itself on the streets, with
drivers cruising the same busy thoroughfares in search of customers, often racing with one
another to win a fare. To make ends meet, some drivers would negotiate a decreased price with a
customer without turning on the meter, thus cutting out the fleet owners. This was a widespread
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practice with some degree of tolerance amongst the owners, though by the late 1960s, owners
installed sensors, hot seats, to automatically turn on meters when customers sat down.80
While they sometimes used disciplinary techniques to achieve driver obedience, fleet
owners also used more dubious methods, with older rank and filers alleging the widespread use
of bribery to ensure loyalty and division in the workplace.81 The constant competitiveness led to
some skepticism of collective action, and though many older drivers who had lived through one
or more unionization drives had their gripes with the new leadership, internal divisions and a
predilection for individual survival practices kept many divided.82
Another source of division amongst the ranks of taxi drivers was the fact that nearly five
thousand drivers owned their own cabs. Like the fleet owners, these owner-drivers held a
medallion, the license to cruise and pick up passengers for a fare. Medallions were becoming an
increasingly expensive piece of paperwork in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the average ownerdrive medallion cost nearly $25,000, and new owner-drivers had to take out large loans to pay
for them. While they incurred their own costs, owner-drivers worked for themselves and kept the
entirety of each fare, making much more money than either the part-time or full-time fleet
drivers. This distinction also brought owner-drivers’ interests in line with fleet owners in that

80

Vidich, 27-29.
“Old Timers,” 1976, Taxi Rank and File Coalition Oral History Collection, Tamiment Library
and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives; Old Timers, April 15, 1976, Taxi Rank and File
Coalition Oral History Collection, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives.
82
For division and cynicism, see Activists, Taxi Rank and File Coalition Oral History
Collection, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives; for distrust and let down
of many union drives, see “Old Timers,” 1976, Taxi Rank and File Coalition Oral History
Collection, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives.
81

211
fare hikes benefited them, outside competition threatened their monopoly, and regulation from
the city was of great concern.83
In the aftermath of unionization, fleet owners brought in thousands of part-time drivers.
These part-time drivers used the license for many things including supplementary incomes,
temporary stints between other work, and summer employment. The influx of part-time drivers
undermined the union’s position by swelling its ranks with drivers who were neither committed
to improving the industry nor the rank-and-file condition.84 The one important exception to this
trend was that in lowering the minimum driver age, a large influx of younger drivers entered the
industry, some of who would form the core of the union’s most significant internal opposition,
the Taxi Rank and File Coalition.85
By the end of the 1960s, crime and violence were becoming a growing concern of taxi
drivers, and 1969 stood out with five drivers murdered. Crime had long been a problem for
cabbies because they carried cash and picked up strangers at all hours of the day, but crime was
growing in New York City during the mid-1960s, and cabbies were increasingly targets. During
the 1965 unionization drive, two drivers, one white and one black, were murdered in Brownsville
and Bedford-Stuyvesant, and in the first three years of the union, eight cabbies were murdered.86
Murders and crime against taxi drivers grew significantly in the final five months of 1969, with
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four cabbie murders and 660 robberies. When 1970 began, two more drivers were murdered, and
there were 3000 robberies in the first six months of the year.87
Rank-and-file taxi drivers complained about the increasing prevalence of crime, and they
connected it to the demographic and spatial transformation of the city. By 1970, New York’s
black population had grown to more than 1.6 million people—roughly 20 percent of the city’s
population—expanding from the older ghettoes of Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant to areas
adjacent.88 Attempts to stave off white outmigration, either through liberal planning efforts or
violent neighborhood defense, were mostly unsuccessful, and as most whites left the racially
integrating neighborhoods of Brownsville, East New York, Bushwick, and the South Bronx,
larger and larger portions of the city became almost exclusively black or Latino.89
White drivers openly discussed their refusal to pick up black fares. Racist white drivers
used slurs and racial stereotypes to describe black fares, but others who began skipping over
black fares had a more nuanced position.90 A veteran driver and longtime white Communist
Party member who had been involved in anti-racist activism argued that after 1968, there was
growing racial hostility in the city from both whites and blacks. After a black rider robbed him at
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gunpoint—his second robbery by a black customer—he began to skip more black fares. Though
he understood what he was doing was discriminatory, he believed himself to be making a lifepreserving decision in an increasingly polarized city.91
Though black taxi drivers complained that they often had problems hailing a cab because
of driver discrimination, they too admitted to sometimes avoiding black fares, making their own
judgments about who appeared dangerous or likely not to pay.92 While the issue was wrapped up
in driver racism and the refusal to pick up blacks, as Van Arsdale would argue in the early 1970s,
the majority of cab drivers who were murdered were themselves black and Latino, and most of
them were killed in the city’s poorer, non-white neighborhoods like Brownsville, BedfordStuyvesant, and East New York. Van Arsdale, however, used this as evidence that taxi union
men did not discriminate against riders, which was untrue.93 In refusing black fares or fares to
black neighborhoods, taxi drivers cut themselves off from a growing segment of the city’s
population. Many black customers complained that they had long had difficulties hailing a cab,
and increased crime only worsened an ongoing practice amongst drives. Another important
consequence of discriminating against black fares was that livery cabs—mostly driven by blacks
and Latinos—stepped in to service the needs of black and Latino riders.94
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Livery cabs, often referred to derogatorily as gypsy cabs, became more commonplace in
the 1960s in response to the transportation and work needs of the city’s black and Latino
population. Unlike yellow cabs, the law confined liveries to phoned-in pickups, though they
often cruised for fares illegally. Their exponential growth confirms both their popularity and
usefulness to communities they served, numbering perhaps as high as 10,000 in 1970.95 Though
less archival material is available from livery cab drivers, livery cab fleet owners spoke
repeatedly on their aspirations and beliefs, including Calvin Williams, a short-term New York
State assemblyman representing Bedford-Stuyvesant and the owner of Black Pearl Car Service.
Williams couched his enterprise in the language of black liberation and empowerment, claiming
that he was providing a much-needed service to an underserved community, even deploying the
slogan, “Black Pearl Means Black Power.”96
While many major Black Power advocates were anti-capitalist and would have been
critical of Williams’ identification of Black Power with business, there existed broad grassroots
support for his position.97 In the memory of one black yellow cab driver, many black people in
New York City would wait for a livery car even if a yellow cab were available, making clear
their preference. While there was some difference in price—liveries were often cheaper—many
black people also used livery cabs out of racial solidarity with the institution.98 With employment
discrimination and unemployment rate much higher than the national average, many blacks felt
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that the attack on livery cabs was a racist attack on people who were simply trying to earn a
living.99
In the face of union campaigning, livery cab drivers collectively organized—with their
employers—in the name of serving their community, sometimes using force to protect their turf.
There were myriad accounts of attacks on yellow cab drivers—white and black—and yellow
cabs being surrounded by livery cars and “escorted” out of neighborhoods.100 Many white drivers
thought they were protecting themselves when refusing to pick up black fares, and as gypsy cabs
grew, they believed themselves under threat from two directions: blacks were not only robbing
taxi drivers but also stealing their livelihoods.101
The union had publicly opposed livery cabs since the initial unionization drive in 1966,
but their growing prevalence, cab driver complaints, and the need to shore up internal support led
the TDU leadership to take a stronger stand against liveries. During the 1969 union election, the
Van Arsdale administration set the terms of the new debate, arguing: “The greatest threat to the
owner-drivers and taxi drivers’ future is the widespread failure of the Mayor to enforce laws and
regulations pertaining to the illegal taxi racket which is victimizing bona-fide men and women in
our industry and the citizens.”102 As described above, livery cab service was growing in size
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across the city, but equally threatening to the union was its growing acceptance under Mayor
Lindsay. Lindsay was sympathetic to the livery cab services as befit his broader political goals,
and he wanted to provide a means for them to be regulated by city.103
Lindsay’s support of liveries earned him the ire of the primarily white TDU ownerdrivers who would challenge their union leaders to do more to stop the liveries. Owner-drivers
were the most steady portion of the union because they had each invested thousands of dollars in
their own medallions; they were not in the industry as a side job and the size of their investment
meant that they would not move on from driving a taxi until they were ready to retire. The basis
of their stability for the union—the large cash investment in the right to pick up fares—was also
why owner-drivers were so threatened by livery drivers: while the illegal cruising of livery
drivers “stole” fares from yellow cabs, it also rendered meaningless the medallions ownerdrivers had often worked years for.104 Catering more strongly to owner-drivers and organizing
more actively against the livery cab industry provided the union a basis to manage a “union
membership [that] stands divided, frustrated, and in deep doubt of what our future will be in this
industry,” and immediately after winning the 1969 elections, the union set to the task, organizing
a major meeting with over 1,000 taxi drivers denouncing the growing phenomenon, with ownerdrivers at the forefront.105
While the union’s focus on the livery cab issue would help build some support within the
ranks, especially from owner-drivers, fleet drivers wanted much more than the reigning in of
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competition, and anger simmered all throughout the year. When negotiations opened with the
fleet owners in 1970, Van Arsdale promised the many dissatisfied yellow cab drivers that the
union would win them benefits and pay that rivaled the TWU.106 Inflation was chipping away at
taxi drivers’ incomes, and as a result one of their central demands in the 1970 negotiations was
higher fare percentages. Alongside this vital economic demand were increased pension
payments, a medical center, and stronger protection for drivers in the form of bullet-proof
dividers in cabs.107 Fleet owners nominally agreed to some of these demands but argued that they
ought to be funded by increased fares and not a cut into the fleets’ profits. Van Arsdale was
initially opposed, but in spite of many meetings and even state mediation, employers would not
agree to any demands without a fare hike. Angry drivers stormed a union meeting in late
November calling for a strike, but Van Arsdale held out for as long as he could.108
The tension finally broke in December 1970 when the union led its drivers off the job.
The TDU organized pickets across the city, but primarily in front of hotels and travel hubs where
an easy fare was normally had. Picket lines brought drivers into direct and often violent
confrontation with the police and livery drivers looking to make money off of the strike. In spite
of some inconvenience, the city’s transit system and livery drivers absorbed much of the
impact.109 Employers held the line, and union leaders began backing the calls for a fare increase
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as did many of the owner-drivers who stood to benefit from the increased fares.110 Fleet drivers
however opposed the fare increases because they believed it would decrease both ridership and
tips. The strike dragged on for more than two weeks, and taxi drivers eventually returned to
work, failing to gain parity with transit workers. Knowing that he would never gain approval of
the contract, Van Arsdale never put it before a membership vote. The defeat was palpable, and
one taxi rank and filer would go on to call the whole strike “fruitless.”111
After the strike, Van Arsdale conceded to numerous employer demands, including fare
hikes, a lower commission rate for drivers with less experience, and a dime taken from the
driver’s percentage of each fare towards the union benefit funds.112 Perhaps taking a page from
the expansion of the apprenticeship program in Local 3, Van Arsdale solidified the division
between new and old drivers, with the former receiving a smaller 42 percent commission on
fares and eligible for increases after 200 days of work. In this contract, owners avoided the cost
of wage increases by pegging all demands to fare increases and creating a second tier of new
part-time drivers who they would come to increasingly rely on.113
Most fleet drivers considered the two-tier percentage unfair, but older drivers were more
enraged by the dime taken out of each of their fares. Taxi drivers were paying for benefits out of
their money, not employers, leading many to believe that Local 3036 was nothing more than a
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racketeer union making money off of its members.114 As the union and fleet owners came to
terms, the Lindsay administration used the city’s power to authorize the fare hikes to push
through a regulatory shift within the industry, creating the Taxi and Limousine Commission on
the back of the failed strike. Established in March 1971, after using dilatory tactics to hold back
fare hike and thus wage gains, the new commission regulated both yellow cabs and livery cabs,
giving greater legitimacy to the latter albeit not the right to cruise.115 When the city finally
granted fare hikes, it led to a weeks-long crash in ridership. By that time, many hacks were fed
up with Lindsay, and as one TDU official put it, “[t]he men are disgusted with City Hall...They
are disgusted with the City Council and the Mayor.”116
This disgust was not confined to politicians as union officials found out on April 14,
when thousands of drivers gathered for the union’s semi-annual membership meeting to discuss
the effects of the fares and renewed negotiations with the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade.
The union tried and failed to check drivers’ dues as they pushed in past union security, flooding
the hall. Boos and whistles filled the auditorium as Van Arsdale tried to explain the need for
compromise on the fare hikes. Suddenly, a young driver jumped on stage, grabbed the
microphone and the meeting’s attention, but the union leadership quickly cut power.117 Workers
stormed the stage, union delegates threw their presentation table down into the crowd, and taxi
drivers began throwing chairs at Van Arsdale as he and the rest of the leadership retreated,
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escaping out of a side door of the Manhattan Center. Workers completely took over the meeting
hall, and only the police put an end to the chaos.118 While the union would try to characterize the
attack as the product of subversive elements bent on destroying the union, it occurred
spontaneously. Though the union had sporadic internal problems since its founding, fare hikes,
the dime, and the city government made the anger finally boil over.119
The day following the attack on Van Arsdale and the rest of the leadership, sixty fleet
drivers met to discuss the need for a rank-and-file organization to fight within the union,
founding the Taxi Rank and File Coalition. Some were energized by the previous day’s events,
some were informally organized groups of politicized young people, and others were older
workers who had sought to unseat Van Arsdale’s leadership in 1969. During their first meeting,
drivers decided on three key avenues of activity. The first was bringing together more drivers out
of the some 30,000 represented by the union. Their second major task was the launching of a
petition drive among taxi drivers around the losing contract of 1970. Among its demands was
equity in fare shares for all drivers regardless of their hire date, benefits for full and part-time
drivers, a decrease in the fare, and benefits paid for by owners, not from the drivers’ fares. Their
third task was starting their own publication, Hot Seat, which took its name from the sensor in
the back seat that activated the fare meter.120 Their first issue, which was distributed by hand at
various garages across the city, denounced the union-negotiated contract, laid out the group’s
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purpose and composition, and encouraged members to sign their petition.121 After gathering
6,000 signatures in a matter of weeks, the Coalition took things a step further, organizing a
protest against the union itself, in which 300 taxi drivers participated. As their influence grew,
the Coalition immediately began pursuing a takeover of the union through electoral channels.122
Elections in the taxi union took place in individual garages where taxi drivers worked and
within the union’s leadership structure, and in the summer of 1971, the Coalition planned to
move on both fronts. Due to union regulations stipulating more than two years of continuous
service in the industry before holding office, many of the rank-and-file organization's members
found themselves ineligible, signaling the degree to which their ranks were made up of young
newer drivers. Meanwhile, some of the older, more politically active workers fought amongst
themselves, refusing to accept any position other than president, leaving the Coalition without a
full slate of candidates.123
In spite of these internal problems, the group’s agitation was beginning to yield results as
some of Van Arsdale’s former supporters began to oppose parts of the contract, jumping ship to
form the Watchdog Committee, which parroted the style and claims of the Coalition. The
Coalition allied with the Watchdog Committee, and the two endorsed one another’s candidates at
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the garage level. In the September 1971 garage elections, a handful of Taxi Rank and File
Coalition members were elected, as were a handful non-aligned anti-Van Arsdale advocates.124
Hoping to capitalize on these gains, the Coalition mounted an unsuccessful challenge for
union control in the November leadership elections. By the time union elections came around,
the Watchdog Committee abandoned their partnership with the Rank and File Coalition, publicly
making their peace with Van Arsdale.125 While the Coalition’s candidate Leo Lazarus made a
good showing by winning 3,073 votes, Van Arsdale remained in power, winning 5,207. With
their hopes for an early victory dashed, Coalition members began the difficult project of longterm organizing in what was becoming an increasingly divided union and increasingly divided
city.126
With the Taxi and Limousine Commission now regulating the industry, livery cab
legalization was becoming an ever more pressing issue for the taxi rank and file. During 1971
electoral challenges, the union published many articles on livery cab drivers, arguing that they
were at once a criminal enterprise and a regression to segregated locals of the Jim Crow South.
As the union rightfully argued, livery drivers had no benefits and made less money on average
than their yellow cab counterparts. What the union did not discuss was that in spite of the
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industry’s low wages, it provided gainful employment to thousands of blacks and Latinos who
were often excluded from other forms of union employment. 127
The City Council began discussions to license livery drivers for work within Manhattan
in late January 1972, with Mayor Lindsay arguing that the industry already existed and bringing
it under greater government regulation would only improve it. The union and fleet owners
countered that regulation was but a step towards allowing livery cabs to cruise for fares, and that
the livery cab industry only flourished because of Mayor Lindsay’s unwillingness to enforce the
law.128 Dozens of the city’s black and Puerto Rican livery drivers rallied outside city hearings,
shutting down traffic, and the union mobilized owner-drivers mobilized for the hearings while
the drivers organized pickets against those who were allegedly stealing their livelihood.129 The
Taxi Rank and File Coalition stood with angry cab drivers against the regularization of the livery
cab industry, though many of them considered it to be scapegoating by the union and racism on
the part of many drivers.130
On the last day of January, another city licensing hearing brought out owners and union
heads, with Van Arsdale making a defiant speech against livery drivers and threatening a citywide strike should any legislation be passed.131 Though this was an idle threat, he was still the
city’s most powerful labor leader and held sway through important political connections to the
Democratic and Republican parties in the city. During the hearing, the union made sure to
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mobilize and forefront black owner-drivers, highlighting its own diversity while tacitly admitting
to the racially polarized nature of the livery battle. The combined effort of the union and the fleet
owners was able to stave off livery cab legalization in Manhattan, and though drivers backed the
union’s anti-livery position, it did little to quell discontent within the ranks of fleet drivers.132
With the threat of livery drivers’ legalization minimized, the union had to once again face
its many internal problems, having neither the power to impose better terms with employers nor
gain the consent of its membership. In mid-February 1972, the union organized a series of
“wildcat” strikes against the 42 percent shares that it had negotiated for newer drivers.133 On a
Friday afternoon, several dozen drivers at two garages, one in Manhattan and one in the Bronx
walked off the job, forming picket lines, shutting down operations, and paralyzing hundreds of
taxis.134 The strikes continued for four days with the union publicly denying its involvement, and
on the fifth day two more garages were hit by strikes as well. Since the taxi drivers had never
approved the contract Van Arsdale hoped the pressure would bring the fleet owners back to the
table for a renegotiation of commissions for newer drivers. As one driver put it, “Van Arsdale
can’t admit he’s wrong so he handles it this way. They pretend to be trying to stop the strike but
they’re hoping it will spread.”135
The plan backfired miserably. Owner-drivers refused to honor the picket lines—their
income was not determined by commission percentages—and many older drivers crossed the
lines as well since they were already working at the top rate. At one garage, older drivers voted
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down a strike move by younger drivers working at 42 percent; they were more interested in
going back to work than winning parity for their coworkers. When the union tried this selective
strike strategy again the following month, to no one’s surprise, the move was equally ineffective.
The union could not get employers to budge, and many drivers were not jumping to the union’s
feebly organized collective action.136
When the April 1972 membership meeting approached, taxi drivers and union leaders
expected a conflict. The union hoped to use the meeting as a venue to build support for
upcoming negotiations and to double down on the improvements made since the union began in
1966. Opposite them was the Taxi Rank and File Coalition, which hoped to use the event as a
stage for undermining the leadership and building support for future electoral efforts.137 As the
meeting began and the agenda announced, members of the Rank and File Coalition called for a
vote on restructuring the meeting to discuss the lack of a contract and the issue of smaller driver
percentages in the aftermath of the disastrous 1970 strike. Roars of approval filled the Manhattan
Center, forcing the union to consider the proposal with a hand vote. But when the leadership said
the count indicated that the Coalition’s motion had failed, all hell broke loose in the meeting with
shouting, chair throwing, and fist fights between taxi drivers and union goons and between taxi
driver and taxi driver. For the second year in a row, the meeting completely devolved, and Van
Arsdale and the union leadership fled the room, summoning the police to restore order.138
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The union bemoaned the outcome of meeting, blaming it once again on a small group of
agitators. While there were in some ways correct that there were agitators within the union, the
anger was more widespread than they were willing to publicly admit. The union even went so far
as to say that the membership-meeting melee did a disservice to the union by showing that there
was disunity in the ranks, when according to the union, there was in fact none at all!139 Despite
these propagandistic claims to unity, the taxi drivers were increasingly divided and like New
York City in miniature: drivers were fighting their elected leaders, the young fought the old, full
timers fought part timers, and the primarily white owner-drivers fought the primarily black and
Latino livery and gypsy cab drivers. Growing anger had catalyzed rank-and-file rebellion, but the
anger was so divided it had difficulty coalescing.140
With the Taxi Drivers Union leadership was gearing up for another round of talks and
shoring up its position, it brought the increasingly rancorous debate around livery cab drivers to
the forefront once again. In mid-June 1972, the union called an owner-driver meeting, with AFLCIO Regional Director Michael Mann as keynote speaker. While there were some black TDU
members present at the meeting of over 3,000 owner-drivers, Mann used backlash imagery to
denounced the liveries and Mayor Lindsay, who he claimed was prioritizing welfare recipients
and criminal livery drivers over the honest, hard-working owner-drivers of Local 3036.141
Though the union would always supplement its anti-gypsy rhetoric with claims to racial equality,
such imagery was common in its denunciations.142
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To differentiate liveries from taxis, the Taxi and Limousine Commission called for an
end to the livery drivers’ usage of meters, setting an October 1 deadline for police enforcement.
In mid-September, livery companies and their drivers responded by organizing protests that
blocked intersections and caused massive traffic jams across the Bronx. When the police arrived,
a riot ensued involving a crowd of over 500 people in a primarily Puerto Rican area of the South
Bronx. Protesters attacked several yellow cabs and the police, preventing them from making
arrests. The situation took a deadly turn when police chased a man to the roof of a five-story
building where, according to witnesses, they threw him to his death. In spite of the arrests and
one death, the violence subsided for a short time, picking up again on the October 1 deadline
with more traffic blockades and groups of people attacking yellow cabs in the Bronx.143
As with many black riders who supported the likes of Black Pearl and its claims of black
community service, many Puerto Ricans strongly supported the livery cab industry as providers
of much needed jobs and transportation. Some Puerto Rican livery cab drivers preferred the
flexibility and self-managed nature of the work to the supervision and regimentation of factory
work, and in a parallel to Calvin Williams, José Rivera, a prominent advocate for gypsy cab
drivers, would use the struggle as a springboard to political power in the early 1980s.144 While
there was widespread community support, the violence only confirmed the beliefs of the industry
and union officials, with the taxi industry denouncing the police and the city for lax enforcement
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during the protests, claiming that their workers and cars, “once again… have been exposed to the
terror, violence, and destructive tactics of thugs.”145
Internal divisions in the Taxi Rank and File Coalition over the anti-gypsy fight give us
some insight into the difficulty of addressing the issue. To some members, it seemed clear that
the union used the anti-gypsy campaign in order to divert anger from itself. The union leadership
was failing to deliver in contract negotiations and by scapegoating the primarily black and Latino
livery cab drivers, they could shore up their own support and blame wage and work issues on
liveries. Racial invective was evident in the union’s rhetoric, and some Coalition members felt
that racism played a primary role in the average driver’s anti-gypsy sentiment, which prevented
yellow cab drivers from understanding that gypsy drivers were also struggling for their rights. In
fact, livery cab drivers were subject to the same violence as yellow cab drivers, with their own
safety issues such as robberies and murders.146
Other members took issue with statements such as these, arguing that the Coalition
underplayed the very real threat to driver’s livelihoods that the gypsies posed. After all, with the
fare hikes, livery cabs had a competitive advantage, and they often illegally cruised for fares.
Coalition members skeptical of the livery cab struggle also argued that gypsy owners were
heavily involved in coordinating the protests and stood to gain much more than the average
driver, thus it was not strictly a worker’s struggle against the bosses or bureaucrats. In retrospect,
some coalition members felt that the Hot Seat underplayed the real physical dangers that crime
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posed for taxi drivers, which they argued came mostly from black fares. While some members
looked back, arguing that they should have tried to organize with livery cab drivers to form their
own driver-led groups, others remained uncertain whether it was ever in their power to get out in
front of the issue at all. The internal debate was difficult, presupposing that there was a viable
rank-and-file solution to the problem, and for some members, the Coalition’s inability to
confront this problem effectively became emblematic of the groups broader racial problems:
while more black drivers became involved in the taxi industry and joined the ranks of Local
3036, the Taxi Rank and File Coalition in no way reflected this growing demographic.147
By the beginning of 1973 the Coalition was made up of highly politicized—mostly
young—members who had been active in Civil Rights and anti-war struggles in the 1960s.
Though the Coalition was able to work in the presence of broader driver anger at the 1972
membership meeting, when they called for a picket later that year, only two dozen drivers were
involved, the majority of whom were young!148 A year earlier, a similar rally drew some 300
drivers, and the Coalition was consolidating around an activist core that was made up of leftwing
activists with experiences in the broader political upheaval of the era. With the exception of a
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handful of older drivers, who came out of the Old Left, the Taxi Rank and File Coalition’s
members were young socialists who were more hopeful than many of their fellow drivers.149
Though the Coalition was only able to muster a small number of people for
demonstrations, the Local 3036 leadership still believed that the Rank and File Coalition posed a
potential electoral threat. In the fall of 1972, Van Arsdale shut down elections at the garage level
under the premise that the union did not have enough money. Rumors circulated that the taxi
union could even be placed in trusteeship.150 There was some truth to the union’s financial woes
as many angry members had begun refusing to pay dues, a move the Coalition felt was more in
line with drivers’ usual individualist solutions. While there was some uproar over the lack of
elections at the union’s October membership meeting, alongside some calls for strike and booing
of Van Arsdale, the response was subdued compared to earlier meetings. The meeting was rather
poorly attended, with some 800 drivers taking part.151 While some Coalition members felt that
winning elections could potentially put them in a compromised position, without elections to
contest, the Rank and File Coalition was ultimately confined to an agitational group rather than
what it aspired to be: a powerful rank-and-file group with an active membership base that was
representative of the Local 30336’s demographic makeup.152
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In the last days of December 1972 and after two years without a contract agreement, the
Taxi Drivers Union leadership and taxi fleet owners agreed to binding arbitration. While sources
do not indicate what brought on the arbitration agreement, in early 1973 the State Mediation
Board’s Vincent McDonnell increased the 42 percent fare share for new drivers to 43 percent,
but he did not significantly alter the time it would take to get to the top percentage of 49,
effectively providing a middle ground decision that would please both union leadership and fleet
owners.153 Van Arsdale never brought the contract to a vote in the TDU, and the Coalition
challenged the union in a multi-year legal battle that would eventually force the TDU to put the
contract to a vote, albeit two years later.154
The Coalition also continued to fight to get garage elections reopened, when in
September 1973, the union cancelled them yet again. In March 1974, the Coalition delivered
2,500 signatures for elections.155 At the end of 1974, the Taxi Rank and File Coalition made a
final electoral challenge, but prior to the election, the TDU leadership put the union into
trusteeship in case of an electoral upset. This safeguard was ultimately unnecessary as the
Coalition won only 1,400 votes out of some 7,500, a significant decline from 1971. The election
only made official what was already a fact: rank-and-file rebellion within the ranks of the taxi
union was ending.156
While electoral challenges and combative meetings petered out, the Taxi Rank and File
Coalition maintained some power at a handful of garages over the next few years until the
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organization belatedly folded in 1977. Their largest base was in the Dover garage in Greenwich
Village, which employed many young white workers, many of them as bohemian or left leaning
as the Taxi Rank and File Coalition. At Dover, Coalition members were able to dispute daily
concerns of drivers and even led a short-lived wildcat in 1974. But the story was mostly the
same: the Coalition was a small activist core that had a hard time building any lasting power with
the other workers.157
Some members in particular wanted to understand why so few black workers joined the
Coalition, but the truth of the matter was that very few workers, white or black, joined the
Coalition. Some members blamed their own failure to adequately address the gypsy issue,
yellow cab driver racism, and “white skin privilege.”158 One member of the Taxi Rank and File
believed that “the contradiction between white and third world people in the industry was the
primary contradiction.”159
Others members vehemently disagreed. Some coalition members arguing that the livery
threat to drivers’ economic livelihood pushed black drivers to support the union’s anti-gypsy
campaign and some related their experiences in primarily black garages where leading black
workers were involved in the union.160 In fact the union’s main publication, Taxi Drivers Voice,
continually emphasized the multiracial nature of the union, in both the semi-regular feature
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entitled, “Keeping the Cabs Rolling, ” which included photographs and interviews with its many
black and Latino members who worked inside of the garages servicing and repairing the city’s
taxis, and in driver interviews, which featured statements and photographs of often very diverse
groups of drivers.161 Finally some rank-and-file activists argued that the lack of black members
had to do with the union being yet another hassle that blacks had to deal with in life, many
workers, white, black, or Latino did not want the bother of fighting against the union or joining
in the Coalition’s activities like leafleting, meetings, advocacy, and lawsuits.162
While anger at the TDU leadership remained high, by 1973, internal divisions and
multisided battles with fleet owners’ liveries, and union leadership made the taxi union a portrait
in miniature of a fracturing city and declining hope. While the livery battle was not strictly white
versus black, on the stage of city politics and in union meetings, it was deeply racialized, and taxi
drivers’ anti-livery fight pit them against Mayor Lindsay, black civil rights organizations and
businesses, and portions of the city’s black and Latino communities.163 Drivers also fought with
each other, competing as always for fares and assignments, and worse than that, union-led strikes
saw drivers crossing the picket lines and a rank-and-file opposition never coalesced. In the
estimation of one Taxi Rank and File Coalition member, some drivers had begun to despise their
jobs, feeling the work, in spite of some union gains, had become “lousy.”164 While the anger was
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palpable, many were increasingly cynical about the union, with some vocal opponents not
bothering to attend meetings to challenge the union. After years of agitation, a close election, and
boisterous meetings, taxi rank-and-file efforts had made relatively little headway, with a rankand-file activist claiming in the late 1970s, “I don’t think that taxi drivers believe that any form
of common effort will result in anything...and justifiably so.”165

Conclusion

By 1973, one would be hard pressed to find evidence of rebellion in the ranks of either
TDU Local 3036 or CWA Local 1101. Local 1101 was one of the standard bearers of rank-andfile militancy in New York City. Throughout the late 1960s, its members voted out a series of
leaders and engaged in citywide wildcat strikes for improved contracts and workplace
conditions. A pivotal moment in the rank-and-filers’ development came after violent attacks in
1967 on change collectors and telephone servicers in the city’s poorer neighborhoods. Inside
workers united with outside workers in a wildcat strike for safety measures, staying out on strike
for more than a week. The influx of younger workers into the industry also increased the union’s
militancy and led to wildcat strikes over work conditions in spite of some cultural conflicts
between older and younger workers. Some younger workers were part of leftwing organizations
like UA and BWAC, which sought to organize across both Local 1101 and the TTU in hopes of
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creating a multiracial and multi-gender union. They exercised some power on local job sites and
during the 1971 strike would help to organize opposition to the CWA International.
By the early 1970s, increasing inflation both nationally and specifically in New York
City undermined workers’ economic standing, and CWA leaders were concerned that inflation
and other “Big City Problems” were not only eating at their members’ wages but also impelling
them to more radical action. In national negotiations from 1970 to 1971, President Beirne hoped
to obtain a national bargaining agreement from AT&T, as well as significant wage gains and an
agency shop agreement. Several local leaders across the country reported unrest in the ranks, and
whether or not they supported a strike, believed that the CWA International had much to prove in
the upcoming contract. After months of negotiations, Beirne called a national walkout of CWA
telephone workers in the summer of 1971, and after five days on strike obtained a national
agreement that included an agency shop agreement, fringe benefit increases, and a 27.4 percent
pay increase over a three-year period.
While the wage gains were substantial, for many members of CWA Local 1101, they
were insufficient in the face of growing inflation, and they remained on strike against the wishes
of the International, eventually voting down the contract. Leftwing militants were excited by the
strike and hoped to use it as an opportunity to build solidarity between CWA and TTU members.
Their efforts were initially successful in the early days of the strike at job sites where their
members worked, but the Local 1101 leadership gave no support for their pickets and many
members did not take to their strategy. Though telephone workers were initially hopeful about
winning their strike, NYT held the line against its employees, bringing in out-of-state
strikebreakers to run its heavily automated operations.
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The 1971-1972 strike ultimately proved to be the death knell of militancy within the
ranks of Local 1101. As the strike dragged on, a malaise set in among many workers. Though
workers remained on strike and used innovative out-of-state picketing to support their strike,
they were unable to exact more than an extra dollar and a fifteen percent premium for Saturday
work after a full seven months off the job. A final contract vote put the strike to rest, and when it
was over, many were relieved to return to work, and the restiveness that characterized the end of
the decade prior completely disappeared. In the strike’s aftermath NYT telephone fired many
militant workers who were involved in confrontations on picket lines and exacted reprisals on
workers who committed small infractions at work. Additionally, Brooklyn CWA leaders pushed
to take their members out of the local, and the International backed their efforts in hopes of
undermining the uncontrollable Local 1101. The defeat was so significant, that a new generation
of leftwing militants found wide-scale demoralization and a complete lack of interest in rankand-file campaigns. Workers focused on their own economic survival, and as one CWA militant
James McMahon described the defeat’s impact, “The era was lost.”166
Though the taxi union was quite new, rank-and-file challenges to the Van Arsdale
leadership were abundant in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The earliest phase of challenges
often involved older drivers with experience in the unionization drive, and some of these men
organized opposition slates to challenge the TDU’s first leaders and sometimes Van Arsdale.
Many of the drivers were initially divided on Van Arsdale, with many considering him a
paternalist with little faith in taxi drivers’ ability to organize their own affairs. These initial
challenges failed to unseat the TDU leadership, but in the early 1970s, the entrance of younger
drivers and growing anger at the Van Arsdale leadership’s contract stipulations led to violent
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confrontations between taxi drivers and union leaders at general membership meetings in both
1971 and 1972.
The Taxi Rank and File Coalition emerged from these initial violent confrontations, and
in the summer and fall of 1971, they agitated against the union leadership and ran an opposition
slate. The Coalition brought together many younger drivers with a set of seasoned leftwing
drivers, and their earlier efforts were relatively successful, organizing a large picket of the union
leadership and winning some garage-level elections. Their growing influence brought them into
a short-lived coalition with former Van Arsdale supporters, but by the fall elections, these
erstwhile allies of the Coalition abandoned it, and the taxi insurgents lost the election to TDU
leadership.
While taxi drivers fought an internal battle against their union, the union and its drivers
became increasingly involved in a racially polarized battle against the livery cab industry. The
livery cab industry had grown significantly throughout the 1960s and impinged upon the
economic livelihood of yellow cab drivers. The problem of growing crime and increased
violence against taxi drivers overlapped with anti-livery sentiment, and many white drivers saw
themselves as threatened by black criminals and a non-white livery industry. While accusations
of racism and discrimination were leveled by all sides, the union lost the public relations battle
and many in the city’s black and Puerto Rican communities supported liveries as both an
important job opportunity and a representation of their growing social importance in the city.
In the years that followed, the Taxi Rank and File Coalition would struggle with the TDU
leadership, challenging it at union meetings, in the courts, and through opposition slates in those
elections not cancelled by the union leadership. Coalition members were divided on the livery
cab struggle, and taxi drivers became progressively more cynical about the prospects of
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collective struggle as union contracts took money from drivers’ fares, fleet owners resisted wage
and fringe demands, and new contracts were not voted on for several years. By 1974, when the
union finally allowed elections, the incumbent leadership put the union in a preventive
trusteeship and gained victory at the polls. Though the Rank and File Coalition persisted until the
late 1970s, rebellion within the taxi union’s ranks had faded away.
As Joshua Freeman argued in Working-Class New York, “By the time Lindsay left office
at the end of 1973, a darker, defensive, parochial mood pervaded the city and its working
class.”167 Thus far, the defeat of rank-and-file movements has not been sufficiently highlighted in
this social transformation, and these two portraits of rebellion shed light on shifting workingclass norms in New York City. While the development, articulation, and course of their
militancy was different, taxi drivers and telephone workers—along with so many other workers
in New York—were defeated. Some challenges had proven effective, but employer recalcitrance
in the face of greater demands and union attacks on militant workers proved too powerful. The
collective restiveness, confidence, and disobedience of earlier rank-and-file struggle dissipated,
and in their place grew a survivalist attitude.
This attitude, already presaged in earlier defeats, was one of accommodation and
resignation in the face of both union and employer resistance. Telephone workers used wildcats
and contract rejections to try to fight inflation, increase job safety, or push leaders to better
demands, and taxi drivers supported a unionization drive, attempted electoral challenges,
wildcatted, and picketed to try and meet their demands. While some headway was made, their
victories stalled and many turned toward individual strategies for survival. While such activities
were already present to some degree among taxi drivers, they had for a time put their faith in
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collective solutions. After years of hitting a wall, that faith eroded. Telephone workers, whose
work was more cooperative yet still divided, had a much more developed militancy, but like their
taxi counterparts were defeated, ultimately focusing on their individual economic survival.
Though the 1970s are often portrayed as the “Me Decade” of selfishness, self-fulfillment, and
retreat, for many working-class New Yorkers, it was more about keeping their heads above water
amidst the massive changes. Gone was the aggressive confidence of the year’s prior; in its place
were defeat, frustration, and a turn away from rank-and-file mobilization in the ranks of two of
the city’s biggest unions.168
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Chapter Five: Rank-and-File Resistance to Fiscal Austerity

In 1975, New York City stood at the precipice of fiscal default. After years of growing
expenditures, increasing short-term borrowing, and snowballing debt servicing, financial
institutions refused to purchase any more city bonds, demanding that the city government and its
labor supporters dismantle the municipality’s social democratic infrastructures. Months of backand-forth negotiations saw bitter denunciations of overpaid union members, lazy welfare
recipients, and greedy bankers. Unions and community groups organized large demonstrations
and major strikes broke out as the city’s “[n]ormally opaque class relations became shockingly
visible.”1 Threats of a city default increasingly frightened politicians and business elites, and the
fiscal crisis became the subject of national and even international attention. While strikes were
on the decline and many rank and file struggles had petered out, because of the fiscal crisis,
many public sector union members found themselves in conflict with labor leaders, politicians,
and business elites.
While traditional narratives focus primarily on politicians like Mayor Abraham Beame
and union leaders like Victor Gotbaum of District Council (DC) 37 or Albert Shanker of the
United Federation of Teachers (UFT), rank-and-file workers were a far more significant font of
resistance to the business elite’s political agenda. In the Social Service Employees Union (SSEU)
Local 371, a member of DC 37, social workers, white and black, male and female, advocated a
general strike of public employees to oppose fiscal austerity measures and routinely denounced
the fiscal crisis as an attack by the city’s big banks. In the Uniformed Sanitationmen’s
Association (USA), whose ranks had forced a strike in 1968, workers led the way in early
1
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summer with work slowdowns, sabotage, and a multiday wildcat strike. Laid-off roadway
workers led a shorter-lived wildcat, and fired police officers sparked violent confrontations at
City Hall. The city’s teachers took up the campaign in the summer and fall, organizing
opposition groups, rejecting Shanker’s contract recommendation, and forcing a strike that was
only put down by electoral subterfuge. Repeatedly workers championed militant action while
their leaders negotiated givebacks. Their resistance failed, however, and by the end of 1975, New
York’s social democratic polity was seriously undermined.2
Rank-and-file opposition lends credence to the left historiography of New York City’s
1975 fiscal crisis, as workers themselves challenged the conservative narrative of overinflated
budgets, welfare scammers, and overpaid municipal employees; they repeatedly advocated
exposing the economic interests of the city’s business elite and the degree to which the 1975
fiscal crisis was a politically contestable event. The fiscal crisis rebellions also demonstrate the
ongoing gap between union members and their leaders in the mid-1970s. Though insurgent
workers in the city were mostly defeated, they still advocated a more militant stance than their
leaders, and as early as the spring of 1975, Gotbaum told his fellow DC 37 Executive Board
members that his initial willingness to accede to layoffs and benefit payment deferrals had only
whet the financial elite’s appetite. Like many other rank-and-file insurgencies, though, these
2
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worker-led efforts to fight fiscal austerity failed, exhibiting some of the same problems as earlier
rebellions. Social workers hoped that meetings and resolutions would transform their union into
a vehicle for struggle, but the layers of bureaucracy within their own union and DC 37 defeated
their efforts. Meanwhile other workers engaged in powerful strikes, but these efforts were shortlived, relying on union leaders to negotiate in an increasingly difficult situation.

Fiscal Crisis

By the spring of 1974, the upper echelons of the labor movement and City Hall began
discussing budgetary shortfalls New York would experience in the 1975 fiscal year.3 The city
had accumulated billions in debt over the prior decade, both from financing the city’s day-to-day
operations, including its growing municipal workforce and generous social democratic
institutions, as well as financing its massive capital projects budget, which had helped to reshape
parts of the city into a white collar, financial hub. Meanwhile, deindustrialization, job loss, and
white outmigration had damaged the city’s tax base, as had years of tax incentives to the real
estate industry. As city comptroller during John Lindsay’s mayoralty, Beame had known about
the budget crisis for quite some time. In order to make ends meet, the city increasingly relied on
short-term notes, and as a result was allocating an ever-growing portion of its budget to debt
servicing.4
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While in initial discussions, the Mayor suggested that the solution was increased taxes,
layoffs, and service cuts, labor leaders like Harry Van Arsdale Jr. responded that they supported
taxes but wanted to maintain the city’s free higher educational system and low subway fare.
Municipal labor unions opposed layoffs and wanted to avoid the friction with their membership
that job cuts could bring about. In following months, the heads of the AFL-CIO would discuss
the crisis’ effects at length, and in particular the possibility of fare hikes on public transit, but
their understanding of the city’s fiscal problems was so bound up in the broader economic
downturn that they could not see the budgetary crisis as a contestable issue. Van Arsdale and
others believed that tough economic times necessitated cut backs, and labor was one player
amongst money who had to do its part. The city’s business elites, however, did not view it the
same way.5
New York’s elites had decried the direction of city spending prior the events of 1975, and
their demands were similar. During Mayor Wagner’s third term, the city sought to cover a $250
million budget gap with future real estate taxes. Business elites in the Real Estate Board of New
York and Morgan Guaranty Trust cried foul and bond raters wanted the city to abandon its low
transit fare and to cut back other social spending.6 In 1971, the city battled ratings agencies over
its bond ratings. Then-mayor Lindsay and city comptroller Beame publicly attacked Standard
and Poor’s and Moody’s for their refusal to increase the city’s bond ratings because of negative

York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 60-65; Moody, From Welfare State to Real Estate, 5456; for different depictions of the fiscal crisis, see note 1.
5
“Executive Board Meeting Notes,” April 18, 1974, New York City Central Labor Council,
Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archive, box 117, folder 1974-1975, 1-3.
6
“Tax Rise Opposed by Realty Board,” New York Times, March 28, 1965.

244
publicity, including crime, strikes, and public services. Weak bond ratings forced the city to
guarantee interest rates of roughly 7 percent on nearly $400 million in tax-free bonds.7
Prior to making their 1975 demands, major financial lenders silently offloaded their New
York City municipal bonds from the summer of 1974 through the spring of 1975, divesting
themselves of the possibility of major losses. With billions in short-term debts due and the city
looking to borrow in order to pay back its creditors and maintain daily operations, the city’s
business elite was poised to advocate for a new order, reflecting the increasing organization and
assertiveness of business elites nationwide.8
While initial discussions suggested an understanding of the problem as one of simple
economics, the budget problems became increasingly politicized from late 1974 through 1975 as
the city’s business elite used short-term debt obligations as political leverage against social
democratic New York.9 In January 1975, Chase Manhattan’s David Rockefeller, William T.
Spence of First National City Bank, and Ellmore Patterson of JP Morgan formed the Financial
Community Liaison Group (FCLG). The organization developed a broader strategy for
demanding wage freezes, service cuts, and the creation of a state agency to issue long-term debts
and purchase short-term debts. Significantly, almost all of their demands would ultimately be
implemented by the end of the year.10
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Attacks on municipal services and workers appalled union leaders like Gotbaum, but
from the outset, they were prepared to negotiate away past gains in order to survive.11 Angered
by rhetoric from the financial community and from the city’s newspapers, DC 37 paid to take out
its own column in the Daily News, attacking fiscal austerity plans, the financial elite, and the
media.12 In February 1975, DC 37 printed thousands of copies of “The Big Bank Hold Up,” a
pamphlet that denounced the banks for putting undue pressure on the city, but which ultimately
asked the banks and other major corporations to shoulder their fair share of cut backs.13 Mayor
Beame came around to this position as well, and in public hearings in June 1975, in addition to
denouncing the debilitating effects of the recession and inflation, he called out the, “conservative
elements within the financial community that took advantage…to dictate the social and
economic policies of our City government.”14
While Gotbaum would employ confrontational rhetoric in fiscal crisis negotiations, his
main goals were the avoidance of a strike and the preservation of collective bargaining.15
Gotbaum was such a prominent figure in negotiations because he not only spoke for DC 37’s
more than 100,000 members, but he also spoke on behalf of many other municipal unions as the
head of the Municipal Labor Committee (MLC), a joint organization of city unions including
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those of the firefighters, police, nurses, and several others.16 As Freeman has argued, over the
course of the negotiations, Gotbaum would become not only more conciliatory but also
“entranced by the power elite” whom he began to regard as his friends.17 In later interviews, he
would tout his influence with the very same people who forced his union into thousands of
layoffs and the investment of pension funds into city bonds. He would begin to see himself as a
partner to the business elite, in a time when the business elite’s power, especially that of
financiers, was growing at the expense of the very labor organizations Gotbaum oversaw.18
In May 1975, events forced Gotbaum, the MLC, and other municipal unions into public
contestation. The city was facing another budgetary shortfall. The situation was compounded in
early April when Standards and Poor cut the city’s credit rating yet again, though its competitor
Moody’s kept rates level. With banks withholding money, Beame looked to the state and federal
government for aid, and neither was forthcoming.19 The situation devolved quickly, and in May
1975 Mayor Beame announced an austerity budget that required cutting 67,000 jobs from
municipal payrolls, alongside pay and hiring freezes.20 From the outset, organized labor, both in
the public and private sector, may have accepted layoffs as inevitable, but the catastrophic nature
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of the forthcoming 1975-1976 fiscal year budget was unanticipated. Business elites were
increasing pressure on the city to lay off workers, and in order for organized labor to maintain
collective bargaining, it would have to openly fight them.21 But when unions finally decided to
fight back, the response was uneven and uninspiring. While union leaders were quick to
negotiate but late to fight, some rank-and-file workers organized and resisted the fiscal crisis
agenda, proposing alternative explanations for the city’s fiscal crisis and formulating alternative
demands to austerity.

Meeting Resistance in SSEU Local 371

Internal debate within SSEU Local 371, a member of DC 37, gives us important insight
into how some rank and filers attempted to use their union as a platform to resist fiscal austerity,
but it also shows us how union leaders controlled that resistance. From the fall of 1974 through
the end of 1975, members and delegates repeatedly forced the union’s leadership to not only
oppose fiscal austerity but also demand militant action within the framework of DC 37’s
Executive Council and delegates’ assembly.22 In fact, President Patrick Knight of the SSEU
Local 371 was the leading voice for militant action within DC 37’s Executive Council because of
his member’s resolutions. The social workers’ opposition to fiscal austerity also shows us the
limitations of their union representatives and their own organizational weakness. While members
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repeatedly supported calls for opposing layoffs and organizing a citywide strike of public
employees, they never moved to militant action; their efforts remained confined to working
within their union and DC 37 parliamentary mechanisms, which were thoroughly bureaucratized.
In spite of militant resolutions, their calls for confrontation with the “businessmen’s coup” went
completely unheeded.23
Unionized social work in New York City has a long and contentious history. While
leftwing social work organizations emerged in the 1930s, the Red Scare saw the destruction of
the communist-led United Public Workers (UPW). In its place, AFSCME’s Local 371, a member
of DC 37, emerged as the main organization for Department of Welfare workers. Local 371 was
noted for its leadership’s focus on legislative and political matters, often at the expense of its
members’ on-the-job needs, and in the late 1950s rank-and-file activists started a new
organization, the SSEU, to challenge 371’s supremacy. The SSEU was in part a revival of the
older leftwing UPW, but the union also attracted a growing number of socially committed young
people.24
Unlike the Old Left’s industrial unions, SSEU organized around the increasingly
professionalized identity of caseworkers in the Department of Welfare (later the Department of
Social Services), leaving out clerical staff and campaigning against the introduction of lowerpaid case aids. In spite of the narrowing of the types of members it represented, the SSEU was
known for high member participation, strong internal democracy, and powerful advocacy for
welfare clients. But after failed strikes in 1967, internal factionalism, DC 37’s increasing
influence with Mayor John Lindsay, and a restructuring of city labor negotiations under the
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auspices of the Office of Collective Bargaining, the SSEU voted to merge with Local 371. The
tradition of advocacy remained alive, as did that of membership participation, two factors that
would inform resistance to the fiscal crisis.25
Social work was much more integrated than many other industries, and by 1960 social
work in New York City was 11 percent black. Amidst ongoing demographic changes in the city,
by the mid-1970s Local 371 was one quarter black.26 Importantly, social work was a primarily
female profession, and though more men began to enter social work in the 1960s, by the mid1970s, the majority of SSEU Local 371’s 11,500 members were still women. As in other unions,
a growing number of young people entered the SSEU’s ranks. Many were committed liberals
and leftists who saw their profession as a means to make a difference by alleviating social
inequality.27
While the union was both racially and sexually integrated, these relations were
sometimes contentious, with black members organizing for better representation within the ranks
of leadership. In 1970, a multi-racial opposition slate was elected with the union’s first black,
albeit male, president, Stanley Hill.28 Women, who made up the bulk of social workers in New
York City, also organized for their own representation, and many had opposed merging with
Local 371 because older men dominated it. While by 1975 there was no coherent rank-and-file
movement in SSEU Local 371, social workers were by and large a politicized group whose
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experiences, identities, and past political activism would help them in their opposition to the
fiscal crisis.29
With the initial discussions of the budgetary gaps, municipal workers across the city were
frightened, but SSEU Local 371 members initiated a quick response because of the already
heightened political nature of their work. After all, the fiscal austerity was a multi-pronged attack
on SSEU Local 371. First it sought to attack social workers as over-paid public employees,
though in fact New York City municipal employees’ rising wages were similar to other large
cities.30 Second, it attacked the services they provided and the mission of social relief to which
they dedicated their lives. Third, the fiscal crisis rhetoric attacked the clients to whom social
workers increasingly provided those services.31 Welfare rolls had become increasingly black and
Latino in the postwar era, and the numbers on welfare had increase dramatically both as a result
of increasing activism through the National Welfare Rights Organization and growing economic
stagnation in the 1970s. Because of this, the welfare budget expanded rapidly, with $1 billion in
spending each year by the beginning of the decade.32 For black and Latino social workers in
particular, these racist attacks on welfare recipients would certainly hit close to home, especially
for those who embraced racial nationalism.33
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Social workers, including the union leadership, believed that layoffs and service cuts
would only worsen a stagnating economic situation that average workers could not be blamed
for. Many rank-and-file social workers, in the estimation of one insurgent candidate, also
believed that the fiscal crisis was not inevitable and that banks would not in fact allow the city to
default given the massive economic chaos that would ensue.34
With initial announcements of layoffs and budget problems in late 1974, both union
leaders and rank-and-file delegates from various work sites opposed budget cuts and firings, but
they generally disagreed on the appropriate course of action to take. While some of his advisors
had recommended more than 16,000 layoffs to balance the books, in November 1974 Mayor
Beame announced the imminent layoff of nearly 1,600 city employees.35 In Local 371, members
of the Executive Committee opposed layoffs and discussed a strike possibility, but in the
delegates’ assembly, rank-and-file members took a firm stand against the layoffs after the city
gave nearly 150 SSEU members pink slips. Delegates resolved that their union was against all
layoffs, mandating that their union president, who was a member of the DC 37 Executive Board,
call for an emergency meeting of DC 37 delegates to discuss the possibility of a public employee
general strike in the event of layoffs.36 President Knight, as directed by the rank-and-file
delegates, motioned at the DC 37 delegates’ meeting for an emergency discussion of a citywide
strike in the event of layoffs. While his motion was seconded and some discussion followed,
34
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delegates from the Queens Library Guild and Local 420 of municipal hospital employees
motioned to table the discussion, and a vote put the issue to rest.37
While Local 371 members forced their leader into taking a public stand, Knight told his
members that the decisions were increasingly out of his hand as Gotbaum took charge of
negotiations not only as head of DC 37 but also as the head of the MLC.38 While wary of fiscal
austerity’s negative effects, Gotbaum was willing to negotiate cost cutting measures with Mayor
Beame, and in late 1974, he pushed for the use of attrition to help ease budgetary gaps. Several
thousand New York City municipal workers retired each year, and Gotbaum hoped that their
departure would cut costs enough to prevent layoffs. Gotbaum also argued for the elimination of
provisional employees or those who had entered either through appointment or without civil
service exams that DC 37 members underwent. Thus unlike rank-and-file members of Local 371,
who took a stand against all layoffs, Gotbaum was willing to sacrifice provisional employees—
who were not union members—relatively early on in negotiations.39
In late January 1975, another Local 371 delegates’ assembly revolved around strategy,
with Knight putting forward a motion that the union should hold press conferences and issue
public statements attacking the crisis measures. He wanted to reframe the budget debates by
arguing that unemployment was the city’s biggest problem and that layoff plans would only
worsen the unemployment problem by adding to the number of people out of work and lessening
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the ability of social workers to service them.40 While this motion was seconded, Michael
Padwee, a long-time rank-and-file organizer, put forth an alternative motion, arguing for SSEU
Local 371 representatives within DC 37 to once again advocate a citywide public employee
general strike in the face of any layoffs.41 Furthermore, this counter motion demanded no layoffs
of any workers, an increase of taxes on commercial real estate and corporate profits, rent and
price freezes, and the examination of the city budget by consumer-advocate Ralph Nader.42
The motion triggered considerable internal debate, with another countermotion calling
for a complete rejection of austerity negotiations and an immediate SSEU Local 371 strike
referendum. In response to these countermotions, president Knight radicalized his strategy’s
language but not its methods. Knight then called for public relations campaign to denounce the
bankers’ blackmail, the exorbitant interest rates they exacted from the city, and decreasing city
revenues due to low corporate and real estate taxes. With the previous strike call shot down in
the DC 37 delegates’ meeting, a majority of the 124 social worker delegates voted to go along
with the public relations strategy and its more oppositional language. While militant action did
not result from Padwee’s and others motions, opposition forced Knight to take on a more
adversarial public stance than he had initially proposed.43
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In the early months of 1975, union leaders began to develop a more multifaceted strategy
for dealing with the fiscal crisis, combining both virulent denunciations of banks and conceding
union benefits and gains. At a DC 37 delegates meeting in late February, Gotbaum let it be
known that upcoming budget gaps looked to be severe, and to help the city, the union was giving
up one week of summer hours—municipal workers in New York City worked one hour less each
day during the summer months—and foregoing two months of health and security fund benefits
for new employees. While Gotbaum worked out these smaller cost-cutting measures, he also
warned that the budget gaps might call for 50,000 to 80,000 layoffs.44 In the face of such threats,
Gotbaum advocated that funds from the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA)—a Nixon program to train and employ minorities and the unemployed for civil
service—ought to be used to rehire any fired union members. Though he in effect conceded to
firings, Gotbaum hoped that CETA block grants, which allowed significant leeway for spending,
could be used as a safety net.45
DC 37 was also ramping up its rhetoric at the very same moment as making these
concessions. That February, the Council issued thousands of copies of a pamphlet titled, “The
Big Bank Holdup,” which decried the banks refusal to lend and questioned why police,
firefighters, librarians, and sanitation workers had to tighten their belts while banks were making
more than ever off of the city. The pamphlet concluded with a challenge:
Why don’t we ask all the companies making money off of New
York City to tighten their belts, to make a little less for a while. It’s
their city, too. Let’s ask them to help out. Ask the banks to the cut
the interest rates to the city. Let’s ask Con Ed to charge less for
44
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city hospitals, day care centers, schools and other institutions.
Same for the phone company. Same for everybody doing business
with the city of New York.46
Though rhetorically combative, DC 37 was simply asking the city’s business elite to make some
concessions as well, to meet in the middle as was routine in collective bargaining. Months later,
as Gotbaum came to recognize, labor’s conciliatory attitude in the beginning of the crisis only
whet the appetite of the city’s business elites.47
There is a gap in SSEU Local 371’s records, between February and April, but opposition
to fiscal austerity became more militant during this time. While delegates had not supported
Padwee’s January motion calling for a strike in case of layoffs, by the spring, a slightly modified
position had won the day. In early April, the union’s position was that no layoffs were acceptable
and that any layoff of permanent workers was grounds for a citywide strike.48
While social workers were closer to the DC 37 leadership on who should be fired,
Gotbaum’s support of attrition irked older workers, and members of the hospital corporations
chapter passed their own resolution against the forced retirement, calling banks “the real enemy”
of city workers.49 These members brought their angry resolution before the SSEU Local 371’s
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Executive Board, but the leadership pared down the statement’s language, eliminating “the real
enemy” phrase and agreed to pass on this sanitized objection to the rest of DC 37.50
At that month’s delegates’ assembly, another argument took place within the union when
members made a call for the union to take its own vote for authorizing strike action rather than
waiting on DC 37. Knight defeated this call, insisting on unity with the rest of DC 37 and going
so far as to argue that mandating a strike vote within the local could undermine a potential strike
call from Gotbaum and the Executive Board of DC 37.51 Knight was more interested in
promoting a DC 37-sponsored march in Washington, DC than advocating militant action.52
Rank-and-file social workers supported and participated in DC 37 actions in large numbers, but
they did not see the marching and lobbying as a substitute for more militant organizing on the
part of their leaders. Well aware that concessions were already underway, the ranks passed a
motion in April calling for any DC 37-negotiated agreements to be put to a citywide vote. In
effect, SSEU Local 371 members wanted any deals to face the entire membership of DC 37 as a
single unit rather than on local-by-local basis, which could lead to isolation and distrust between
various locals.53
As the fiscal crisis mounted in June and opposition to austerity grew among many
workers, so too did Gotbaum’s opposition to independent action. SSEU Local 371 members
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participated in a boisterous June 4 rally against First National City Bank. But many thought that
with the July 1 deadline looming, more action was warranted. To achieve this, they distributed
leaflets and tried to question the union’s strategy at the DC 37 delegates’ assembly, but Gotbaum
loyalists ejected some of them from the meeting and prevented others from asking questions and
trying to influence the debate.54
At the leadership level, Knight’s oppositional stance within DC 37 led to short-lived
organizing efforts with David Beasley, president of Local 1930 of the New York Library Guild.
In late June, the two unions organized their own fiscal crisis protest, which sought community
support, but Gotbaum ally Lillian Roberts attacked these efforts by pressuring community
organizations to pull out.55 On June 19 at an emergency meeting of DC 37 delegates, Local 371
delegates sent their president to once again call for a strike. Knight first motioned that CETA
funds were an unacceptable solution to firings, and that laying off any permanent DC 37 member
ought to be sufficient grounds for action. Secondly, Knight motioned that alongside the
mobilization and rallies DC 37 had organized or participated in, they should begin to
immediately begin to prepare for a strike, and if any permanent employee were terminated, the
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Executive Board should implement strike plans. Once again, Knight was the only union leader in
DC 37 proposing militant action and not of his own volition.56
The discussion of Knight’s strike proposal carried over to a regular meeting on June 25.
Rather than directly oppose the strike, Gotbaum told delegates that the DC 37 was not currently
organizing a strike because the July 4 weekend would be an inopportune moment to get the
public’s attention. When paired with his opposition to independent rallies and silencing of
members that opposed his strategy, it becomes clear that Gotbaum played a critical role in
preventing rank-and-file opposition to the crisis from coalescing. As such, when thousands of
workers from non-DC 37 unions would go on strike on July 1, DC 37 members were left to their
own devices and for the most part failed to take part in any substantial way.57
In July Gotbaum publicly agreed to accept a pay freeze, pay raise deferrals from earlier
contracts, and an excusing of millions in city contributions to the unions’ welfare funds. Though
he had argued in months prior that no agreement he made was binding for any member local, the
July agreement was to be imposed whether members approved or not.58
At the August 20 SSEU Local 371 delegates’ assembly, where most of the rank-and-file
opposition to the fiscal crisis had taken place, delegates rejected their leadership’s
recommendations, voting down the agreement. In hopes of delivering a yes vote, the 371
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Executive Committee called for a mail-in ballot of all members to vote on the agreement.59 At
the following delegates’ assembly in mid-September, which took place before votes were
counted, the union’s executive committee urged the delegates to reconsider the issue. Debate and
questions went on for more than an hour, and the discussion became so contentious that the
leadership ended the meeting. While members fought over whether to endorse the agreement or
not, bigger problems emerged as the city reached a critical budget gap, prompting unions to
invest billions in pension funds to save the city. Gotbaum’s July agreement looked quaint.60
While dissension and disruption reigned in SSEU Local 371, oppositional activity
remained parliamentarian in nature. DC 37’s Executive Committee shot down months of
resolutions, leaving rank and filers with few alternatives. Though rank-and-file delegates
proposed and voted for many oppositional resolutions, their lack of militant action suggests that
many members were afraid of striking without the rest of DC 37. In fact, SSEU’s last strike in
1967 failed due to its isolation, bringing about merger with the more acquiescent Local 371.61
Michael Spear has pointed out that DC 37 united a variety of different workers who could
be incredibly distrustful of one another. For example, many of DC 37’s blue-collar workers were
rooted in communities that were increasingly skeptical of educated, white-collar professionals
and leftwing politics that were common in SSEU Local 371.62 Furthermore, social workers’
profession tied them to an institution that increasingly large swaths of white, working-class New
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York had begun to question, especially as stories of welfare fraud circulated and welfare rolls
became increasingly black and Latino in New York City.63 According to available archival
sources, it is unclear to what degree rank and filers tried to independently organize outside of
union channels and whether such divisions and other obstacles were even reached.
The social workers’ battle to push DC 37 towards a more militant posture is also
indicative of both the bureaucratic nature of DC 37 and of fiscal crisis negotiations. Not only
were SSEU Local 371 members trying to influence their own union leaders, they were forcing
those leaders to make a stand in DC 37’s leadership bodies, which in turn were mediated through
the figure of Gotbaum in the MLC. In spite of claims that DC 37 was a very democratic
organization, its structure insulated its highest echelons from the ranks with the Executive
Director chosen by the DC 37 delegate’s assembly.64 In turn Gotbaum curried favor with enough
local presidents to not only maintain his position but also deny opposition motions and quash
independent action. Given Gotbaum’s willingness to compromise, independent action was
essential to opposing fiscal austerity, but DC 37’s structure made it incredibly difficult.65
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Worker Resistance to the Municipal Assistance Corporation

At midday on June 4, the MLC mobilized a crowd of some 10,000 workers to protest
First National City Bank and the rest of the financial elite. Claiming that the banks were the
cause of the crisis, extorting the city for both high interest rates and actively refusing to lend
without political concessions, union leaders vehemently denounced the potential cutbacks and
the undue harm that would be inflicted upon the city.66 According to Bellush and Bellush,
historians of DC 37, the June 4 rally on Wall Street sought to flush out the banks, to make them
take a public position for austerity rather than allowing them to remain behind the scenes and
exert pressure through refusing funds on the grounds of uncontestable market logic.67 Investment
banker and future Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) chairman Felix Rohatyn recalled
this event as a particularly frightening manifestation of public anger.68
While organized labor seemed to be on the attack, the June demonstrations marked the
only truly confrontational move Gotbaum and the MLC would make throughout the remainder of
the fiscal crisis. The rally showed just how angry workers were and just how deep the opposition
to the fiscal crisis ran.69 Like many other labor leaders, Gotbaum feared a failed strike and had
already experienced several months of proposals for a citywide strike, and after June 4, he pulled
back from further escalation. In spite of mobilizing 10,000 members for a mid-day rally,
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Gotbaum would urge labor leaders to focus all of their efforts on lobbying, hoping that a lastditch effort to sway Albany would result in fiscal relief.70
While Gotbaum pulled back from militant mobilization, other labor leaders in the city
tried alternative, sometimes provocative, methods. In hopes of proving their importance over
other city workers, the police and firefighters organized the notorious “Fear City” campaign,
which involved passing out pamphlets at hotels, train stations, and airports to scare tourists with
tips for avoiding muggers and murderers.71 Beame denounced the pamphlets, obtaining a
restraining order to prevent their dissemination. Much legal wrangling ensued, and the police and
firefighter’s union eventually desisted, giving both the city and the labor movement a black
eye.72
In late June, the UFT organized a “Day of Mourning” alongside the Board of Education
in hopes of protecting educational funding and as a result, teachers and paraprofessionals’ jobs.73
Smaller demonstrations proliferated as well, with 1,000 crossing guards protesting outside of
City Hall in the middle of the month; 1,000 had already been laid off, and the other 1,400 were
scheduled be laid off by the end of the same school year.74 Some voices would still target the
business elite, like Beasley, president of Local 1930 of the New York Library Guild, who in a
joint rally with SSEU Local 371, decried the firings, proclaiming that New Yorkers were, “being
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crushed by the giant hand of corporate finance, poor administration and bad politics.”75 Beasley
had backed the SSEU Local 371 strike call that same month, and unlike other DC 37 presidents,
pushed for action independent of the rest of the union.
Amidst the days of protest, the state passed legislation creating the MAC, a business
backed plan for cutting New York’s budget expenditures.76 The state appointed eight of nine
members to the board, and invested them with the power to lend $3 billion in state bonds to help
replace city bond obligations that the municipality could no longer meet. Prominent members
included William M. Ellinghaus, President of New York Telephone, finance lawyer Simon
Rifkin, and Felix Rohatyn, financial adviser of Lazard Freres.77 Business interests were not only
involved in writing the legislation, they were also given the authority over lending state money
under conditions of their own design, including a balanced budget that would require layoffs and
service cutbacks. As such, in one fell swoop, a new and completely unelected force had formal
decision-making power over New York City’s fate.78
Though Beame originally opposed it, he was forced to concede to the MAC’s demands,
pushing through a harsh austerity budget.79 Seeing that the city would follow through with tens
of thousands of layoffs in July, the MAC offered $1 billion in bonds, but managed initially to
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only sell some $650 million of them, a sign that in spite of many assurances of guaranteed bond
repayment, investors and the business elite wanted even more stringent measures to be taken.
With layoffs imminent, some of the more militant city workers began to take action.80
In late June, the city’s sanitation workers led the first militant rank-and-file opposition to
new austerity measures. In many boroughs, USA members implemented a work-to-rule strike,
where they observed safety and productivity measures to the letter, which slowed down the pace
of their work immensely. Others simply refused to do their work in any orderly way, picking up
trash on one side of the street or randomly skipping pickup spots. As a result, several thousand
tons of trash accumulated, giving a visual sign of both the sanitationmen’s willingness to take
action and their anger at austerity measures.81
In the Lower East Side, sanitation workers initiated a wildcat strike that completely shut
down trash removal on Manhattan’s east side. Younger sanitation workers led the wildcat
because they were most vulnerable to layoffs, but older workers stood beside them. Together
they shut down operations and sabotaged nearly 30 trash trucks, breaking windshields and
disabling wiring.82 The city swiftly responded, suspending more than 200 USA members.83
Joseph DeLury intervened to get the men reinstated, putting an end to the wildcat and resuming
regular trash pickup. He also seized the moment to warn the city that these small actions were
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only the beginning, arguing that “the mayor is sitting on a volcano that could erupt into a general
strike.”84
On the morning of July 1, all 10,000 of New York’s sanitation workers walked off the job
in the largest disruption since the 1968 rank-and-file strike.85 The threats, slowdowns, and
wildcats of the days prior had not forestalled the austerity budget, and on the first day of July,
3,000 sanitationmen were laid off, and those not fired lost promotions and higher pay; some who
had qualified for indoor work would now find themselves back in a truck while others who were
in supervisory positions would be downgraded. The cutbacks also insulted sanitiationmen’s
pride. Echoing longstanding anger that surfaced in the 1968 sanitation strike, one fired worker
argued: “just because we pickup garbage doesn’t mean we are garbage.”86 Adding to this
disrespect was that sanitation was slated for a much higher percentage of firings than the city’s
other uniformed services; with a decreasing budget, sanitation work was judged to be less
essential to public safety and order than firefighting and police work.87
While rank and filers forced the 1968 sanitation strike on DeLury, he and the rest of the
USA leadership ultimately led the men out. The 1975 walkout was different, with small groups
of sanitation workers taking the initiative and organizing their own militant actions.88 In a later
interview, labor negotiator Jack Bigel, a close ally of DeLury, confirmed that it was the men who
organized the walkout.89 Additionally, the mayor’s office was in direct contact with DeLury
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from the very beginning, relaying their potential course of action and even discussing the best
time to deploy an injunction against the wildcat.90
While DeLury made no formal claim to leading the illegal strike, he was able to end the
strike and convince the city to rehire all of the fired sanitation workers by guaranteeing their
wages with union money.91 While the plan forestalled firings with union funds, two weeks later
1,500 sanitation workers were laid off anyway. Meanwhile older sanitation workers feared that
wage cuts were in the works, and attrition soared with nearly 200 retiring in July. The sanitation
wildcat was both a win and a loss for sanitationmen. Their strike managed to prevent more than
1,000 layoffs but nearly 2,000 workers were either fired or left the profession early, and the
union conceded to new efficiencies that increased workloads and decreased fringe benefits for
sanitationmen.92
During rush hour on July 1, 500 police officers marched to City Hall. Protesting the
layoff of some 5,000 officers, they used police barricades to block off traffic at the foot of the
Brooklyn Bridge, snarling the commute for thousands.93 As they blocked the inbound and
outbound lanes of traffic, they deflated the tires of several cars, immobilizing them and turning
them into impromptu barricades. Fired officers’ resentment was expressed in all directions: they
attacked motorists who argued with them and threw cans and bottles at police officers trying to
control the protest. When PBA president McFeeley arrived on the scene to confront the 500 laid90
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off officers, many chanted against his inaction, calling on him to organize an immediate strike of
the city’s remaining 20,000 police officers. Some even chanted, “We want DeLury,” in reference
to the sanitation workers total walkout against the crisis budget.94
Ironically, McFeeley criticized his own members for being too obedient to his authority
and unwilling to organize themselves for their own ends. Of course when disobedience to union
authority had reared its head at the end of the 1960s, with police officers forming the Law
Enforcement Group (LEG), the PBA disavowed its ranks’ organizing efforts. While LEG had
faded away, an upsurge in militancy on the part of their leadership perhaps gave some of them
the impression that the PBA would lead them out on strike in the face of budget cuts.95 In 1971,
the union led a five-day wave of sickouts that saw nearly 20,000 police officers call out each
day. Expectations of a repeat of the 1971 strike were misplaced, and the PBA leadership did not
move to strike or call a sickout.96
In response to the accusations of inaction and the wildcat mobilization of the sanitation
workers, the PBA leadership convened on July 2 to determine a course of action. With close to
one quarter of their members fired, the PBA leaders hoped to produce some kind of results to
shore up support amongst the membership. Though the public might disapprove of laying off
police officers, they would oppose any strike as well, an action that could be easily cast as an
attack on the citizens of New York. The PBA leadership adopted a call for all of its working
members to follow all operating procedures–a major work slow down—and the PBA also took
over coordination of pickets outside of the city’s 73 precincts. That same day 250 young officers
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blocked traffic again near the Brooklyn Bridge. On July 3, the laid-off officers gave up their
protests, but the PBA kept up picketing, and the city agreed to a temporary rehiring of 2,000
officers, but Beame wanted escrow payments from the union in case of budgetary gaps and a
revision of their previous contract.97
Spurred by the sanitationmen’s militancy and protests by police, firemen staged a sickout
against more than 1,500 layoffs. On July 2, 400 firemen called in sick across the city, ten times
the usual number. The firefighters union head had hinted at the action in the days prior,
mimicking DeLury, “I cannot control the fire fighters’ actions any longer, as a result of the
shabby, callous and provocative treatment they are receiving during the layoff.”98
Meanwhile in neighborhoods like East Harlem and the Lower East Side, young men
barricaded entire streets with mountains of trash, which they then set aflame. When police
arrived on the scene, local youths attacked them with rocks and bottles. With fewer firefighters
on hand to douse the flames, smoldering piles of trash covered several city blocks. McFeeley
hoped to leverage the firemen’s sickout and ensuing fires, telling the media, “You know damn
well it is ‘Fear City.’ People will die.”99 Like their counterparts in the uniformed services,
firefighters achieved some rehiring, with the city reinstating 750, but with similar demands for
union payments and contract revisions.
Perhaps most short-lived was a wildcat strike by fired DC 37 members at the
Transportation Administration. After 570 layoffs, transportation workers picketed at 15 separate
work yards across the city; some even assaulted a supervisor. In shirking their duties, they
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blocked off the Hudson River Parkway, which runs along half of the city’s West Side and up to
the Westchester County, snarling the commutes of thousands of people. DC 37 did not move to
organize the protest of its laid off members, and ultimately none of these workers were
reinstated.100
The legacy of these short-lived strikes, pickets, and sickouts was mixed. On the one hand,
it showed that rank-and-file workers were able to resist fiscal austerity. Partial rehiring resulted
after nearly each case of militant action, and the case of the highest militancy—the sanitation
strike—produced the greatest proportion of reappointments. On the other hand, the strikes also
showed that union leaders would not lead a concerted resistance to cuts and that they would
make major concessions to achieve defensive compromises. Initial rehiring in July involved
union funds, which set a precedent for the union investment in city functions threatened by fiscal
austerity.101
While DC 37 wanted the city’s banks and major corporations to shoulder some of the
burden of fiscal austerity and economic stagnation, labor and the city’s diverse communities
would ultimately bear the costs. Additionally, thousands of workers were ultimately laid off, and
those who remained were subject to worsening work conditions and pay freezes as well as
widespread fear of further layoffs. This new regime went beyond the early July layoffs, however.
By the middle of the month, bankers such as David Rockefeller and Walter Wriston were
demanding that the city charge tuition in the CUNY system, raise the subway fare, impose wage
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freezes, and layoff more workers.102 At the end of July, Gotbaum agreed either tacitly or directly
to all of these demands. Thus if some workers were able to save their own jobs, they were not
able to prevent the business elite’s broader social aims. In this regard the July mobilizations were
completely unsuccessful and are representative of a failure of the city’s labor movement to
defend its social values.103

The 1975 Teachers’ Strike

New York City’s 55,000 teachers mounted the most significant counterattack against
austerity. While most unions were negotiating austerity cuts to existing contracts, in 1975, the
UFT was fighting austerity in its negotiations for a new contract, with its existing one set to
expire at the beginning of the 1975-1976 school year. Thus unlike sanitation, police, or parks
service, any agreement would be brought before the UFT membership, giving teachers and
paraprofessionals the ability to veto their leadership in case of poor results. In September 1975,
after months of layoffs and what seemed to be only bad news for city workers and the city’s
working class, rank-and-file anger within the UFT at both budget cuts and their union
representatives erupted into a week-long strike that completely paralyzed the city’s education
system. But in spite of deep-seated anger, rank-and-file organizing, and even community
support, teachers for the most part left their fate in the hands of the union, which ended the strike
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through the subversion of its own democratic procedures, ultimately bringing its rank and file
back to work in defeat.
By the 1970s, the UFT as an organization and teachers as a rank and file had severely
damaged their standing with the growing black and Puerto Rican communities in the city. A
series of stances, including crossing picket lines of the 1964 school boycotts and 1967 contract
demands, which included greater punitive power over disruptive students, had caused major
friction with communities and sparked rank-and-file opposition on the part of black teachers
through both the African-American Teachers Association (ATA) and the New Coalition.104
The most damaging events were the three strikes during the 1968-1969 school year, in which the
UFT faced off with community control advocates in a horrible back and forth that fueled racial
resentment and set organized labors’ demands firmly against large parts of the black
community.105
The ATA led the charge against the union, but internal opposition was more varied, with
the foundation of a black caucus within the union both supportive of the strike and community
control as well as a primarily white leftist organization willing to cross the picket lines in support
of community control. The majority of teachers maintained picket lines even if they thought the
strike was hurting their cause.106 Ultimately the strike reinforced a debilitating white versus black
polarization that aligned the political concerns of union teachers with white racism but also
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aligned the legitimate political demands of black communities with the likes of the Ford
Foundation a brand of racial nationalism unwilling to think the question of class.107
In the strikes’ aftermath, the union rebounded when the thousands of black and Puerto
Rican paraprofessionals voted to join the union over DC 37, which tried unsuccessfully to use
the UFT’s stance in 1968 Ocean Hill-Brownsville strike to win support. While paraprofessional
support for the UFT suggests that the strikes’ racial polarization was not all-encompassing, they
were more likely an exception to the rule given the desire of many of them to become teachers
themselves. While the union’s ranks became more integrated, the union’s reputation was heavily
white and anti-black.108
While the UFT’s reputation would certainly be an obstacle, rank-and-file groups within
the union had begun to mobilize in early 1975. That spring, the Board of Education pushed to
remove thousands of substitute teachers from its payrolls, the first in a series of major cuts that
would see the city’s school system left overcrowded and underfunded. Up until those firings, the
Teachers Action Caucus (TAC), an opposition faction of Communist Party (CP) members and
New Left teachers, focused its energy on an unsuccessful bid for power with the union.109
Founded during the 1968 Ocean Hill-Brownsville strikes, TAC brought together long-time
teachers from the CP with younger teachers who wanted to unite community control advocates
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and the teachers’ rank and file.110 For these rank and filers, the business elite’s fiscal crisis
demands put into stark relief that teachers’ conditions of labor were their students’ conditions of
learning, which only a joint effort of the community and union could defend. TAC’s chairperson,
Anne Filardo, was a guidance counselor in a Queens junior high school, and, like many other
TAC members, prominently crossed the picket line during the Ocean Hill-Brownsville strike.
Many rank and filers opposed Shanker and believed the 1968 strike to be a horrible mistake, but
they stuck with the strike in solidarity with their fellow union members. TAC’s attempt to bridge
the teacher-community gap both earned them undying hatred of the UFT leadership as well as
negative reputation among other teachers.111
The UFT hoped to mobilize its members and gain public support with a “Day of
Mourning” protest against cuts to city education, which they jointly organized with the Board of
Education in June 1975. Rank-and-file groups like TAC hoped the UFT would take a more
antagonistic position in the cuts, not simply arguing against cuts in education but in the city as a
whole.112 Their leaflets argued that there was in fact no budget shortage because the city had
generated the shortfall by giving millions in tax breaks to the real estate industry and refusing to
collect millions in delinquent tax payments from large property owners across the city. TAC also
decried the tone of the Day of Mourning. Using the old adage attributed to Joe Hill: “Don’t
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Mourn – Organize!”, TAC urged a broad-based community struggle against austerity measures,
hoping to influence many UFT members to organize themselves for outreach to parents and
students.113
Other teachers found Shanker’s approach wanting, with a short-lived group of teachers,
the Coalition Against Budget Cuts, arguing: “With the demonstration today, Shanker gave out
notice to teachers only in the last minute because he could not allow our militancy to hurt his
collaborating friendship with the government. Shanker is conducting this show with the Board of
Ed. just to trick us.”114 In spite of such criticisms, the union and the Board of Education
mobilized nearly 30,000 people for the rally, bringing together supportive students, parent
groups, and rank-and-file UFT members. The image was powerful, but like their counterparts in
SSEU Local 371, many New York City teachers believed that much more action was necessary
to fight the fiscal crisis.115
After the Day of Mourning and the initial layoffs of other municipal workers in July,
many New York teachers were dismayed by their union’s conciliatory approach. A group of 80
teachers met in late July, founding the Citywide Coordinating Committee to Save New York
Schools (CCC). Like TAC, the CCC criticized the UFT for being too conciliatory and being
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undemocratic, which in the case of the fiscal crisis negotiations meant that the leadership was
unreflective of the base’s resistance to firings and class-size increases.116
Their initial press release was very clear: the CCC was organizing a militant fight against
austerity that could lead directly to a strike in September. The CCC, like TAC, saw community
support as paramount, and on August 9, a month prior to the beginning of the school year, CCC
members organized a petition at eleven sites throughout the city to gather support for their antiausterity campaign. At the end of August, the CCC mobilized a picket of the Board of Education
and the UFT negotiations in downtown Brooklyn. Foreshadowing events to come, their press
release stated, “Rehire every teacher, or no teacher works in September!”117
Importantly, many teachers increasingly resented Shanker, who was insulated from his
membership.118 At the end of the 1974-1975 school year, a unanimous vote of the South Shore
High School UFT Chapter in Brooklyn called upon Shanker to stop his “labor statesman” ways
and to begin acting like a “down-to-earth union leader” who communicated directly with his
rank-and-file.119
Shanker was increasingly aware of the internal opposition, but he was also in a delicate
position wherein a strike could symbolize a strike against the city and could end in defeat. He

116

“CCC to Albert Shanker,” August 1975, United Federation of Teachers Records, Tamiment
Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archive, box 135, Strike 1975 folder.
117
“CCC Press Release,” August 25, 1975, United Federation of Teachers Records, Tamiment
Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archive, box 135, Strike 1975 folder; “Board and Teachers
Seek State Aid in Reaching Pact,” New York Times, August 30, 1975.
118
Merry Tucker, August 25, 1981, New Yorkers At Work Oral History Collection, Tamiment
Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives.
119
“South Shore High School UFT Chapter to Albert Shanker,” June 24, 1975, United
Federation of Teachers Records, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archive, box
135, Strike 1975 folder; Maier, 175; for a more extensive look at teacher militancy, see Marjorie
Murphy, “Militancy in Many Forms: Teachers Strikes and Urban Insurrection” in Rebel Rank
and File: Labor Militancy and Revolt From Below During the Long 1970s, eds. Aaron Brenner,
Robert Brenner, and Cal Winslow (New York: Verso, 2010), 229-248.

276
went so far as to ask the Board of Education to extend the previous contract, thus allowing him
to symbolically maintain his “no contract, no work” position and avoid a strike. The Board of
Education refused and Shanker brought a strike vote before an angry membership.120
On the night of September 8, more than 20,000 teachers packed Madison Square Garden.
Earlier in the day, the city’s teachers had arrived for the first day of school, finding many
austerity measures already in place: oversized classes, schools without guidance counselors,
teacher activities extended far beyond the classroom, in addition to the 7,000 layoffs already
issued by the Board of Education. Community solidarity was strongly in effect as well, as many
parents across the city kept students out of schools in boycott of deteriorating educational
conditions; three schools were closed in Manhattan due to a near total boycott of parents. In
many ways, teachers, parents, and students knew that the 1975 school year was not going to go
on without interruption.121
In Ocean Hill, the focal point of the 1968 strike, TAC members alongside other staff
members collectively authored and issued a leaflet to community members on the first day of
school that apologized for the fact that the following day they would go on strike.122 The CCC
also leafleted at schools where it had active members, reaching out to other teachers as well as
parents and students. The teachers emphasized that the strike was for the children and for the
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maintenance of their children’s learning conditions, which was in fact a broadly held sentiment
throughout the strike amongst teachers, not simply an opportunistic use of propaganda.123
If many teachers thought teaching as a whole was at stake, so too did they think that a
strike was the only way to preserve what they had. And though Shanker had done little to rally
the troops to the action, in fact repeatedly stating he was against a strike, teachers were ready for
confrontation. A massive roar of approval came with the motion to call a strike vote at Madison
Square Garden, with the final ballot tallying a landslide 22,870 for and a mere 900 against.124
While teachers may have voted down the contract against Shanker’s wishes, the UFT’s
bureaucracy outmatched rank-and-file organizations in both resources and leadership. Its high
level of organization and strict hierarchy allowed for an orderly and well-staffed strike, with
teachers picketing every school in the city for the entire day and with a reinforced presence
during lunch and closing hours. While some teachers designed their own signs and conducted
their own conversations with community members, the UFT produced the majority of the
propaganda and signage during the strike, leaving it effectively in charge of the strike’s
representation.125
While the strike may have been well organized, many teachers wanted to ensure its longterm success, such as the more than 75 teachers in Washington Heights who issued a letter to
Shanker and the UFT Executive Board members urging them not to end the strike prematurely
because of the immensity of the issues at stake. This letter is quite indicative of the rank-and-
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file’s actual capacity to shape events: it could express and implore the union to action but like
many other rank-and-file generated strikes, the 1975 teacher’s strike was in the hands of the
union’s leadership.126
Importantly, the walkout pitted New York City’s teachers and many supportive families
and community members against the state’s newly created Emergency Financial Control Board
(EFCB). As William Tabb argues, the MAC was unable to sufficiently impose the will of
financial elites on the city and its working class, and in order to more adequately discipline the
city into falling in line with their austerity aspirations, business elites, including Rohatyn,
Ellinghaus, and Rifkind drafted a law that called for an organization with direct oversight
concerning city spending. While earlier, budgets and contracts could be a site of power struggles,
the EFCB removed any such possibility by creating a politically insulated organization with the
power of life and death over any contract.127 In spite of this power, the EFCB was careful not to
stake the its future on the outcome of either the strike or its settlement package, hoping instead to
portray it as an instrument of pure economy in which there was no room for negotiation.128 A
prolonged teachers’ strike had the potential to turn a broad swath of the community and the labor
movement against the board.129
After months of bargaining and a full week into the strike, the Board of Education offered
the UFT that the money saved by not paying tens of thousands of striking teachers would be used
to rehire some 2,000 laid-off teachers. Shanker scooped up the deal and conceded on teacher
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productivity, which was an effort by the Board of Education to compensate for firing teachers
with increased teacher workload.130 The UFT bureaucracy prepared a hasty vote the following
day, issuing outlines of an earlier agreement and with voting capped at 5 p.m. Rank-and-file
groups and left-wing groups like the PLP and Coalition for a Labor Party called for a no vote.131
TAC called the settlement, “a proposal that a defeated union accepts.”132
The union’s machinations produced chaos and left thousands locked out, resulting in a
much lower turnout and a 10,651 to 6,695 vote to approve the contract and go back to work.
Teachers across the city immediately reacted, collectively petitioning and criticizing Shanker for
his undemocratic move and the weakness of the contract. 133 Teachers from PS 90 in Queens
collectively penned a letter to Shanker denouncing “the disgraceful way in which this contract
offer was accepted and the way in which this most serious and important strike was ended.”134
Teachers at IS 210 also in Queens immediately forced their union delegate–a Shanker loyalist—
to send a letter on their behalf denouncing the agreement and the undemocratic nature of voting
procedures that. In spite of the reaction, teachers were not sufficiently organized to lead their

130

“Teachers Vote to Return, But Many Reject Pact,” New York Times, September 17, 1975;
Merry Tucker, August 25, 1981, New Yorkers At Work Oral History Collection, Tamiment
Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives.
131
For leftwing leaflets, see “Vote No!” and “Vote No to Sellout!,” September 1975, United
Federation of Teachers Records, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archive, box
135, Strike 1975 folder.
132
“Reject the ‘Settlement’,” September 15, 1975, Anne Filardo Papers on Rank and File
Activism in the Federation of Teachers and the United Federation of Teachers, Tamiment
Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archive, box 1, Teachers Action Caucus September 1975Aug 1976 folder.
133
Maier, 175-176; “Teachers Vote to Return, But Many Reject Pact,” New York Times,
September 17, 1975.
134
“To: Al Shanker and all members of the Executive Board,” Sept. 17, 1975, United Federation
of Teachers Records, President’s Files, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archive,
box 43, Contract Negotiations: Strike ’75 – Positions Other than UFT folder.

280
own fight, leaving them to protest and implore the UFT leadership but with little recourse in the
face of its decision to orchestrate a return to work.135
Unlike SSEU Local 371 members who maintained a primarily parliamentarian
opposition to fiscal austerity, UFT members moved to militancy because of a combination of
increased anger at Shanker, the deleterious effects of austerity on their work environment, and
the critical nature of their work. When teachers struck, the city was massively disrupted. Unlike
many other rank and filers who opposed the fiscal crisis though, teachers were able to push their
leaders forward but they were ultimately outflanked. Shanker, like Gotbaum, wanted to preserve
collective bargaining and ultimately wanted to avoid a strike. By ending the strike, he was able to
deliver labor peace and end a conflict that he believed could not be won. Some rank and filers
linked union subterfuge to the fact that several months after the strike, the UFT obtained an
agency shop agreement, and in the words of one teacher, Merry Tucker, “The union [was]
cutting the throat of the teachers … [and] the bureaucracy has set up an interest totally aside
from the interest of the teachers.”136
Though the teachers’ strike ultimately failed to defend the city’s educational services
from major cutbacks, it was successful in the very short term at exacting some concessions.
Shanker, like other labor leaders, achieved some rehiring of members, who were ironically
funded by the money saved by the strike’s shut down of the school system. Shanker, however,
conceded to a series of cost cutting measures that dramatically worsened education in the city.
Part of the problem lay in the fact that the business elite’s hand had strengthened significantly by
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the fall of 1975. While the summer strikes had faced off against the business elite’s austerity
programs implemented through the new fiscal year’s budget, teachers were fighting to preserve
educational services and their own livelihoods against the EFCB, which would be able to review
their contract. When the board ultimately examined the UFT contract, it found the agreement
completely inconsistent with austerity priorities and let the agreement hang in limbo for more
than a year, a state of exception wherein the rapid rise to power of municipal unions was
dramatically curtailed. As Lichten succinctly put it, “the EFCB refused to accept and ratify the
contract as punishment for the teacher’s militancy.”137 That being said, their refusal to decide on
the contract for quite some time also speaks to the effectiveness of teachers’ resistance. The
EFCB let the process languish rather than make a decision too soon and possibly spark another
strike.

Conclusion

From the end of 1974 through the end of 1975, rank-and-file municipal workers contested
the fiscal crisis, passing militant motions, creating their own propaganda, organizing wildcat
strikes, and rejecting leadership-brokered contracts. In many cases union leaders acted directly to
halt such independent organizing but in the best-case scenario they leveraged militancy to broker
a better settlement for their particular union, which sometimes left them at odds with their fellow
labor leaders. Though union leaders disputed the givebacks and layoffs, they ultimately conceded
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defeat and allowed the financial elite to determine the meaning of the crisis, touting the
“common determination” and “common answer” to which they had all arrived.138
When Mayor Beame first announced the possibility of layoffs in the fall of 1974, SSEU
Loca 371 members in the union’s delegate assembly passed a resolution declaring opposition to
all layoffs and calling on President Knight to motion for a strike within DC 37. Social workers
were a diverse, highly politicized group with a history of rank-and-file mobilization, and when
Gotbaum, DC 37, and the MLC chose a strategy of negotiation, rank and filers kept up the
agitation. In January 1975, SSEU leaders presented a motion to investigate the cause of the fiscal
crisis, but some rank-and-filers demanded that DC 37 push for a public employees general strike
in response to austerity measures. While debate eventually table the motion, Knight revised their
motion, using more strident language to denounce bankers.
Pressure from business elites grew in 1975, and social workers maintained their
resistance. In the late winter-early spring, their position shifted however, from opposition to all
layoffs to opposition to all layoffs of fulltime employees; the call for a general strike still stood,
but it would only be used to defend full-timers. In the face of increased pressure from above, DC
37 and the MLC organized a march in Washington DC in May and even a rally against First
National City Bank in June, but rank-and-filers still demanded direct action. At a DC 37
Executive Board meeting in June, SSEU members leafleted outside and tried to intervene in the
meeting, but Gotbaum loyalists ejected some of them from the meeting and prevented others
from questioning the leadership. Later that month, members once again motioned for President
Knight to advocate that DC 37 immediately organize a public employees general strike. They
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also opposed Gotbaum’s proposal to reroute CETA funds to rehire any fired full-timer, opposing
instead layoffs as whole. Though Knight’s strike call received backing from library guild
president Beasley, Gotbaum refused it, arguing spuriously that the July 4th weekend stood in the
way of gaining public attention for the strike.
The summer of 1975 saw continuing, albeit declining, opposition within the ranks of
SSEU Local 371. In late July Gotbaum agreed to pay freezes and productivity measures in
exchange for the potential use of CETA funds to rehire fired workers, but the deal had to
nominally be ratified by DC 37 locals. SSEU Local 371 delegates voted down the deal but
Knight and the rest of the leadership insisted on the vote going to the rest of the membership.
Contentious meetings followed, but the fiscal crisis accelerated with massive investment of
union pensions into city bonds and the acknowledgement by many that the deal would be
imposed with or without their consent.
SSEU Local 371 members used parliamentary procedures within the framework of their
local to try and push DC 37 to militant action, but the higher echelons of the Council stymied
their efforts. In the most serious cases of opposition, DC 37 ejected social workers from its
meetings or prevented them from speaking. In the case of a joint rally between social workers
and library workers, DC 37 went so far as to pressure community allies to pull out of the rally.
Social workers were aware of the structural limitations of the organization, and they tried to
overcome disunity in the ranks by calling for a DC 37-wide ratification of any contract rather
than local by local approvals, which left different sets of workers isolated from one another. In
all cases their efforts failed, and as they predicted, a local-by-local vote occurred leaving
opponents angry and isolated.
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Amidst SSEU Local 371’s primarily parliamentarian opposition, the summer of 1975 saw
a short a series of short-lived strikes, sickouts, and protests by sanitationmen, police, firefighters,
and roadway workers against fiscal austerity and the MAC. While a slew of firings had already
laid off a variety of different municipal employees in May and June, the beginning of the 19751976 fiscal year brought thousands of layoffs in some of the city’s most powerful unions
including the USA, PBA, and UFA. Workers found themselves at odds with the MAC, which the
state had created at the behest of some business elites in order oversee city compliance with
austerity measures.
With layoffs slated for July 1, USA members began a series of actions in late June to
protest the layoffs including a short wildcat strike on Manhattan’s east side, a work-to-rule strike
that saw trash pickup several disrupted, and sabotage of vehicles and job sites. Though President
DeLury did not help coordinate these activities, he helped get suspended workers reinstated for
the wildcat, and he took the opportunity to warn of further action. His calls went unheeded by the
MAC, and on July 1, all 10,000 sanitation workers walked off the job when 3,000 were laid off.
For two and a half days, sanitation workers remained on strike while DeLury negotiated with the
city to rehire them. With money from the union and agreements to efficiencies and attrition,
Beame temporarily rehired all sanitationmen. Two weeks later 1,500 were laid off and nearly
200 retired.
Police officers and firemen did not walk off the job in response to the thousands of
layoffs, but they did picket, protest, and engage in sickouts. After 5,000 layoffs, several hundred
police officers protested outside of City Hall, shutting down traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge, and
even clashing with other police officers. When PBA president McFeeley arrived on the scene,
fired police officers denounced him, calling for a strike like the USA. McFeeley in turn
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denounced his own men for not taking action on their own, and in the days that followed the
PBA took control of picketing at various precincts across the city. Meanwhile, UFA members
took a somewhat more combative approach, taking part in a sickout that seriously curtailed fire
service in the city, and in concert with accumulating garbage, led to a large number of trash fires.
Both the PBA and UFA won some rehirings, though initially not as great a proportion as the
USA.
The shortest-lived walkout was on the part of DC 37 roadway workers. After 600 layoffs
on July 1, some workers picketed outside of Department of Transportation jobsites while others
caused massive traffic tie-ups by refusing to move traffic barriers. The disruption ended the next
day, and none of these workers were rehired. The summer strikes, protests, and sickouts on the
part of the uniformed services demonstrate that fiscal austerity could be fought, to some degree,
through direct action and protest. In each case that workers used militant action, and
significantly, that leaders came in to broker deals, significant rehiring occurred. In the long run,
such strategies did not prevent pay freezes and contract renegotiations, though it is possible that
with more unity different outcomes could have been achieved.
The most significant strike against fiscal austerity came in September. Shanker used
large-scale mobilization and backroom negotiations in the summer to try and deliver an adequate
contract for teachers, but ongoing efforts by the city’s business elite to impose austerity led to
teacher layoffs, increased class sizes, pay freezes, and increased working hours by the beginning
of the school year. In response, the teacher rank-and-file, many of whom already had their
disagreements with Shanker, voted to strike against the wishes of their leadership, once again
shutting down the country’s largest school system.
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Amidst the summer negotiations, rank-and-file organizations mobilized to push for a fall
strike. The longstanding TAC, which had opposed Shanker and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
strikes, leafleted their fellow rank and filers, calling for militant action to defend the working
conditions of teachers and the learning conditions of community. Like their counterparts in the
SSEU, the leftwing TAC argued that bankers and businessmen had a stranglehold over the city,
and that the fiscal crisis was primarily their fault. TAC also tried to reach out to community
members, distributing leaflets that explained their reasons for a strike and apologizing its
negative effects. That summer, another group of teachers, the CCC, was formed, mobilizing
teachers to resist fiscal austerity. CCC announced its formation to Shanker, calling on him to
more aggressively defend teachers. In August 1975, they leafleted a dozen subway stations with
flyers about the possibility of an upcoming strike, decrying the harmful budget cuts. More
diffuse opposition also occurred with some teachers sending strident letters to Shanker, decrying
him as an insulated, labor statesman.
On September 8, teachers voted overwhelmingly to strike, and the UFT took full control
of the strike, organizing pickets and propaganda. A group of teachers in Queens, called on
Shanker not to end the strike early, and though rank-and-file groups were undoubtedly active at
their regular job sites, there is little archival documentation of their strike-time efforts. After a
week on strike, the Board of Education offered to rehire 2,000 teachers using the money it saved
during the strike, and Shanker organized a hasty strike vote that left many teachers unable to cast
ballots. In the strike’s aftermath, various school chapters denounced the voting procedures and
the end of the strike, but there were no wildcats.
Though the teachers orchestrated a large-scale resistance to the imposition of austerity on
the city’s school system, their leadership brought the strike to an end through dubious methods.
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Significantly, the contract Shanker had won was subject to review from the ECFB, which
tactfully kept the agreement in limbo for nearly a year, eventually ruling that many of its
provisions were not significantly in line with austerity goals. Though there were a handful of
rank-and-file groups within the ranks of the UFT, they were not powerful enough to lead further
walkouts or resistance.
While workers may have lost the battle, the fact that they contested the causes and
consequences of the fiscal crisis suggests the importance of the left historiography of the crisis,
which has questioned the source of the city’s budgetary woes as well as the business eliteproposed remedies. Many groups and individuals within the UFT and DC 37 proposed
alternative explanations for the source of the fiscal crisis and advocated the use of militant strikes
to force the city’s financial elite to capitulate. Some of these can be attributed to leftwing
organizations whose perspectives are sometimes reflected in academic works, but there was also
a widespread working-class understanding of the event. While the banks touted a neutral market
that prevented investment, some working-class New Yorkers argued that the banks were acting
in their own interest and against the interest of everyday New Yorkers when demanding fiscal
austerity. Furthermore, working-class people, in a variety of unions called for their elected
representatives to contest the meaning and articulation of the crisis. The left historiography not
only adequately highlights the power relations at play in the fiscal crisis, but it also maintains an
important emphasis on how some working-class people tried to define and respond to the
crisis.139
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In 1980, transit workers would again shut down the city in a strike prompted by internal
opposition and factionalism. On the one hand, this strike was a testament to the ongoing
possibility of resisting fiscal austerity. After eleven days on strike, transit workers obtained a
much higher raise than previously negotiated, but since they had not had a raise in nearly six
years it was primarily a catch-up contract. On the other hand, this strike did not spark major
organizing and upheaval as in 1966.
While transit workers were still able to maintain some power because of the critical
nature of their industry, much less could be said for the rest of the city’s workers. Failed
rebellions in the early 1970s had transformed the attitudes of many of New York’s workers, and
the punishing effects of stagflation and fiscal austerity left many demoralized and desperate. The
1975 fiscal crisis only served to confirm the decline of workers’ power in the city, though
municipal unions di preserve a circumscribed right to collectively bargain. Unemployment
remained high throughout the 1980s, wealth moved increasingly up the socioeconomic
hierarchy, the national political environment turned anti-labor with the rise of Ronald Reagan,
and in New York City the working class ceased to be a power to reckon with.140
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Conclusion

From 1965 to 1975, rank-and-file workers in New York took part in a broad but inchoate
rebellion that challenged the power of politicians, business elites, and union leaders. While rankand-file rebellion in New York City lacked a founding statement, it was characterized by
common motivations, similar modes of action, and a collective consciousness. Across many
different sectors, powerful strikes shut down essential city services, electoral challenges ousted
entrenched bureaucrats, and contract rejections and wildcat strikes defied the authority of New
York City’s labor hierarchy. Significantly, workers powerfully influenced one another,
catalyzing further rebellion across the city, overcoming barriers of race, occupation, skill, and
political persuasion. Plumbers inspired sheet metal workers and elevator constructors, sanitation
workers encouraged taxi drivers, and transit workers inspired postal workers and even
electricians. New insurgent energies—black militancy and youth revolt—fed the rebellion, as did
growing political polarization under Mayor John Lindsay. New York’s workers wanted more
than just better contracts. They asserted greater control of the work process, contested racism on
the job, demanded more democratic control of representative organizations, and challenged the
workers’ place in America’s socioeconomic hierarchy. In the face of both internal and external
limitations, rank-and-file upheaval mostly petered out by the early 70s, experiencing a brief
revival in 1975, when workers led the resistance to the city’s business elite and its plans for fiscal
austerity
The Rank and File Committee for a Democratic Union’s electoral and contract challenges
in 1965 and the subway strike that followed swiftly thereafter were important sparks for rankand-file upheaval throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. As some authors have noted, diffuse
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internal anger drove Transport Workers Union (TWU) president Michael Quill towards a strike,
but they have yet to acknowledge the importance of the formally organized resistance of the
Rank and File Committee.1 The 1964 Harlem riots, prompted Joseph Carnegie, a black
motorman and member of the NAACP’s Labor and Industry Committee to begin organizing
among his fellow subway workers, and in 1965, with the help of older leftwing activists, he led a
campaign of agitation and organization publicly challenging the TWU’s contract demands,
which saw Committee members repeatedly ejected from meetings and shouted down by
leadership loyalists. The Committee’s challenges led to both accommodation and suppression,
with the union twice revising its contract demands upward and reformatting the election process
to a more easily controllable mail-in ballot. In December of that year, Carnegie and his allies led
an unsuccessful bid for leadership of the union, winning roughly a quarter of the votes.
Ultimately, the efforts of the Rank and File Committee helped push Quill to the brink, and the
strikes’ outcome sent a signal across the city that militancy and illegal strikes could result in
major gains for workers. Historians have noted the 1966 subway strike’s effects on municipal
workers, but its impact was much wider, with New York City’s powerful class-consciousness
acting as a conduit for its militant lessons.2
The six-month Local 2 plumbers’ strike, which shut down the city’s billion-dollar real
estate industry, gave public voice to workers’ discontent. Angry at nepotism, intermittent work,
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and leadership corruption, plumbers rising anger pushed their union president to lead a strike
demanding a hiring hall. The strike dragged on with leaders fearing a weak settlement in the face
of upcoming elections, and in the final months of 1966, plumbers voted out the bulk of their
leaders and repeatedly rejected contracts put to them by their International. It was only under
threat of trusteeship that the strike ended, and plumbers gave up on their demands for a longhoped for hiring hall. Their example however spread throughout the buildings trades, with
several contract rejections in the following years.3
Such militant action troubles the predominant image of a satisfied and deeply
conservative buildings trades sector, but it also points to some of the fault lines within the
rebellion: only two years earlier, plumber business managers led their rank-and-file out on a
multi-week strike against civil rights hirings.4 While this strike was neither as vehemently racist
nor self-organized as hate strikes in the United Auto Workers, plumbers helped defend the
racially exclusionary nature of their union on the grounds that civil rights hiring violated an
otherwise unbiased apprenticeship program.5 Black workers however complained bitterly of
exclusion, and many unions in the buildings trades were overwhelmingly white.6
By the late 1960s a broader environment of rebellion developed, with proliferation of
wildcat strikes and contract rejections in important sectors like transportation, logistics, and
3
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utilities. A statewide wildcat strike by Communications Workers of America (CWA) Local 1101
in the summer 1967 revealed the growing aggressiveness of New York’s workers and their
increasing concern with safety in a changing city. Long Island Railroad engineers used wildcats
and slowdowns in 1967 and 1968 to resist scheduling changes that would reduce their overtime
pay. In 1967, newly unionized taxi drivers wildcatted when their leaders were unable to achieve
an increase in their share of the fare. Even waiters, meter maids, and lifeguards organized their
own illegal walkouts. Meanwhile contract rejections also grew with tugboat operators, welfare
caseworkers, and firefighters rejecting contracts. Finally a diffuse dissatisfaction proliferated in
many workplaces, sometimes manifesting itself as absenteeism or short-lived strikes. Historians
have largely ignored these strikes or failed to place them in their broader context.7
New York’s localized labor militancy resonated nationally when postal workers,
emboldened by the struggles around them, engaged in massive wildcat strike against the federal
government. Spurred by the militancy of illegally striking public sector workers and the contract
gains of private sector unions, postal workers demanded increased wages and a respect befitting
the importance of their industry. Black civil rights claims merged with claims to economic
citizenship and wider demands to end the era of “collective begging.” 8 When New Yorkers
walked off the job, postal workers across the country followed them, leading to real collective
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bargaining rights and wage gains. Without New York City’s localized rank-and-file upheaval, it
is likely that the postal wildcat would not have happened.
In much smaller unions, rebellion was similarly fomented by a combination of
longstanding grievance and newfound combativeness. As one former driver described the union,
“[the union leadership] ran it with the company, and they ran it against the men,” and in both
1968 and 1970, the fuel oil drivers of Local 553 rejected their leadership’s contract
recommendations in boisterous meetings, which in the latter’s case also included physical
assaults on the long-time union president.9 Long-term oppositionists in the fuel oil drivers of IBT
Local 553 were finally able to make their presence felt because their workmates were inspired
and emboldened by strikes in the rest of the city. The 1968 strike produced a better contract but
the 1970 did not, though militants, primarily older drivers, picketed the leadership in hopes of
starting a wildcat. In spite of the prevalence of Teamster rank-and-file strikes and organizing,
there is relatively little historical examination of the union in New York City in the 1960s, and
these unions, in spite of sometimes scant archival resources, warrant much more examination.10
Black workers played a critical role in New York City’s rank-and-file rebellion.
Grievances especially as pertains racial discrimination were not necessarily new in New York
City’s labor movement, with a variety of challenges in decades prior, but the 1960s gave great
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energy to this fight.11 As noted above, black members of the TWU helped spur important strike
action, but organizers like Carnegie transformed what could otherwise have been a fleeting
moment of rebellion into a seven year challenge to the TWU’s leadership, advocating against
discrimination on behalf of black workers and attempting to unseat the union leadership. In 1969,
they sat across the table from the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, hosting the country’s
first gathering of militant, if not revolutionary, rank-and-file organizers.12
While the TWU’s Rank and File Committee for a Democratic Union is but one example
of black workers’ contributions, they represent one of the most highly organized and influential
groups in the period. In other industries, walkouts took place against discriminatory actions by
both bosses and the union, activity that tended to be autonomous from white rank-and-file
organizing. In other cases, black militancy did not translate into rank-and-file opposition. The
Taxi Drivers Union, prominently featured black workers’ contributions to the industry in its
publication and appointed several to its highest echelons, and there was no independent, black
rank-and-file movement, suggesting that the TDU’s attempts to integrate black members worked
to some degree.13
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Younger workers of all races contributed to the wave of upheaval. Young leftwing
activists from organizations like the International Socialists, the Progressive Labor Party, or
Students for a Democratic Society entered a variety of industries, from telephone and taxi to
social work and teaching. To varying degrees they made their programs and presence felt,
participating in strike actions and daily resistances, winning shop elections, producing
publications, or fomenting cross-union organizing. Because of their politicization and the élan
with which they entered labor organizing, their efforts are better documented and are
overrepresented in archival holdings.
More significantly, young workers who had not cut their teeth in activism and politics
entered the workplace, influenced by the diffuse anti-authoritarianism of the times as well as the
norms and values of working-class New York. Unlike their older workmates, the period’s
younger adults were raised in an era of economic optimism and growth, a reality that bolstered
their expectations and demands. Many sported mustaches, beards, and longer hair, rejecting the
straight-laced social conventions of their elders as well as the discipline of the workplace. While
scholars have brought some attention to these cultural changes within the working class,
Jefferson Cowie has primarily placed this shift in the early 1970s whereas it was already
prevalent in New York by the second half of the 1960s.14
In the Communication Workers of America Local 1101, the insurgent energy of the
young combined with the principled unionism of the old, producing a powerful, multi-year rankand-file movement. Telephone workers used wildcats to push for better contracts and force
workplace rule changes, but they also used union grievance procedures and small-scale sabotage
to tie up the company. In 1971, they would reject their local leadership and International
14
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leadership’s contract recommendations, and strike out on their own against the powerful New
York Telephone (NYT). In early 1972, they would return to work utterly defeated, in what one
former shop steward called, “the first major industrial strike in recent memory which has ended
in undeniable defeat for the labor movement.”15 For a short time however, CWA Local 1101 was
one of the most combative rank and files in the city, if not the nation, because of the way in
which diverse insurgent energies combined.
Localizing our view of the rank-and-file rebellion also allows us to see the degree to
which it shaped and was shaped by its political environment. Historians have described how
New York City Mayor John Lindsay was a focal point for white working class anger because of
his support of black civil rights aims. Lindsay, however, was no mere victim of white
resentment, doing much to build that political polarization in his many battles against municipal
unions. In early 1966, amidst the subway strike, Lindsay gave his mayoralty-defining “power
brokers” speech, denouncing organized labor as a force that held a gun to the city’s head.16
While the mayor tried to turn the strike to his advantage, its legacy among many working-class
New Yorkers was quite different. Immediately after the contentious strike was settled, storied
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labor leader Mike Quill died of a heart attack, and as one plumber summed up the whole affair,
“Lindsay killed Quill.”17
In 1968, during the rank-and-file sanitation strike, Lindsay fought tooth and nail against
the Uniformed Sanitationmen Association (USA), hoping to break the strike with the National
Guard and hailing his own recalcitrance as a stand “against illegality, against violence, against
extortion.”18 These same workers lamented the disrespect that came with their line of work,
especially being referred to as garbage men, and many believed that the mayor had little
understanding of the daily lives of working people. One USA shop steward, penned a letter of
thanks to Governor Rockefeller who could “understand the working man’s feelings more than
some people realize.”19
Historians of varying political persuasions have called attention to this political cleavage,
but none have sufficiently emphasized the degree to which Lindsay actively opposed the material
interests of white rank and filers.20 While he fought with members of major municipal unions
like the TWU or USA, Lindsay also opposed private sector workers, including taxi drivers who
wanted better enforcement of their monopoly on cruising and CWA members who demanded
that he enforce anti-scab laws. Such workplace-based political battles helped to shape the city’s
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social environment and workers’ beliefs and attitudes, demonstrating the workers were not acting
always against their material interests when they opposed racially liberal politicians.21
Such conflicts did sometimes undermine the labor movement. In 1969, the newly minted
Taxi Drivers Union (TDU), which was experiencing a diffuse rank-and-file upheaval, went to
war with the city’s growing livery cab industry. Livery cabs, often referred to derogatorily as
gypsies, emerged in response to the transportation and work needs of the city’s black and Latino
population, and livery cab fleet owner, Calvin Williams couched his enterprise in the language of
black liberation and empowerment: “Black Pearl Means Black Power.”22 The city’s role in
regulating cab service brought Mayor Lindsay into the fray, with the mayor siding with the
nascent livery industry.
Though the union hoped to build unity through the anti-livery campaign, it was unable to
exact wage gains for taxi drivers, enraging many when it created a lower payment tier for
younger drivers as well as deducting a dime from the drivers’ portion of each fare in order to
finance its various benefits programs. Explosive union meetings resulted in 1971 and 1972, and
in the aftermath of the former, the Taxi Rank and File Coalition emerged, putting forth a
powerful first year challenge to the Van Arsdale administration. Like other rank and filers, they
did not obtain immediate victory and their struggle transformed into a long-term organizing drive
that attracted little lasting commitment from their fellow drivers. Drivers remained divided in the
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early 1970s, with the new battling the old, the full-time against the part-time, the owner-drivers
against the fleet drivers, and the yellow cabs against gypsy cabs. Rather than a simple battle
between bosses and workers or between insurgents and insulated leaders, the taxi rank-and-file
struggle was a maelstrom, a model in miniature of the city’s multipolar social breakup.23
A variety of factors internal to particular industries and unions drove workers to take
dramatic action in the late 1960s. Many workers believed that elected representatives neither
understood nor sympathized with those they supposedly represented. In spite of their leaders’
commitment to reform liberalism, rank and filers condemned prominent union heads like Harry
Van Arsdale Jr., Albert Shanker, and Joseph Beirne. While some workers criticized the structural
nature of labor relations and how it brought employers and union representatives closer together,
in some instances there was much more explicit collusion. Corruption was both alleged and
proven in a variety of unions, leading some workers to believe that their unions were being run
against them for the financial benefit of both employers and union leaders. The lack of black and
Latino representation in the leadership strata of unions as well as complaints of unfair treatment
and racial stratification of the labor force also prompted some union members to push for
change. Relatedly, many workers challenged their union leaders as part of a broader effort to
create more democratic and representative organizations, which they would lead to increasing
union militancy in the face of employers as well as growing working-class power in society at
large.
In the aftermath of the rank-and-file rebellion, popular images of reactionary white,
working-class Americans prevailed. The most prominent was certainly the hard hat as national
symbol of a vengeful silent majority, but films like Joe and Taxi Driver, both of which were set
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in New York, also circulated widely and compounded this image. Luckily, recent scholarship has
enriched our understanding of political transformation in the 1970s, turning our attention to the
multitude of fissures that prompted the “fracture of the social,” doing much to trouble the simple
left-right or liberal-conservative narratives.24 My research argues that New York’s rebellious
workers did not easily fit into such labels. They took part in a wide variety of challenges to
established authority, and the turn to conservatism was neither ineluctable nor absolute, with the
politics they expressed often contradictory and inchoate.
Some workers at once sought ways to circumvent their unions, undermine bureaucratic
and corporate mechanisms that governed their working lives, and voiced support for Wallace’s
1968 presidential campaign. Wallace support was complicated, taking the form of a protest
sentiment for some, while for others, like the Law Enforcement Group, it was a full-scale
endorsement of backlash politics. Ultimately, the tumult of the rank-and-file rebellion saw
workers searching for political options to better their lives and increase their own power in
society, but they found themselves opposed by everyone including their own union leaders,
corporations, liberal politicians, and the press.
A similar anger animated the Hard Hat riots of 1970, as construction workers, some of
whom had taken part in significant contract rejections, denounced student protesters as upper
class elitists who did not appreciate the sacrifices working-class families had made in the
Vietnam War. While the postwar era saw rising standards of living and was sometimes portrayed
as a classless society, working-class life remained substantially separated both geographically
and socially from that of the country’s wealthy. Many workers in the 1960s and 1970s were
24
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afflicted with the blue collar blues and white collar woes as they faced the disjunction between
their life expectations and lived realities workers’ beliefs and attitudes could be contradictory,
misguided, or destructive, but they constituted a core around which actions revolved. Workers
wanted more than just more.
While the era was charged with powerful working-class challenges to established
authority, the legacy of the rebellion is primarily one of defeat. In the early phase of the strike
wave, workers were able to extract substantial gains from employers, though as Robert Brenner
has shown, many of these were catch up contracts. Militant action engendered more militancy,
but the tide began to turn in the 1970s. Small unions like Local 553 were unable to win the
strikes after their contract rejections, leaving militant rank and filers abandoned by many of their
coworkers. Even the largest and most powerful rank-and-file movements—TWU Local 100 and
CWA Local 1101—could not overcome the combination of union and employer recalcitrance,
hamstrung by legal battles and union-run votes or smashed by strikebreakers and automation.
Workers continued some of their internal battles but the number of strikes collapsed after 1972,
rising again only in 1975 during the fiscal crisis when rank and filers confronted the city’s
business elite in a lopsided battle, which saw the burden of austerity foisted on public sector
workers and working class communities across the city. The sense of defeat was palpable. As
one taxi rank-and-filer put it in the late 1970s: “Elections weren’t getting us anywhere, the
masses weren’t revolting, the industry was falling apart.”25 Workers’ struggles had hit a wall,
and few found a way forward.
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When workers efforts were defeated, whether in the aftermath of years of wildcat strikes
and challenges or much more short-lived upheaval, results were similar: rank and filers lost
confidence, disengaged from challenges, and focused on their own economic survival.
James Haughton captured the challenges of survival during a 1980 interview: “They totally cop
out. They just totally withdraw. They accept their alienation, so they live in sort of a cocoon,
somewhat isolated from reality, not paying too much attention to anything, as long as number
one is getting over.”26 But with earnings eaten away by rising prices and the threat of
unemployment growing across the whole of the country, the ‘getting over’ was often selfpreservation in the face of seemingly intractable problems. Importantly, such a turn inward also
meant a rejection or at least declining commitment to broad social horizons that undergirded both
New York’s social democratic polity and the labor movement more broadly. Thus the focus on
individual problems was neither crass individualism nor simply a turn to the right. Instead it was
a strategy of accommodation in the aftermath of failure. Such defeat-engendered norms led to a
decline in strikes and rank-and-file challenges, as workers lost confidence in their own ability to
shape their future.
In the aftermath, business elites led unprecedented attacks on working people,
accumulating equally unprecedented wealth. Organizations like the Business Roundtable “linked
up high-profile CEOs with a series of think tanks, academic studies, and outlets like Reader’s
Digest all aimed at [its] principle political adversary…the entirety of organized labor.”27 Spurred
by the era’s strikes and business’ declining reputation, the Roundtable would reach its greatest
strength in the late 1970s when it helped defeat a series of consumer protection as well as the
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Labor Law Reform Act of 1978. Politics played an important role in the business elite’s
counterattack, but so too did capital flight and globalization. As manufacturers relocated
production, they broke once powerful unions. While productivity in the United States has
increased massively since the 1970s, business have kept wages down, with the top quintile of
American society accounting for much of the income growth. The gap between the rich and the
poor has grown both nationally and globally, with recent estimates from Oxfam International
suggesting that 8 men control as much wealth as half of the world’s population. Nationally the
picture is similar, with the top 20 percent controlling 80 percent of the wealth.28
With Donald Trump’s ascendancy and the renewed interest in the figure of the white
working class during the 2016 presidential election, the political legacy of the rank-and-file
rebellion takes on renewed relevance. While it’s ironic that the man who best embodied the ethos
of the revanchist New York of the 1980s and 1990s has positioned himself as the champion of
working people, it should not be too surprising. As during the 1960s and 1970s, there is a deep
well of anger among working-class people today, and for the last 40 years their social standing
has deteriorated, with deunionization, growing personal debt, and the rise of a dual labor market
in many areas of the country. In the face of these changes, Trump cast himself as a political
outsider, criticizing the very policies that both Democrats and Republicans have championed to
the detriment of labor, including the North American Free Trade Agreement, deindustrialization,
and immigration rules that have a negative impact on non-college-educated American workers.
28
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Like Wallace before him, Trump wove racial invective into his populism, calling for a ban on
Muslim immigration and the mass deportation of immigrants that he respectively portrayed as
terrorists and murderous job stealers. Echoing John Lindsay, Democratic nominee Hillary
Clinton and some of her supporters ignored much of the economic reality behind the pro-Trump
sentiment, arguing that the bulk of his supporters were “deplorables…racist, sexist, homophobic,
xenophobic, Islamaphobic, you name it.”29 Though she apologized for the statement, her beliefs
are broadly representative of liberal elites and elitists in the country’s largest cities, an enduring
limousine liberalism that heaps invective on its social inferiors—who, like the barbarians of the
past, are unable to speak the language of the polis. More than 40 years later, working people in
the United States, unionized or not, find themselves drawn into battles whose outlines and
objectives are primarily to their own detriment.
For America’s working people, the picture seems quite bleak. Nationally, the labor
movement is declining rapidly, though New York City’s unionization rate has remained
relatively high. In 2016, the national unionization rate stood at 10.9 percent, and what remains of
the labor movement has been unable to prevent rising inequality. New York City and New York
State have remained exceptions to this deunionization trend because of the unionization rate in
the public sector as well as the tight relationship between those unions and the Democratic Party.
In the private sector, the unionization rate has hovered between 15 and 20 percent over the last
decades while the public sector boasts a 70 percent unionization rate. In fact, the same juridical
mechanisms that managed public sector rank-and-file rebels in the 1960s and 1970s still
29
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hamstring the bulk of New York City’s union members. When these workers strike, they face
firings, loss of pay, and reprisals against union dues collection.
While New York’s unionization rate is still high, as elsewhere in the country the number
of strikes has dropped significantly, and to date, the rank-and-file rebellion is the country’s last
strike wave. Some have argued that labor’s nationwide rout should be transformed into a waitand-see “fortress unionism,” while others argue that the impetus is on rank-and-file workers and
the unionized to begin new round of labor organizing.30 Though rank-and-file challenges to
leadership have never completely disappeared, they have not reemerged as a widespread and
powerful challenge, and they increasingly take place within a progressively small stratum of the
American labor force.
What of the future, then? Given that the challenges of the 21st century include rising
inequality in a world that is increasingly chaotic and unpredictable, beset by rising seas and
societal divisions that make the 1960s look quaint, the era of unity and social commitment seems
over. When asked where he found the strength to continue organizing, James Haughton
answered:
It’s not a question of strength, it’s a question of understanding. It’s
being aware of the nature of the problem. I didn’t create it. It’s like
all other problems out here, confronting the American people, and
they’re very formidable problems. It’s not only a question of
racism in the building trades, or any other industry, but, as a matter
of fact, the survival of the whole human race. Unless people
become conscious of it, aware of what is behind these
30
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developments–how they’ve taken place, how they have developed,
how they can be changed, you’re right—they could not only tire,
but they could flip out, because the thing has become so irrational
and so insane that people literally go crazy.31
In 2018, this is exactly where we find ourselves as a society and as a planet, and the stakes are as
serious as Haughton suggests. As of now, neither understanding nor solutions seem to be
forthcoming.
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